A. Whether the revised rules of employment unfavorable to workers without their consent by means of collective decision-making (negative)

(b) Method of collective decision-making of workers required where the rules of employment are modified disadvantageous to workers;

C. Whether the revised rules of employment applies to a worker who accepted a working condition pursuant to the revised rules of employment and acquired a labor relationship where a revision to the rules of employment becomes null and void due to the worker’s consent (affirmative)

A. As a matter of principle, an employer may prepare and revise the rules of employment according to his/her intent, since he/she has the authority to prepare and revise the rules of employment. However, if the rules of employment were to be modified disadvantageously to an employee, consent is required by the collective decision-making method of the employee who was subject to the previous rules of employment or the rules of employment. Any modification of the rules of employment that did not obtain such

B. A collective decision-making method required to revise the rules of employment to workers at a disadvantage is allowed not only to hold a meeting by gathering all workers at a time at one business or workplace but also to gather opinions by exchanging opinions among workers under the condition that the employer’s involvement or interference is excluded by the organization or unit department of the business or workplace, and to gather the opinions as a whole.

C. That the employer’s amendment of the working conditions stipulated in the rules of employment to a disadvantage to a worker is invalid, and thus, the previous rules of employment remains effective as it is without the consent of the worker. It is merely the same in relation to the existing worker whose vested interests are infringed. The revised rules of employment should be applied as a matter of course to the relationship with the worker who accepted the working conditions according to the revised rules of employment after the amendment and who acquired the employment relationship, and the previous rules of employment should not be applied by denying the validity of the amendment to the relationship with the employment worker after the amendment without any ground to exclude the infringement of vested interests.

Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act

A. (B) Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165 Decided December 22, 1992 (Gong1993,546) (Gong1993,546) Decided January 15, 1993 (Gong1990,82). Supreme Court Decision 89Da31753 Decided November 24, 1992 (Gong193,213). B. Supreme Court Decision 91Da25055 Decided February 25, 1992 (Gong192,1125)

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Kim Jong-sik et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na43529 delivered on July 21, 1992

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant regarding retirement allowance after re-admission shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal dismissed shall be assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. In principle, an employer is entitled to prepare and revise the rules of employment according to his/her own intent, as it is an employer’s right to draft and modify the rules of employment. However, if the rules of employment were to be modified disadvantageously to an employee, consent is required by the collective decision-making method of the employee who was subject to the previous rules of employment or the rules of employment, and any modification of the rules of employment that did not obtain such consent has no validity unless it is recognized as reasonable by social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 78Da1046, Sept. 12, 1978; 88Da4277, May 9, 198; 89Meu24780, Mar. 13, 190).

In light of the records, the remuneration rules of Defendant Corporation amended as of January 27, 1981 were modified disadvantageous to workers regarding the payment rate of retirement allowances, and the modification did not obtain the consent of the employees subject to the revised pre-revision remuneration regulations by the collective decision-making method, as recognized by the court below. On the other hand, even if the amendment of the above remuneration regulations was made in accordance with the legitimate purpose and government policy as asserted in the lawsuit, it cannot be deemed that there is a rationality of social norms that could be caused without the consent of the employee group. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below that the above provision was null and void is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as

The theory of lawsuit argues that it is practically impossible to obtain the consent of employees in accordance with collective decision-making methods as a public news reporting agency of Defendant Corporation with the characteristics and size of the size of the public news reporting agency at the time. However, when the rules of employment are modified disadvantageously to employees, the method of collective decision-making required is not always a method of holding a meeting in a lump-sum manner but a method of gathering opinions among workers by exchanging opinions with each other under the circumstances where the employees are excluded from the employer’s involvement or interference by the organization or unit department of a business or workplace (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da2505 delivered on February 25, 192). In the case of Defendant Corporation, it cannot be deemed that it is impossible to obtain the consent of employees by such method. Therefore, the argument is without merit.

2. The court below rejected the defendant's assertion on the ground that the amendment of the above remuneration provision cannot be deemed to go against the principle of good faith merely because the plaintiff and other retired workers have received retirement allowances under the revised remuneration provision so far, or the plaintiffs' assertion on the validity of the amendment of the above remuneration provision cannot be deemed to go against the principle of good faith, and the trade union established after the amendment of the above remuneration provision cannot be deemed to have ratified the amendment of the above remuneration provision while entering into a collective agreement with the defendant. In light of the records, the above measures of the court below are just and there is no violation of law such as the theory of lawsuit. This argument also has no merit.

3. Where an employer amends the working conditions stipulated in the rules of employment to a disadvantage to an employee without the consent of the employee, the revision of the rules of employment remains effective and therefore, it remains effective as it is. However, this is the same as the previous rules of employment. However, this does not apply to the relationship with the existing employee whose vested interests are infringed, and as to the employee who accepted the working conditions according to the revised rules of employment and acquired employment relations after the revision, the revised rules of employment should be applied as a matter of course. It does not mean that the previous rules of employment should be applied by denying the validity of the revision from the relationship with the employment employee after the revision without any ground for exclusion of infringement of vested interests (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165 delivered on December 22, 192).

According to the decision of the court below in this case, the plaintiff was employed as employee at the defendant corporation on March 1, 1973 and was re-entered on April 7, 1986 after he retired on March 31, 1986 and retired from office until December 31, 1989. Thus, even if the remuneration provision of the defendant corporation revised on January 27, 1981 was invalid as it was revised disadvantageous to the worker without the worker's consent under the collective decision-making method, this legal principle can only be applied to the case where the plaintiff retired from office before the change of the above provision, i.e., the case where the plaintiff retired from office on March 31, 1986.

Nevertheless, the lower court did not apply the remuneration provision of the Defendant Corporation as amended on January 27, 1981, even if the Plaintiff, after re-entered into the Defendant Corporation on April 7, 1986, to the calculation of retirement benefits following retirement, and calculated retirement allowances in accordance with the former remuneration provision. This is an unlawful act that affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of the amendment to the rules of employment. Therefore, it is therefore justified.

4. Accordingly, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant regarding retirement allowance following the plaintiff's re-admission is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating