(a) The nature of the crime of forging a private document where the seal of the person under whose name the document was duly formed states the content by a person not authorized, or where the content exceeds his/her authority is stated (affirmative);

B. Whether the Defendant’s assertion that the person preparing the document grants the right to prepare the document or that the document should be presumed as such constitutes a statement as to the legal grounds for the denial of the formation of crime (negative)

B. Whether the omission of judgment on the above statement affects the conclusion of judgment in a case where a statement on the grounds for the exclusion of the establishment of crime constitutes a statement on the legal grounds for the exclusion of crime, but the establishment of crime is not avoided even if such grounds exist (negative)

(d) The number of crimes where a witness who has taken an oath makes a false representation on the same date (=comprehensive 1)

E. Whether it would impair the identity of the facts charged to add the remainder in the appellate court after instituting a public prosecution on a part of the facts constituting a crime of perjury, which is related to a comprehensive one crime (negative)

(a) Even if the seal affixed by the title holder is a private document duly formed, if a person without legitimate authority to enter the content enters the content, or a delegated person prepares a private document contrary to the intent of the seal holder by stating the content in excess of his/her authority, the crime of forging the private document is established.

B. The Defendant’s assertion that the preparing titleholder granted the authority to prepare documents or should be presumed as such is nothing more than the intent of denying the crime, and is not a statement concerning the grounds for denying the establishment of a crime under the law, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the lower court committed an unlawful act of evading judgment on the ground that the lower court did not render a judgment on the above assertion.

C. The assertion that the Defendant’s act of preparing and using documents by the person in whose name the statement was prepared constitutes a statement on the grounds that the establishment of a crime was excluded by law, and thus, the lower court should have determined the judgment, but if it did not constitute a legitimate act that does not violate the social rules even if there were such grounds as alleged in the above, the illegality of the omission of the judgment does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

(d) If a witness who has taken an oath once with respect to one case makes a false notarial act contrary to his memory on the same day, this constitutes a single perjury, which consists of continuing to make a false notarial act by one criminal intent.

E. Since res judicata as to a part of the crime of perjury, which is a comprehensive crime of one offense, is limited to other parts that are not subject to adjudication in reality, it cannot be deemed that the identity of the facts charged is harmed by adding the remaining parts in the appellate court after the prosecution was instituted on certain criminal facts.

A. Article 231(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Article 323(2)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act is Article 152(1)(d) of the Criminal Act. Article 37 of the Criminal Act is Article 298 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Do2023 delivered on October 12, 1982 (Gong1982, 1125) 83Do2408 delivered on June 12, 1984 (Gong1984, 1237) (Gong1984, 1237) 91Do2815 delivered on March 31, 1992 (Gong190, 825). Supreme Court Decision 89Do1212 delivered on February 23, 1992 (Gong190, 825) 92Do498 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong193, 312), Supreme Court Decision 87Do101, 87Do92 delivered on July 21, 1987 (Gong1987, 194, 1935).

A

Defendant

Attorney B and one other

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 91No7494 delivered on July 7, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

1. We examine the Defendant’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 1.

Even if the seal affixed by the person signing a private document is a duly formed private document, in cases where a person who has no legitimate authority to enter the content thereof, enters the content thereof, or a person to whom the authority was delegated, and enters the content in excess of the authority and prepares a private document contrary to the intention of the person signing the document, the crime of forging the private document is established (see each of the Supreme Court Decisions 82Do2023, Oct. 12, 1982; 91Do2815, Mar. 31, 1992).

According to the facts duly established by the court below, if Non-Indicted C did not pay the amount at the time of original adjudication by June 5, 1989 to Non-Indicted D, etc. on April 20, 1989, he agreed to change the name of the instant age club in the future, such as the above D, and affixed his seal thereon, and delivered it to the letter of transfer and takeover in blank, for which no specified matters are stated, and the defendant agreed to keep the above documents until June 3, 199 of the same year from the above D, and although he was delivered the above documents until June 5, 199 of the same year, on May 6 of the same year, the above documents stated that C transferred the above age club to the defendant as of the 1st of the same month. Accordingly, without being delegated with the authority to write the above contents, the defendant's act constitutes a crime of forging a private document in the above name against the will of the person preparing it.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the forgery of private documents, such as the theory of lawsuit.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

Examining the evidence of employment of the first instance court cited by the court below, we affirm the measures of the court below that recognized the facts constituting the crimes of paragraphs 3 and 4 at the time of the first instance trial against the defendant, and there is no error of law of misunderstanding of facts due to a mistake of facts by violating the rules of evidence

In addition, the Defendant’s assertion that Nonindicted Party C granted the right to prepare a report on discontinuance of business at the time of the first trial as cited by the lower court, or that it should be presumed as such, is nothing more than the intent of denying a crime and is not a statement as to the legal grounds for denying the establishment of a crime. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the lower court committed an unlawful act of evading judgment on the ground that the lower court did not make a judgment on

However, according to the records, although the defendant had the right to receive the instant age club transferred by Nonindicted Party C, it is obvious that the above C prepared and used a written report on closure of business in the name of the above C to preserve the above right, and the defendant's act of preparing and using the above written report on closure of business was a legitimate act that does not violate social norms. This assertion constitutes a statement on the grounds that the court below should have judged the establishment of a legal crime, and thus, the court below did not make any judgment. However, even if there were grounds as alleged by the above defendant, the act of preparing and using the written report on closure of business cannot be deemed as a justifiable act that does not violate social rules even if there were grounds as alleged by the above defendant. Thus, the illegality of the judgment of omission does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, it is not justified.

3. We examine the above grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4.

Since a change in indictment can be made in the appellate court is a party member's opinion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Do101, 87Do92, Jul. 21, 1987; 89Do225, Feb. 9, 190). Thus, there is no reason to object to the amendment.

In addition, a witness who has taken an oath once with respect to one of the facts at the same date shall be deemed to constitute one perjury, inclusive, as he/she conducts a false representation contrary to memory on the same date (see Supreme Court Decision 89Do1212, Feb. 23, 1990). Since res judicata with respect to a part of the facts constituting perjury, which is related to a comprehensive one offense, affects other parts that are not subject to adjudication in reality, res judicata with respect to a part of the facts constituting perjury, it cannot be deemed to impair the identity of the facts charged by adding the remaining parts at an appellate court after instituting a public prosecution against a certain facts constituting a crime (see Supreme Court Decision 87Do101, Jul. 21, 1987).

Therefore, the decision of the court below that permitted the prosecutor to change the indictment to add other perjury crimes related to one comprehensive crime at the time of one trial is just and there is no error of law in violation of the provisions of Article 298 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, such as the theory of lawsuit, and therefore there is no reason for this issue.

4. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 5.

The court below recognized the fact that the defendant made a false representation based on the evidence of employment in the court of first instance. In light of the records, the court below accepted the above fact-finding of the court below and there is no violation of law such as theory of lawsuit.

However, in the judgment of the court below, the part of the fact that the defendant, among the facts at the time of the judgment of the court below, lent to the above C the above age club acquisition fund and the operation fund of the above age club from May 1987 to February 1989, is merely 118,00,000 won, and a significant portion of the loan was paid, is not sufficient to be criticized as a violation of the rules of evidence or an incomplete hearing because there is only a vague statement of the above C and E, a partner of the above Dong, who is contrary to the interests of the defendant, and it is difficult to expect the objectivity of the statement, and it is difficult to expect the objectivity of the statement from the record. However, the part of the testimony that the defendant lent 38,00,000 won to the above C does not affect the conclusion of the judgment of the court

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.