[2] Criteria for determining whether the content of the report, which is the ground for excluding illegality, in the act of defamation of the media, is "any reasonable ground to believe that it is true"

[3] Whether a civil defamation is established not only by an expression that expresses a fact but also by an expression that expresses an opinion or comment (affirmative with qualification)

[2] In cases of defamation via a report of the media, whether an actor has any reasonable ground to believe the content of the report is true or not shall be determined in light of the fact that the actor has conducted an adequate and adequate investigation to verify the authenticity of the report, in full view of various circumstances, such as the content of the alleged fact, the grounds for believing that the report is true and credibility, the easiness of factual verification, the degree of damage to the victim caused by the report, etc., and whether the authenticity is supported by objective and reasonable materials or grounds.

[3] In a case where an expression of opinion or comment as well as an expression of opinion or comment that expresses the facts that constitute the premise at the same time, if the expression of opinion or comment is implicitly indicated, defamation under the civil law may be established.

1. As to the defendant's appeal

A. As to the first, second, and fourth points

In a case where the press media, such as a newspaper, carried a news article about a specific person, whether the news article impairs a specific person’s reputation or not shall be determined on the basis of its determination, comprehensively taking into account the overall flow of the article, the ordinary meaning of the used words, the connection method of phrases, etc., on the basis of the objective contents of the article, as well as the ordinary method in which the general readers contact an article (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da38032, Oct. 28, 1997).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below determined that the defendant's 4th anniversary of the fact-finding of the defendant's 3th anniversary of his issuance on April 1, 1997, "No 20,000 military co-operations" was threatened with non-discriminations on the basis of the order of martial law promulgated under the command of the President only for the 4th and 3th century." It is presumed that at least 20,00 were killed during the 4th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the fact-finding of Jeju-do's election, the court below erred in the law of 94th anniversary of the fact-finding's violation of the law by misunderstanding the legal principles of free evaluation of the press reports and the records of "No 94th anniversary of the fact-finding's violation of the law of free evaluation of the 4th anniversary of the fact-finding of the defendant's 3th anniversary of the fact-finding of the above 194th anniversary of the fact-finding."

B. On the third ground for appeal

In cases of defamation through a report on the media, whether an actor has any reasonable ground to believe the content of the report is true or not shall be determined in light of the following: (a) whether the actor has conducted an adequate and adequate investigation to verify the authenticity of the report by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as the content of the alleged fact, the grounds for believing that the report is true, the certainty and credibility of the material, the easiness of verifying the fact, and the degree of damage to the victim caused by the report; and (b) whether the authenticity of the report is supported by objective and reasonable material or evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da24624, Oct. 27, 1998).

In the same purport, we agree with the judgment of the court below that the defendant did not seem to have any reasonable ground to believe the content of the article as true, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to the illegality of defamation. The grounds of appeal on this point are not acceptable.

2. As to the plaintiff's incidental appeal

If an expression of opinion or comment, as well as an expression of opinion or comment, expresses a fact that constitutes the premise at the same time, such expression can constitute defamation under the civil law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da31356, Feb. 9, 199). Thus, the lower court’s determination that the expression of opinion or opinion alone does not constitute defamation is erroneous.

However, according to the records, the part concerning the illegality of martial law among the articles of this case published by the defendant was established on November 24, 1949, and according to the documents relating to the declaration of martial law in Jeju-do, which was recently established in the records keeping office of the government documents under the jurisdiction of the general secretary, this right is found to have declared the martial law of this case on November 17, 1948, before the enactment of the Martial Law, through the resolution of the State Council. Accordingly, it is not clear that the martial law of this case was illegally declared by the right of transfer without legal basis. Thus, it is not clear that the defendant expressed his opinion that it is unlawful, that is, the basis to regard it as being the basis of its opinion, and therefore, it does not constitute an act of damaging other person's reputation as a pure opinion, and that the part concerning the article of this case declared by the defendant does not constitute an "an article of this case" as well as the entire article of this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the part of the article of this case where martial law is illegal does not constitute defamation is just in its conclusion despite the above error. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to factual acts and defamation, violation of the logical rule, violation of the reasoning of law, incomplete deliberation, etc. As otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, we cannot accept all the grounds of incidental appeal by the plaintiff.

3. Therefore, the defendant's appeal and the plaintiff's incidental appeal are all dismissed, and the costs of appeal and the incidental appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)