(a) The meaning of possession of goods and the criteria for continuous judgment on the transfer and continuation of possession of forest land

(b) Whether it is deemed that there was possession and delivery of the whole forest land in cases where the forest is purchased and the registration of transfer of all the forest land is completed;

(c) In the case of real estate sale, if the seller is the same as the titleholder on the registry, whether there is any negligence on the purchaser who believe that the entry on the registry is valid;

A. The possession of a thing refers to the objective relationship that appears to be in a person's factual control under the social concept, and is in de facto control, it does not necessarily mean only physical and practical control over the thing, but should be determined in accordance with the social concept in consideration of the time, spatial relationship with the thing, principal right relationship, possibility of excluding others' control, etc. In particular, the transfer of possession of forest land or the continuation of possession is not necessarily required to be physical and realistic, but should be deemed to have taken delivery when there is transfer of management or use. If ownership of forest land is transferred, it is the ordinary form in the transaction to exercise the control over it, and the continuation of possession is presumed to have been presumed.

B. If the forest is purchased and the registration of transfer of all the forest is completed, it is reasonable to deem that there was delivery and possession of all the forest land, barring any special circumstance.

C. In principle, a person who purchases real estate shall inquire of the seller whether he/she has the right to dispose of the real estate, and if the seller could have known that he/she would have been an unentitled person if he/she had known that he/she had been the unentitled person, he/she shall be deemed to have been negligent. However, if the seller is the same person as the owner on the registry, if there is room to suspect the seller's ownership due to the registry or other circumstances, it shall not be deemed that the purchaser was negligent, unless there

(b)Article 192(c) of the Civil Code;

A. Supreme Court Decision 73Da923 delivered on July 16, 1974 (Gong1974, 807), 78Da192 delivered on November 14, 1978 (Gong1981, 14373) (Gong1983 delivered on September 22, 1981). Supreme Court Decision 80Da3198 delivered on March 8, 1983 (Gong1983, 646) (Gong1985, 1108), 91Da1172 delivered on February 14, 192 (Gong192, 105)

Seoul District Court Decision 200Na14888 delivered on August 1, 200

Attorney Lee Dong-sung, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Daegu High Court Decision 90Na5987 delivered on September 12, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The cooking of evidence and finding of facts belong to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless they exceed the limit of the rules of evidence, and in light of the records, the court below's fact-finding is acceptable, and the facts-finding by the court below is not unlawful since the facts-finding by the court below violated the rules of evidence, and it is not erroneous in the incomplete hearing, the contradiction of reasons or the lack of reasons, and there is no error of law that the parties did not assert. Furthermore,

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Law Firm Daegu General Law Office, Attorney Seoyang-yang

A. The court below acknowledged that the non-party 1 had decided to return the plaintiff's temple to the non-party 2 at the time of the non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 8's non-party 8's non-party 5's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 1's

In addition, the above fact-finding by the court below cannot be said to have gone through the determination of circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be said that such fact-finding by the court below is against the defendant's assertion, even after examining the contents of the deceased forest private expenses (Evidence No. 4-1), the Song-chul (Evidence No. 4-2), and the auditor's plaque (Evidence No. 4-3) related to the restoration of the divided forest and fields.

B. The court below's disposition that recognized Defendant 2's possession of the forest of this case as non-performance of negligence as follows is just and acceptable, and in light of the fact that Defendant 2 was the owner at the time of acquiring the forest of this case at the time of acquiring the forest of this case, it cannot be said that Defendant 2's possession of the forest of this case is not an autonomous possession, on the ground that there was no permission from the competent Minister for the disposal of the temple property of this case at the time of acquiring the forest of this case, and the precedent of the theory of lawsuit (Law No. 78Da449 delivered on July 25, 197) is not appropriate in this case.

C. The issue is without merit, which argues that there is a misapprehension of the legal principles as to the prescription for acquisition of real estate in the judgment of the court below, based on the facts established by the court below, or based on the facts different from the facts.

3. As to the grounds of appeal by attorneys Lee Jong-sung and Red leaps

A. As acknowledged by the court below, the forest land, which was awarded by Nonparty 1 prior to the division under the name of the Maritime Research Institute established in the name of the foundation, and was divided as part of the necessary part for the plaintiff's temple due to the negotiation and compromise with the chief of the plaintiff's temple, the new Do council and the defendant's association, shall complete the ownership transfer registration under the name of the plaintiff's temple - The forest land in this case is transferred to the defendant's association - the defendant association - the defendant association - the defendant association 2 when the ownership transfer registration is completed under the name of the defendant association, and the defendant 2 purchased the forest in this case from the defendant association to take possession of the forest in this case when the ownership transfer registration is made on April 21, 1976, and thus, it is true that the court below's fact-finding is acceptable, in light of the fact that the defendant 2 transferred the ownership transfer registration under the name of the plaintiff's association - the right to purchase the forest in this case to the plaintiff association 1 and the plaintiff 2.

The issue is that Defendant 2 did not continue to maintain the state of exclusive control over the forest of this case to an extent objectively clear, and Defendant 2's continued possession is denied for the period from April 21, 1976 to 10 years. However, the possession of the forest of this case refers to the objective relationship deemed to be in a person's factual control under the social concept, and the possession of the object is not necessarily a mere physical and real control, but a decision should be made in accordance with the social concept, taking into account the time and space relationship with the object, the possibility of excluding others from the management of the forest of this case. In particular, the transfer of possession or the continuation of possession of forest of this case does not necessarily require physical and real control, and the transfer of management or use of forest of this case is not necessarily required, and if ownership of the forest of this case is transferred, it is presumed that the possession of the forest of this case is a normal form in trade, and it is presumed that the possession of the forest of this case is also a continuous possession.

In addition, since the forest of this case has a passage to the plaintiff temple, the possession of the defendant 2 cannot be excluded, and the possession between the plaintiff temple and the defendant 2 cannot be deemed concurrent.

The argument of the theory that the plaintiff temple continued to possess the forest of this case without delivering the forest of this case is not accepted by the court below, and therefore, it cannot be said that there was no error of law such as the reasoning and inconsistent reasoning or lack of reasoning in the reasoning of this part of the court below.

B. In a case where Defendant 2 purchased the forest of this case and completed the registration of transfer of all the forest of this case, it is reasonable to deem that there was delivery and possession of all the forest of this case, barring any special circumstance, and it cannot be said that Defendant 2 lost possession of part of the forest of this case on the ground that there was a circumstance such as the theory of lawsuit on part of the forest of this case.

C. In principle, a person who purchases real estate should consider whether the seller has the right to dispose of the real estate to the seller, and if the seller could have known that he/she was an unentitled person if he/she had known that he/she was the unentitled person, he/she shall be deemed to have been negligent. However, if the seller is the same as the nominal person on the registry, if there is room to suspect the seller's ownership due to the registry or other circumstances, it cannot be said that there is negligence on the part of the purchaser who believed that

Therefore, if the facts are as determined by the court below, it is difficult to view in this case that Defendant 2 was negligent in starting possession by purchasing and purchasing the registration of the Defendant Union, which is the nominal owner on the registry of the forest of this case. The forest of this case had already been registered in the name of the Maritime Institute in February 10, 1956, and Nonparty 1 had already acquired it by auction in the compulsory auction procedure at the request of the Maritime Bank, and the registration of the name of the Defendant Association was not against the intent of the Plaintiff Inspection.

D. In addition, since the non-party 3 occupied and managed the forest of this case on behalf of the defendant 2 by using the forest of this case as a female breeding farm, the possessor's bona fide negligence should be determined on the basis of the possession of the above non-party 3. However, this is the case after the defendant 2 took over the forest of this case, and the court below did not recognize that the above non-party 3 occupied the forest of this case from the time when the defendant 2 purchased the forest of this case. Thus, the court below did not err in incomplete deliberation or incomplete reasoning because the court below acknowledged the non-party 2's negligence.

The paper argues that the lower court's exclusive right is unlawful, and there is no reason to believe that the lower court erred by misapprehending the facts acknowledged by the lower court.

4. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)