The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the Defendant’s act is a legitimate expression of opinion that does not contravene the duty of political neutrality of public officials, and thus cannot be deemed as a “collective act with purposes other than official duties” under Article 58(1) of the former Local Public Officials Act, but the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case. In so doing,

2. In a case where the expression of opinion made by a judgment official collectively constitutes a specific political activity prohibited against a public official under the State Public Officials Act or other individual laws, such as the Public Official Election Act, or where it is deemed that an act that clearly expresses a specific political party or political force’s support or opposition to a certain political party or political force, which may cause a direct danger that may infringe on the public official’s political impartiality, such as an act that clearly expresses a political biased or political opinion, it is reasonable to deem that the act constitutes a “collective act for any purpose other than public service” as an act contrary to the public official’s intent, which constitutes an act contrary to the public interest and detrimental to the public interest, and thus, it constitutes a “collective act for any

In this context, it cannot be uniformly determined to the extent that any act may cause a direct danger that may infringe on political neutrality. In addition to the specificity of a public official position that requires political neutrality pursuant to the Constitution, it should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances related to the act in question, such as the motive or purpose of the act in question, the time and background thereof, the political and social background at the time of the act, the contents and method of the act, and the connection with

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Do6388 Decided April 19, 2012). The evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court is as follows.