Recognizing that the defendant's seal, signature or unmanned fact exists, but it is admissible as evidence of the protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor disputing the contents of the statement

A suspect interrogation protocol prepared by a public prosecutor who is the original person making the protocol, signed or sealed facts, shall be presumed to have been recorded according to the contents of the statement, unless there are circumstances to deem that the inter-conscepter, signature or unmanned was made without going through the procedures prescribed in Article 244(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, even if the defendant asserts that the contents of the statement recorded in the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the public prosecutor are different from those of his/her own statement in the court court, the formal authenticity of the protocol is recognized by recognizing the existence of inter-conscept, signature or unmanned, and on the other hand, if no circumstance exists to deem that the inter-conscepter, signature or unmanned was made without going through the procedures prescribed in the above Criminal Procedure Act, the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by

Articles 244(2), 244(3), and 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 84Do748 delivered on June 26, 1984 (Gong1984, 1378) 86Do218 delivered on March 25, 1986 (Gong1986, 738) 92Do769 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong192, 2318)

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendants

Attorneys Lee Byung-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Gwangju High Court Decision 92No170 delivered on June 4, 1993

All appeals are dismissed.

The Defendants’ grounds of appeal Nos. 1 through 3 and 1 and 2 as well as the grounds of appeal No. 1 to No. 3 of the Defense Counsel.

1. An interrogation protocol prepared by a public prosecutor, where the defendant who is the original person making the protocol, signed or sealed, shall be presumed to have been recorded as the content of the statement made by the original person, barring any circumstance where it is deemed that the inter-concepter and signature, and the secretary did not go through the procedure under Article 244(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, even if the defendant asserts that the contents of the statement recorded in the interrogation protocol prepared by the public prosecutor are different from the contents of his/her statement in the court room, the formal authenticity of the protocol is recognized by recognizing the existence of the inter-conception, signature or seal, and if no circumstance exists to deem that the inter-concepter, signature or seal was made without going through the procedure under the Criminal Procedure Act, the protocol protocol prepared by the public prosecutor may be deemed to have been authentic by the statement made by the original person on the date of trial (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Do748, Jun. 26, 1984; 86Do2186).

Upon review of the record, Defendant 2 made a statement as a witness at the sixth trial day of the court below and made a statement to the effect that he accepts the fact that each interrogation protocol of Defendant 2 prepared by the public prosecutor was affixed with the seal, signature and seal, etc., and further, since the defendant interrogation statement at the time of the first and second trial day of the court below acknowledged the fact that he read the above protocol and signed and sealed it, it is recognized that the authenticity of the above protocol is established. On the other hand, there is no circumstance to see that Defendant 2 was done without going through the procedure under the above Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, the court below acknowledged the authenticity of the above protocol. In addition, in light of the various circumstances indicated in the record, such as the form and content of the above protocol, the academic background, career, intelligence, etc. of the person who made the statement, it cannot be deemed that the statement of Defendant 2 recorded in the above protocol was made at will, and therefore, the court below's admission of each of the above evidence in the protocol employed by the court below does not err in the misapprehension of legal principles or the admissibility of evidence.

2. Reviewing the employment evidence of the first instance court as cited by the lower court and each protocol of examination of suspect suspect as to Defendant 2 prepared by the prosecutor in comparison with the records, all of the crimes against the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bribery) and the crime of offering of a bribe as to Defendant 2 can be fully recognized, and each judgment of the lower court which found Defendant 2 guilty shall not be erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the admissibility of evidence, the hearing truth, and the statement of

3. All of the appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)