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(영문) 대법원 1998. 6. 23. 선고 98다14191 판결
[채무부존재확인][공1998.8.1.(63),1956]
Main Issues

[1] Where an insurer concludes an insurance contract in violation of the duty to specify and explain the terms of the insurance contract, whether the insurer can assert the contents of the insurance contract as the content of the insurance contract (negative)

[2] Whether the special terms and conditions for limited driving between the age of 26 and the age of 26 fall under Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act and thus invalid (negative)

[3] Whether Article 158 of the Insurance Business Act preferentially applies to Article 756 of the Civil Act (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] The insurer and the person engaged in the conclusion or solicitation of the insurance contract are obligated to specify and explain the important contents of the insurance contract, such as the content of the insurance contract, the system of insurance premium rates, and changes in the entries in the written subscription for the insurance contract, which are stipulated in the terms and conditions of the insurance contract. Therefore, when the insurer concludes the insurance contract in violation of such duty to specify and explain the terms and conditions of the insurance contract, the insurer may not claim the contents of the terms

[2] Although it is clear that the scope of the insurer's collateral is reduced and thus it is unfavorable to the policyholder, there is a benefit that the policyholder may not pay the premium discounted and discounted by incorporating the above special clause into the insurance contract. Whether the above special clause is incorporated into the insurance contract or not depends on the policyholder's will. Thus, it cannot be deemed null and void as it falls under Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act.

[3] Article 158 of the Insurance Business Act, which provides for the liability of an insurance company to which an employee belongs, shall be applied in preference to Article 756 of the Civil Act, which is a general provision on employer liability.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 638-3 of the Commercial Act, Article 3 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [2] Article 638-3 of the Commercial Act, Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [3] Article 158 of the Insurance Business Act, Article 756 of the Civil

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da31883 delivered on March 10, 1992 (Gong1992, 1284), Supreme Court Decision 94Da17970 delivered on October 14, 1994 (Gong1994, 2979), Supreme Court Decision 97Da4494 delivered on September 26, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 3277), Supreme Court Decision 97Da4725 delivered on April 10, 1998 (Gong198, 1283 delivered on May 22, 1998), Supreme Court Decision 98Da10816 delivered on May 29, 198 (Gong294, 197; Supreme Court Decision 97Da39409 delivered on April 27, 199) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Da194970 delivered on April 194, 1997

Plaintiff, Appellee

El District Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Lee Dong-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant

Defendant (Attorney White-il, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 97Na3768 delivered on February 4, 1998

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The insurer and the persons engaged in the conclusion or solicitation of the insurance contract are obligated to specify and explain the important contents of the insurance contract, such as the content of the insurance contract, the system of insurance premium rates, changes in the entries in the written subscription form, etc., which are contained in the terms and conditions of the insurance contract in conclusion of the insurance contract. Thus, when the insurer concludes the insurance contract in violation of the duty to specify and explain the terms and conditions of the insurance contract, it is not possible for the insurer to claim the contents of the contract as the content of the insurance contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da3183, Mar. 10, 1992; 98Da10816, May 22, 1998).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the non-party 1, the chief of the accounting division of the defendant 1's management, entered into a new insurance contract on behalf of the defendant 2 with the non-party 1, on November 18, 1995, on behalf of the non-party 2, who is a staff member of the plaintiff's office. However, the above non-party 2 entered into an insurance contract with the non-party 2, on the basis of new insurance premium calculation standards, with the non-party 2's age above 21, and the amount of the insurance premium if the non-party 2 entered into an insurance contract with the non-party 9's age limit above 26, the non-party 2 did not request the defendant to enter into the insurance contract with the non-party 1's age limit above as of the date of the accident, and the non-party 2 did not request the defendant to enter into the insurance contract with the non-party 1's insurance company's age limit above 9's age limit of insurance premium. Accordingly, the non-party 2's insurance policy.

In addition, the ground of appeal asserts that the driver's age 26 years or older of the case is in violation of Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act and is null and void, but this is only asserted in the final appeal without asserting it up to the original trial, and therefore, it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal. It is clear that the scope of security is reduced due to the above special terms and conditions, which is disadvantageous to the policyholder, but there is benefit to the policyholder from failing to pay the premium discounted and discounted by including the above special terms and conditions into the insurance contract, and whether or not to incorporate the above special terms and conditions into the insurance contract depends entirely on the policyholder's will. Thus, the above special terms and conditions cannot be deemed null and void in violation of Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, as alleged in the ground of appeal. All arguments

2. Article 158 of the Insurance Business Act, which provides for the liability of an insurance company to which an employee belongs, shall take precedence over Article 756 of the Civil Act, which is a general provision on employer liability, in a case where an employee of an insurance company causes damage to a policyholder in the course of soliciting insurance contracts (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da19617, Nov. 22, 1994; 94Da19600, Jul. 14, 1995).

However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the non-party 2, who is the employee in charge at the time of entering into the insurance contract of this case, clearly explained and explained the contents of the special terms and conditions to the non-party 1, the court below cannot be deemed to have been negligent in failing to explain the contents of the terms and conditions to the non-party 2. Meanwhile, in this case where the non-party 1 entered into the insurance contract after hearing a sufficient explanation of the special terms and conditions, even though the employee in charge delivered the insurance terms and conditions to the defendant somewhat late or did not have the defendant's signature affixed on the insurance contract, it cannot be deemed that the defendant suffered damages due to such negligence. In light of the records, the court below's above recognition and determination are just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles of causation or Article 158 of the Insurance Business Act as

We also cannot accept the issue.

3. In light of the records, the court below's rejection of the defendant's assertion of violation of the good faith principle is just and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. We cannot accept the argument.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Im-soo (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1998.2.4.선고 97나3768
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