B. Whether an act falling under Article 7 (1) of the former National Security Act (amended by Act No. 4373 of May 31, 1991) requires the awareness of the purpose of objection (negative)

C. Whether the action of the above "B" violates Article 19 (Freedom of Support), Article 21 (Freedom of Press, Publication, Assembly and Formation), and Article 22 (Protection of Freedom of Literature and Artistic Arts, Copyright, etc.) of the Constitution (negative)

B. The crime of Article 7 (1) of the former National Security Act (amended by Act No. 4373 of May 31, 1991) is not a crime of purpose, and therefore, it is not necessary to establish an awareness of the fact that the act is a pro-enemy, rubber, concert, or pro-enemy, and it is not a crime of purpose, and therefore there is awareness of the fact that the act is pro-enemy, rubber, aid,

C. The defendant's action in the above "B" cannot be deemed to be in violation of Articles 19 (Free Deliberation), 21 (Freedom of Press, Publication, Assembly and Formation), and 22 (Protection of Freedom of Literature and Artistic Arts and Copyright, etc.) of the Constitution. Such guarantee of the Constitution cannot be deemed as unlimited, and the defendant's above action must be deemed to exceed the limit of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.

The number of days under detention after an appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

As to the violation of the National Security Act

Although Articles 7 and 14 of the National Security Act, which are applied by the court below to the defendant, was amended and promulgated by Act No. 4373 of May 31, 191, it is identical to the theory that Article 7 and Article 14 of the National Security Act, which are applied to the defendant, was enforced from the date of its promulgation, but it is subject to the previous provisions in the application of penal provisions as to the act before its enforcement. Thus, even if the National Security Act was amended after the judgment of the court below, and the above provision of Article 14 of the National Security Act is revised in favor of the defendant, and the provision of the above Article 14 of the National Security Act, which "a suspension of qualification may be imposed concurrently" is revised or changed after the judgment of the court below, it cannot be said that there is a abolition or change of punishment after the judgment of the court below is made. Therefore, the legitimacy of

The reason why North Korea constitutes an anti-government organization under the National Security Act is the consistent view of the party members (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do646, Jun. 8, 1990; 90Do1586, Sept. 25, 199; 90Do2607, Feb. 8, 1991; 90Do2607, Feb. 8, 199). The court below applied Article 7(5) and (1) of the National Security Act to the defendant, which recognized that the defendant produced expressive materials for the purpose of doing the act under Article 7(1) of the National Security Act (the act of acting in concert with the activities of an anti-government organization). Thus, the issue of whether the defendant was a pro-government organization or not

The crime of Article 7 (1) of the National Security Act is not a crime of purpose, and it does not necessarily require that an actor has an awareness of the fact that praises, rubbers, concerts, or is likely to benefit therefrom (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 81Do145, Dec. 27, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 86Do1499, Sept. 23, 1986; 86Do1499, Sept. 23, 1986; 86Do1499, etc.). When the defendant produced a new wall for the purpose of engaging in an act of Article 7 (1) of the National Security Act, which acts in concert with the activities of an anti-government organization or its members, the elements of Article 7 (5) and (1) of the National Security Act are satisfied. Since the court below was punished by the crime of Article 7 (1) above, it does not affect the outcome of the instant case.

In addition, it cannot be said that the action of the defendant by taking such action violates the provisions of Articles 19 (Freedom of Support), 21 (Freedom of Press, Publication, Assembly and Formation), and 22 (Protection of Freedom and Copyright, etc. of Academic Arts) of the Constitution. Such guarantee of the Constitution cannot be deemed unlimited, and the act of the defendant as stated in its reasoning is deemed to exceed the limit of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do1586, Sept. 25, 1990).

Therefore, we cannot accept the argument of the argument of the argument of the theory of objection from the opposite point of view, and there is no reason for the argument.

As to the violation of the Trade Dispute Mediation Act

In light of the reasoning of the judgment below and the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, we affirm this part of the court below's finding of facts, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence.

The preparation of evidence and the recognition of facts are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the fact-finding court unless they violate the rules of experience and logic. The court below adopted the witness Kim Dae-dae, Han-nam, the testimony of the party in the first instance, or the testimony of the prosecutor or the preparation of the project police officer, and it cannot be said that the defendant's defense counsel's testimony and the fact-finding conducted without adopting the above rules of evidence. If the facts are recognized by the court below, it cannot be said that the judgment of the court below that applied Articles 45-2 and 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Mediation Act to the defendant cannot be said to be unlawful.

Therefore, this paper is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and part of the number of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)