[1] Whether admissibility of evidence can be acknowledged in a case where the defendant, who is the original person making the original statement, contests the contents of the statement when recognizing the fact that the suspect's interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor, signed or sealed (affirmative with qualification)

[2] In a case where a suspect interrogation protocol of another person prepared by the prosecutor is acknowledged as constituted by the testimony of the person making the original statement, and where the co-defendant recognized the suspect interrogation protocol of the co-defendant prepared by the prosecutor, whether it is admissible as evidence of each protocol (affirmative)

[1] An interrogation protocol prepared by a public prosecutor, which recognizes that the defendant, who is the original person, signed or sealed, is presumed to have been recorded as the content of the statement, unless there is any circumstance to deem that the inter-concepter, signature or unmanned was made without going through the procedure under Article 244(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, even if the defendant asserts that the contents of the statement recorded in the interrogation protocol prepared by the public prosecutor are different from those of his/her own statement in the court court, the formal authenticity of the protocol is recognized by recognizing the existence of the inter-concepter, signature or unmanned. On the other hand, if there is no circumstance to deem that the protocol was made without going through the procedure under the above legal provision, it can be deemed that the authenticity of the protocol is recognized by the statement made by the original person on the date of trial.

[2] In a case where the protocol of interrogation of another person as to the public prosecutor's protocol of interrogation is acknowledged by testimony at the court of the person making the original statement, and the protocol of interrogation of a suspect as to the co-defendant as to the public prosecutor's protocol of interrogation is acknowledged and the co-defendant's protocol of interrogation is admitted in court

[1] Articles 307 and 244 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 84Do748 delivered on June 26, 1984 (Gong1984, 1378), Supreme Court Decision 86Do218 delivered on March 25, 1986 (Gong1986, 738), Supreme Court Decision 92Do769 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong1992, 2318), Supreme Court Decision 93Do1747 delivered on January 25, 1994 (Gong194, 859) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Do314 delivered on April 23, 1991 (Gong191, 1561), Supreme Court Decision 95Do2930 delivered on March 8, 1996 (Gong19309, Nov. 196, 199)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Kim Jong-hwan et al.

Ulsan District Court Decision 2000No69 decided May 26, 2000

The appeal is dismissed. 60 days out of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the penalty of the original judgment.

1. An interrogation protocol prepared by a public prosecutor, which recognizes that the defendant, who is the original person making the original statement, signed or sealed, is presumed to have been recorded as the content of the statement, unless there is any circumstance to deem that the inter-contest, signature or unmanned was made without going through the procedure under Article 244(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, even if the defendant asserts that the contents of the statement recorded in the interrogation protocol prepared by the public prosecutor in the court room are different from those of his/her own statement, the formal authenticity of the protocol is recognized by recognizing the existence of the inter-contest, name, and unmanned. On the other hand, if there is no circumstance to deem that the protocol was made without going through the procedure under the above legal provision, it can be deemed that the authenticity of its formation is recognized by the statement made by the original person on the date of trial (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do1747, Jan. 25, 199).

In addition, in a case where the protocol of interrogation of another person as to the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor is recognized by testimony at the court of the original person, and the protocol of interrogation of a suspect as to the defendant jointly prepared by the public prosecutor is established and discretionary in the court of law, the protocol is admissible as evidence for the charges of the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Do314, Apr. 23, 1991; 95Do2930, Mar. 8, 1996).

2. In this case, the court below determined that the defendant's criminal facts are acknowledged by comprehensively examining the evidence and the evidence adopted by the first instance court after considering the following facts: (a) among the evidence adopted by the court of first instance, the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor as to the interrogation of the suspect's interrogation of the first instance court as co-offenders; (b) it stated that the person making the protocol was signed or sealed; and (c) the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor as co-offenders at the time of the prosecutor's investigation; and (d) the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor as to the suspect's interrogation of the first instance court as co-offenders at the time of the prosecutor's investigation; and (e) the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor as co-offenders at the time of the prosecutor's investigation was presumed to have been recorded as the content of the statement; and (e) the protocol prepared by the public prosecutor as to which the formal authenticity is established is presumed to have been recorded as the content of each protocol,

In light of the above legal principles, the judgment of the court below is justified, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of relevant legal principles or in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the admissibility of evidence and the power of evidence.

We cannot accept the arguments in the grounds of appeal.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and 60 days of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the punishment of the original judgment. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)