(a) Form occupying roads by the State or local governments;

(b) The case reversing the original judgment that the local government occupied a road from the time land category was changed to a road;

A. The form of occupation of a road by the State or a local government can be divided into possession and possession as a de facto controller. As such, if the existing road is in fact a public announcement of the recognition of routes under the Road Act or a road zone is determined, or if the road is constructed by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act, possession as a road management authority may begin from the beginning of the existing road. If the State or a local government implements the reconstruction or maintenance of roads, such as expansion of roads, packing of roads, or installation of sewerage systems, and uses the existing road for public traffic, even if there is no act of constructing a road pursuant to the Road Act, it shall be deemed that the existing road is actually under the control of the State or a local government, and it shall be deemed that the occupation as a de facto controller commences. Here, when a road zone under the Road Act has been decided on the existing road, the term "the road management

(b) The case reversing the judgment of the court below which cited the defense of the completion of the prescription period for acquiring possession by a local government on the ground that the local government, which has the land category changed to a road only because it cannot be deemed that the land was incorporated into a road site when it opened the road, or that it did not commence possession by offering it

Articles 192 and 245 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 92Da19804 delivered on August 24, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2572) 94Da23951 delivered on September 9, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2623)

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others

Daegu Metropolitan City Attorney Park Jong-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Daegu District Court Decision 93Na14507 delivered on February 2, 1994

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief filed after the lapse of the submission period).

The form of occupation of a road by the State or a local government can be divided into possession and possession as a de facto controlling body of the road management authority. As such, if the existing road is determined by the Road Act, or a road zone is constructed by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act, occupancy as the road management authority can be recognized starting from the existing existing road. Even if a road is not established by the Road Act, it can be recognized that the State or a local government is actually under the control of the State or a local government and is actually under the control of the State or a local government to take possession as the de facto controlling body of the road. Here, if a road zone is determined by the existing road, it refers to the time the road management authority determines a road zone under the Road Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da23951, Sep. 9, 199; 200Da1984, Aug. 24, 193; 209Da4197, Apr. 16, 1994).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the land of this case was originally owned by the deceased non-party 1, who was originally proved by the plaintiff, on July 24, 191, and succeeded to it through the deceased non-party 2, who was his father, and the deceased non-party 3, who was his father, and completed registration of ownership preservation on November 14, 1991, and rejected the defendant's claim of this case as part of the ground that the land of this case was occupied by the defendant's possession of the above site of this case since the non-party 1, who was the non-party 2, was established on November 25, 1924 by including the land of this case into the site of this case and the land category was changed to that of the general public. The court below rejected the defendant's possession of the land of this case as part of the national highway No. 971, Aug. 31, 1971, under the presumption that the land of this case was occupied by the defendant 1, as part of the above national highway No.25.

However, even according to each evidence cited by the court below based on the above facts, the land of this case and its surrounding land are recognized only as the fact that the land category was changed to the road around November 25, 1924, and other special circumstances do not peep (the testimony of non-party 4 merely appears to have been changed to the road surface in 1924). If the land category of this case was changed to the road, the non-party 1 cannot be deemed to have established the land of this case while the non-party 1 opened the road of this case, the land of this case was included as the site of this case, or the possession of the land was commenced by providing it to the general public for the passage of the public. Further, the court below determined that the non-party 4's testimony of this case only recognized that the land of this case was a part of the national road passage No. 25 of the national road of this case under the Presidential Decree No. 5771 of Aug. 31, 1971 - from the existing road management authority or the road zone of this case as part of the national road.

Therefore, the court below should have judged whether the period of prescription for the defendant's possession of the land of this case has expired after further deliberation as to whether the road zone was determined or when the State or a local government was in fact in possession of the land of this case (as a result of the record, it can be seen that the land of this case was packed only at the time of the construction of the road between Daegu and Busan around July 1978). However, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the period of prescription for the defendant's possession of the land of this case has expired due to the reasons stated in its reasoning, which alone recognized the fact without any evidence or violated the rules of evidence, or affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles as to the acquisition by prescription for the possession of the land of this case, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)