Main Issues
A. Whether the administrative property officially used for administrative purposes is subject to prescriptive acquisition (negative)
(b) Presumption of the abolition of use solely by the fact that the public goods are not used for their original purpose (negative)
Summary of Judgment
(a) The administrative property officially used for administrative purposes cannot be subject to judicial transactions unless it is closed for public use, and thus cannot be subject to the acquisition by prescription.
B. The expression of intent to abolish the use of a public product is either explicitly or implicitly, but it must be a legitimate declaration of intention, and it cannot be deemed that there is an expression of intent to disuse the public product with an invalid selling act, although it is not actually used for the purpose as a public product.
[Reference Provisions]
(a) Article 245 of the Civil Act and Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act;
Reference Cases
A. Supreme Court Decision 68Da1198 delivered on August 30, 1968; 69Da1972 delivered on August 31, 1970; 76Da1127 delivered on September 28, 1976; 80Da236 delivered on December 24, 1982
Plaintiff-Appellee
[Judgment of the court below]
Defendant-Appellant
Senior Military Attorney Park Tae-dae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Judgment of the lower court
Daegu High Court Decision 82Na170 delivered on December 29, 1982
Text
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.
Reasons
The ground of appeal No. 1 by the defendant's attorney is examined.
1. The administrative property officially used for administrative purposes cannot be subject to judicial transactions unless it is closed for public use, and thus is not subject to the acquisition by prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 68Da1198, Aug. 30, 1968; Supreme Court Decision 69Da1972, Aug. 31, 1970; Supreme Court Decision 76Da1127, Sept. 28, 1976; Supreme Court Decision 76Da1127, Sept. 28, 1976). It cannot be deemed that there was an expression of intent to disuse the administrative property solely on the basis of the fact that it is either explicit or implied, but is not actually used for public use.
2. In this case, the court below acknowledged the fact that the land of this case originally purchased from the defendant's educational district for the purpose of using it as a practice area for the elderly citizen school, or that it was inappropriate for it to use it as a practice area for the future, and that the non-party 1, who was the chairman of the family council of the above national school, sold it to the non-party 2 on behalf of the defendant's educational district on March 25, 1958, and the non-party 2 again sold it to the plaintiff on March 13, 1959 and delivered it to the plaintiff 4.16 of that year, and determined that the land of this case was not suitable for the use as a practice area for the above citizen's school, and that the land can be acquired by prescription since it had already been sold to the non-party 2.
However, in the reasoning of the judgment on the main claim of this case, the court below judged that the disposition by Nonparty 1 who sold the land of this case on behalf of the defendant education district was null and void because it did not go through a resolution of the former Education Committee. Thus, if the sale by Nonparty 1 is invalid due to lack of legitimate authorization, it is clear in light of the above-mentioned reasoning that such sale cannot be seen as the expression of legitimate intention of disuse of
Ultimately, the court below's decision that the land of this case can be acquired by prescription on the premise that the land of this case is properly closed for public use is an unlawful act that affected the conclusion of the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles on the disuse of administrative property, which constitutes a ground for reversal under Article 12 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of
3. Therefore, without examining other grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Daegu High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)