A. Whether the establishment of roads and the presumption of autonomous possession are reversed without due process of the State or a local government

(b) Form occupying roads by the State or a local government;

(c) The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that the road was possessed from the time when the Minister of Construction and Transportation makes a public announcement of the

A. The presumption of possession independently applies to roads owned by the State or a local government, and the fact that it is not recognized as legally acquiring the source of possession right in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the Road Act, the Urban Planning Act, etc. at the time of the construction of such roads cannot be deemed as the possession with the nature of the source of possession right.

B. The possession of a road by the State or a local government can be divided into possession as a road management authority and possession as a de facto controller. As such, if the existing road is in fact a public announcement of the recognition of routes under the Road Act, a road zone, or the establishment of a road by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act, possession as a road management authority starting from that time may be recognized. Even if a road is not established pursuant to the Road Act, if the State or a local government executes the reconstruction or maintenance of the existing road, such as expansion of roads, packing, or installation of sewerage systems, and thus, for public traffic, it shall be deemed that the existing road is in fact under the control of the State or a local government, and it shall be deemed that the occupancy as a de facto controller commences. Here, the time when a road zone under the existing Road Act is determined pursuant to the Road Act refers to the time when the road management authority renders a decision on the road zone under the Urban Planning Act.

(c) The case which reversed the judgment of the Minister of Construction and Transportation on the ground that he possessed the road from the time when the determination of urban planning was announced publicly; and

Articles 197(1), 192, and 245(1) of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da6139 delivered on July 12, 1991 (Gong1991, 2012), Supreme Court Decision 92Da8446 delivered on June 9, 1992 (Gong1992, 2125), Supreme Court Decision 92Da35649 delivered on February 23, 1993 (Gong1992, 3242), Supreme Court Decision 92Da34155 delivered on August 24, 1993 (Gong193, 1063), Supreme Court Decision 92Da19804 delivered on August 24, 1993 (Gong2572)

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Lee Jae-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 93Na9422 delivered on April 15, 1994

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

1. The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

A. The presumption of possession with autonomy applies to a road possessed by the State or a local government, and even if it is not recognized as legally acquiring the source of possession right in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the Road Act or the Urban Planning Act at the time of the construction of the road, it is the opinion of party members that the presumption of possession with autonomy cannot be deemed as possession with the nature of the source of possession right by the reversal thereof (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 89Meu12176, Jun. 28, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Da8446, Jun. 9, 192). The theory of lawsuit is merely to criticize the judgment of the court below on the premise of the contrary opinion. It is without merit.

B. (1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, on January 13, 1925, the land category of the annexed land Nos. 1 and the land Nos. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the “instant land”) of the judgment below was changed to a road by a non-party country, and was actually offered for general traffic as a road since that time. The court below determined that, on January 1, 1963, when the instant land was incorporated from the surface of the death and death in the Gyeongnam-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-dong-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-dong-dong-dong-do-do-do-do-do-si.

(2) The form of occupation of a road by the State or a local government can be divided into possession and possession as a de facto controller. Thus, it can be recognized that the occupation of a road management agency starting from the time of the determination of a road route approval or a road zone under the Road Act, or when a road is constructed by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act. Even if there is no act of construction of a road under the Road Act, if the State or a local government performed the reconstruction or maintenance of a road, such as expansion of an existing road, packing, or installation of a sewerage system, etc. and for public traffic, it shall be deemed that the existing road is under the de facto control of the State or a local government, and it shall be recognized that the occupation has been commenced as a de facto controller (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da35649, Oct. 27, 1992; 92Da19804, Aug. 24, 199).

Therefore, the decision of the Minister of Construction and Transportation on January 29, 1968 under the Urban Planning Act (the original decision appears to have been erroneously expressed as the decision of the said urban planning zone) cannot be deemed to be the decision of the road zone by the road management authority under the Road Act. Thus, from the time when the above decision of the Minister of Construction and Transportation was made, the defendant market had possession of the instant land from the time when the decision of the Minister of Construction and Transportation was made, it is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the commencement of possession in the acquisition by prescription due to the occupation

2. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)