[1] The requirements for an administrative property to become an object of prescriptive acquisition

[2] The relationship of ownership ownership after the closure of the educational district, such as the site of the public school, which was owned by the educational district under the former Education Act

[1] Since the administrative property used for administrative purposes cannot be subject to judicial transactions unless it is abolished for public use, it shall not be subject to the acquisition by prescription. The expression of intent to discontinue the use of public property is explicitly, implicitly or implicitly, but it shall be a legitimate expression of intent, and the fact that it is not actually used for the purpose of public use cannot be deemed as having expressed the intention of disuse.

[2] Under the former Education Act, affairs related to public school in the Gun are under the jurisdiction of the educational district. Accordingly, all of the school facilities, sites, playgrounds, and practice areas were owned by the educational district. Since the educational district was repealed by the amendment of the Education Act on January 6, 1962, all of the property owned by the educational district was succeeded to the Gun. However, under Article 2 of the Local Education Autonomy Act and Article 9 of the Addenda of the Local Education Autonomy Act, the special accounts for educational expenses of Sis/Guns succeeded to the special accounts for educational expenses of the Special Metropolitan City, Metropolitan Cities, and Dos, the property owned by the Si/Gun was reverted to the Special Metropolitan City, Metropolitan Cities, and Dos.

[1] Article 245(1) of the Civil Act, Articles 5(2) and 30 of the State Property Act / [2] Article 2 of the Local Education Autonomy Act, Article 9 of the Addenda to the Education Act ( January 6, 1962)

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 80Da236 delivered on December 14, 1982 (Gong1983, 262) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 94Da12579 delivered on September 13, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2634) Supreme Court Decision 93Da42658 delivered on April 28, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1955Sang, 1955) Supreme Court Decision 94Da42877 delivered on November 14, 1995 (Gong196Sang, 2)

Cheong-ju Sari Sari Sari Sari Sari Sari kins

Jeollabuk-do (Attorney Kim Sung-ro, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Jeonju District Court Decision 94Na2018 delivered on April 4, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, since the plaintiff purchased the land of this case from the defendant before the land substitution and possessed and managed it as the soil of the plaintiff clan, the acquisition by prescription was completed at least on April 19, 192. Accordingly, the defendant asserted to the plaintiff that he is liable to implement the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership on the land of this case. Since the land of this case before the land substitution was registered in the name of Jung-gun school expenses of Jung-gun, 1927, after the transfer of ownership was completed on March 2, 192, the land of this case was used as the land of this case until the land of this case was replaced by the land of this case as the land rearrangement project of this case, the land of this case was used as the land of this case until the land of this case was replaced by the land of this case, the court below dismissed the plaintiff's claim for the registration of transfer of ownership for a long time under the former Education Act (amended by Act No. 955 of Jan. 6, 196, 1962).

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The administrative property, which is officially used for administrative purposes, can not be a subject of private transaction unless it is closed for public use, and thus is not subject to the acquisition by prescription. The expression of intent to discontinue the use of public property is explicitly, implicitly or implicitly, but is not a legitimate expression of intent, and the fact that it is not actually used for the use as a public property cannot be deemed as having expressed an intention to discontinue the use (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da236, Dec. 14, 1982; 83Meu181, Jun. 14, 1983).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized that the land of this case was used as a practice area of Sosung National School until the land is replaced by the ordinary land rearrangement project on April 19, 1972 after the registration of ownership transfer was made in the name of the school expenses of Jung-gu, Jung-do on March 2, 1927. The court below held that even if the land of this case was not used for the original purpose as a public property and neglected it thereafter, it cannot be deemed that the land of this case was not subject to the acquisition by prescription. In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or incomplete deliberation or incomplete reasoning. The ground of appeal pointing this out is not acceptable.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

According to the former Education Act, affairs related to a public national school located in the Gun are under the jurisdiction of the educational district. Accordingly, all of the school facilities, sites, playgrounds, and practice areas were owned by the educational district, and the education district was abolished on January 6, 1962, and all of the property owned by the educational district was succeeded to the Gun (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da236, Dec. 14, 1982, etc.), but the property owned by the Si/Gun was succeeded to the special account for educational expenses of the Special Metropolitan City, the Metropolitan City, and the Do pursuant to Article 2 of the Local Education Autonomy Act and Article 9 of the Addenda of the Local Education Autonomy Act, and the special account for educational expenses of the Si/Gun was succeeded to the Special Metropolitan City, the Metropolitan City, and the Do. Accordingly, the land in this case, which was owned by the education district of the Si/Gun, was owned by the Si/Gun, and it was still owned by the Si/Gu, and the defendant was not erroneous in the application of the relevant law.

However, insofar as it is obvious that the land in this case is not subject to prescriptive acquisition, the decision of the court below rejecting the claim for ownership transfer registration of the land in this case is justified in its conclusion, and such error of the court below is not an error of law affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is not acceptable.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-Appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)