A. Judicial effect of a contract which violates the duty to report under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory (=effective)

B. Whether a pre-sale contract for the purpose of speculation is a juristic act contrary to social order (negative)

C. Whether an agreement by which a seller bears a public charge is an unlawful condition or a juristic act contrary to social order is deemed to be a legal act (negative)

D. Requirements for establishing an unfair juristic act under Article 104 of the Civil Act

A. The provisions pertaining to the reported area under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory do not deny the judicial effect of the contract which belongs to the governing law and violates the duty to report.

B. The sales contract was concluded without completing the registration of ownership transfer for the purpose of evading the transfer income tax and speculation, and the sales contract alone cannot be deemed null and void as a juristic act contrary to social order.

C. Even if a sales contract entered into a special agreement that the buyer bears the responsibility for the public charges to be imposed on the seller, it is an agreement on whether the buyer takes the burden in the event of the imposition of the public charges, which itself cannot be deemed an illegal condition, and it is difficult to conclude that it goes against the social order.

D. The unfair legal act stipulated in Article 104 of the Civil Act is established when there exists an objective imbalance between payment and benefit in return, and a transaction which loses such balance subjectively is made through the use of brush, rashness, or inexperience of the victimized Party.

A. Article 21-7(b) of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory; Article 103(d) of the Civil Act; Article 104 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 92Da3311 delivered on December 24, 1992 (Gong1993,589), 92Da27874, 27881 delivered on December 24, 1992 (Gong1993,597), 92Da56575 delivered on March 9, 1993 (Gong1993,1159), 91Da5907 delivered on July 9, 1991 (Gong1991,2121), 92Da84 delivered on May 26, 192 (Gong192,207), 92Da2937 delivered on October 23, 1992 (Gong192,3299)

Plaintiff

Korea Customs Service workplace and four Defendants, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant and two others

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na65369 delivered on November 25, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

In this case, the fact that the purchase price is not KRW 3,326,00,00, which the court below acknowledged, but much of KRW 3,830,400,00, which is more unfavorable than that recognized by the court below, is a claim that is not favorable to the defendants, and thus, it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal that asserts illegality in the fact-finding on this point. Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

On the second ground for appeal

1. The provisions pertaining to the reported area under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory do not deny the judicial validity of the contract, which belongs to the governing laws and regulations and violates the duty to report (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da14218, Feb. 12, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Da27874, 27881, Dec. 24, 1992). The Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant Customs Service Housing Association without the registration of ownership transfer in the future, without the registration of ownership transfer in the way of avoiding the transfer income tax, and solely on the ground that it was conducted for speculation, such contract cannot be deemed null and void as a juristic act contrary to social order.

In addition, even if a special agreement was made to the effect that the Defendants are responsible for the public charges to be imposed on the Plaintiff in the instant sales contract, it cannot be deemed as an illegal condition in itself, and it is difficult to readily conclude that it is contrary to the social order with the same purport.

If the Defendants were to enter into a special agreement that the public charges imposed on the Plaintiff are responsible, the transfer income tax pursuant to the profit margin of this case shall be deemed to be borne by the Defendants, barring any special circumstances, barring any special circumstance, and thereafter, it cannot be interpreted that the Defendants agreed to bear the transfer income tax. The fine to be paid by the Plaintiff is a punishment for the Plaintiff’s crime and cannot be treated as the same as the public charges.

2. The unfair legal act stipulated in Article 104 of the Civil Act is established only when there exists an objective imbalance between payment and consideration, and a transaction which has lost such balance subjectively is done by using gambling, rashness, or inexperience in the affected party. Thus, if the facts are acknowledged by the court below, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to have entered into the contract of this case using the gambling, etc. of the defendants, and the special contract of this case cannot be deemed to have been concluded due to the defendants' gambling, rash, or inexperience, and therefore, the special contract of this case is not an unfair legal act.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below does not contain any error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on Article 103 (b) or Article 104 of the Civil Code, and there is no reason for discussion.

On the third ground for appeal

According to the rules of the defendant association (No. 4-1 to No. 3), the defendant association established with the purpose of constructing and supplying houses, raising and operating funds for such purpose, and conducting other necessary businesses in order to resolve the housing shortage of employees with no houses employed by each association member. Since the head of the association represents the association and supervises all the affairs of the association, the head of the association shall be deemed to have been delegated with the comprehensive authority for all juristic acts within the scope of the association unless the scope of representative authority is restricted. According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, when the defendant association purchases the building site from the plaintiff, the special agreement of this case was inevitable due to the occurrence of the date for approval of the business plan under the Housing Construction Promotion Act when it purchases the building site from the plaintiff, and the special agreement of this case was deemed the premise of the contract of this case. Thus, in light of the circumstances leading to the conclusion of the contract of this case and the special agreement of this case, it cannot be said that the president of the association does not act outside the scope of the association or exceed the scope of the representative authority. As a result, the plaintiff's tax evasion and its purpose.

Therefore, the lower court’s rejection of the Defendants’ assertion that the conclusion of the instant special agreement deviates from the scope of the right of representation and thus cannot be effective against the Defendant and association is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the right of representation, and the lower court’s determination appears to be based on the premise that the conclusion of the instant special agreement constitutes an act within the scope of the association’s purpose. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an error in the judgment of the lower court as to the omission of judgment, such as

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)