A. The nature of the railroad site under the jurisdiction of the Korean Government of the Republic of Korea at a certain time and the acquisition of prescription therefor (negative)

B. Whether the interruption of extinctive prescription, which occurred by the disposition, can disappear in a case where the disposition of imposing indemnity is revoked (negative)

(a) Railroad land which had been under the jurisdiction of the Joseon General Government is a state-owned administrative property devolved to the Republic of Korea from the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 33 of the Military Affairs Act and Article 1 of the first Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America, and is a state-owned administrative property, and land owned by

B. As the interruption of extinctive prescription is a system that prevents the progress of extinctive prescription by reason of the fact that the non-exercise of the right, which serves as the basis of extinctive prescription, was established, the interruption of extinctive prescription that has already been established by the exercise of the right by the person who is entitled to collect indemnity pursuant to a notice of payment, does not disappear on the ground that such disposition was revoked (whether it is by the cancellation of litigation or by the revocation of ex officio)

[1] Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act, Article 245 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 168 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 86Nu725 delivered on April 14, 1987 (Gong1987, 791) (Gong1987, 791) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 85Nu686 delivered on July 8, 1986 (Gong1986, 108), Supreme Court Decision 87Nu298 delivered on February 27, 1990 (Gong1581), Supreme Court Decision 89Nu626 delivered on February 27, 199 (Gong190, 809)

Attorney Cho Jae-chul et al., Counsel for the non-party representative director of the Eastern Industry Promotion

The head of the Seoul Regional Railroad Office Kim Jong-soo, Kim Jin-ho

Seoul High Court Decision 94Gu4983 delivered on July 20, 1995

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

With respect to No. 1:

In accordance with the first agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America on the finance and property of the Republic of Korea, the railway site under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Joseon General at a certain time is state-owned administrative property devolved to the Republic of Korea under the military administration Act and Article 3 of the first agreement on the finance and property between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America. Since the land owned by the State as a railway site is state-owned administrative property, it shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu725, Apr. 14, 1987). The court below, based on the evidence established by the court below, was a railway site in Yongsan-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City ( Address omitted). The above land was owned by the State as a railroad site on July 25, 45.7, 195, when the defendant was negligent in managing the above property, and found it later and made a registration of ownership transfer in the future, it shall not be subject to statutory acquisition from the State-owned Land and the State Administration.

In addition, the part of the grounds of appeal that argues that the land of this case was implicitly abolished and thus subject to prescriptive acquisition is not a legitimate ground of appeal due to the assertion that it was only at the final appeal.

With respect to the second ground:

The court below's rejection of the plaintiff's assertion as to the establishment of customary legal superficies is justified in light of the relation of evidence as stated by the court below, and there is no error of incomplete hearing or mistake of facts as alleged in the ground of appeal.

With respect to the third point:

As long as the interruption of extinctive prescription is a system that preventss the progress of extinctive prescription on the ground that the fact that the non-exercise of the right, which serves as the basis of extinctive prescription, occurred, the effect of interrupting extinctive prescription that has already occurred by the exercise of the right by the person entitled to collect indemnity according to a notice of payment, was cancelled (whether it is by the cancellation of a lawsuit, or by the revocation of ex officio. See Supreme Court Decision 87Nu298, Sept. 8, 1987) (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 85Nu686, Jul. 8, 1986; 89Nu626, Feb. 27, 190).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, as of November 23, 1991, the defendant initially occupied and used the land of this case without permission from the non-party state from November 11, 1986 to December 31, 1990, and decided to reduce indemnity against the plaintiff from November 11, 1986 to March 17, 1992. The above disposition was revoked on the ground that the plaintiff did not comply with the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes in the lawsuit claiming the cancellation of the disposition for the imposition of indemnity, and the defendant again imposed indemnity against the plaintiff on the land of this case for the same period as of August 28, 1993. Accordingly, if the facts established by the court below are revoked by a final judgment, even if the first disposition for the imposition of indemnity was revoked by a final judgment, the suspension of the statute of limitations has the effect of suspension, and thus, the decision of the court below is justified in the misapprehension of legal principles as to indemnity from the expiration of prescription period until the expiration of prescription period of five years.

Therefore, all of the arguments in the grounds of appeal are without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Mar. 8, 1996

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)