A. The meaning of “collective action other than public service” prohibited by Article 66(1) of the State Public Officials Act

(b) The case holding that the act of collective withdrawal from office at the regular inquiry of the Minister's presence constitutes "collective act other than official duties" in paragraph (a) above

(c) Limits of discretion in taking disciplinary measures against public officials;

(d) The case holding that the disciplinary action of a public official who led to the collective retirement action referred to in the above "B" shall be deemed appropriate in the determination of the disciplinary action in the year of suspension from office;

(a) For the purpose of Article 66(1) of the State Public Officials Act, the term “collective act other than public service” means any act conducted by a public official for a specific purpose which damages the essence of public service, such as undermining the discipline of his duties or violating this part, and before the formation of an organization;

B. The case holding that the act of collective retirement at the regular inquiry of the Minister's presiding official constitutes "collective act other than public duties" in Paragraph (a) above, even though it was derived from the expression of an objection to the proposed reorganization of a construction administrative agency, since it is an act of a large number of persons detrimental to the nature of public duties, such as undermining the discipline of duties as a public official or violating this part of his duties.

C. A disciplinary action against a public official is a punishment imposed to maintain the order of public official relations in the event of a violation of duties or other misconduct of the public official in question, and to fulfill his duty as a public official. Thus, it is illegal to decide to impose a disciplinary action upon a person subject to disciplinary action who is a public official in question in the discretion of the person having authority to take disciplinary action. However, it is illegal only when the disciplinary action taken by the person having authority to take disciplinary action by exercising the authority to take disciplinary action has been deemed to have abused the discretionary power that has been left to the person having authority to take disciplinary action because it

D. The case holding that it is not recognized that a public official who has led to the collective retirement under the above "B" was subject to disciplinary action during one-month period of suspension from office due to the type of disciplinary action, and that it was deemed appropriate in the determination of the disciplinary action, and that he exceeded or abused the discretionary power.

(a)(d)Article 66(1)(c) of the State Public Officials Act; Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act;

A.B. (C) Supreme Court Decision 91Nu978 delivered on March 27, 1992 (Dong Branch). (B) Supreme Court Decision 91Nu9176 delivered on March 27, 1992 (Dong Branch). Supreme Court Decision 90Nu4839 delivered on April 23, 1991 (Gong1514 delivered on April 27, 1991). Supreme Court Decision 91Nu9152 delivered on March 27, 1992 (Dong Branch), Supreme Court Decision 91Nu9169 delivered on March 27, 1992 (Dong Branch). Supreme Court Decision 83Nu130 delivered on June 28, 1983 (Gong1983,1207), Supreme Court Decision 84Nu78359 delivered on October 8, 1985 (Gong19759 delivered on September 195, 1995).

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 et al.

The Minister of Construction and Transportation

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu3279 delivered on July 25, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below decided that the actual purpose of the meeting of the head of the competent division convened on August 18, 1990, which the plaintiff called on August 18, 1990, was to seek countermeasures against the reorganization of the building department. However, even if there was a complaint and objections between the employees with respect to the reorganization of the organization that had already been in progress on the secret interest before the competent division council, the court below did not err by reviewing the reasoning of the judgment below as follows: each office of August 18, 1990, each office of the competent division and the head of the competent division had discussed the response measures against the reorganization of the organization; after the majority of the participating members were gathered, the head of the competent division at the regular meeting of the head of the competent division and the head of the competent division, who was led by the plaintiff on August 20, 199, to express directly to the Minister's opinion about the reorganization of the organization; it did not constitute a violation of the rule of experience, even if it did not directly cause such a direct cause it, and it did not err.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

Article 66 (1) of the State Public Officials Act prohibits collective action other than public service. The term "collective action other than public service" refers to an act in a state that does not reach the formation stage of an organization for a specific purpose that undermines the essence of public service, such as undermining the discipline of duties or violating this part of official duties (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu4839 delivered on April 23, 191). Since the general meeting of the State Public Officials is an act that interferes with the nature of public service, such as undermining the discipline of public officials or violating this part of official duties, even though it was derived from the expression of opinion on the resolution on the reorganization of the construction administrative organization, it constitutes a collective action other than public service prohibited under Article 66 (1) of the State Public Officials Act, and even if the plaintiff's resolution on August 20, 1990 at the meeting of the competent chief commissioner led by the plaintiff and its method and resolution was adopted, the plaintiff did not directly inquire into the contents of the above collective action, and therefore, it is found that there was no unlawful for the plaintiff to directly withdraw the above employee.

3. We examine the third ground for appeal.

The disciplinary action against a public official is imposed to maintain the order in relation to the public official in the event of a violation of duties or other misconduct of the public official in question, and to fulfill his duty as a public official. Thus, it is reasonable to decide what kind of disciplinary action should be taken in the discretion of the person having authority to take disciplinary action in the event of a disciplinary action against a public official. However, it is illegal only when it is recognized that a disciplinary action taken by the person having authority to take disciplinary action significantly lacks validity under social norms and is abuse of discretionary power (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu5627, Feb. 12, 191; 84Nu735, Oct. 8, 1985).

Therefore, in light of the fact that the plaintiff's misconduct caused significant and significant social controversy, and the plaintiff's leading role in the above collective expulsion, etc., even if there are circumstances asserted by the plaintiff, the court below judged that the plaintiff's disciplinary action during the one-month period of suspension from office as a kind of disciplinary action against the plaintiff is appropriate in the determination of the disciplinary action, and that it is not recognized that the plaintiff exceeded or abused its discretionary power, in light of the above legal principles, it is correct in light of the above legal principles, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on the right of discretion such as the theory

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-dong (Presiding Justice) Kim Sang-ho (Presiding Justice)