(a) Reversion of the site for a public school which was owned by the educational district after the abolition of the educational district;

B. Whether the property owned by the State or a public organization is subject to the acquisition by prescription for possession (negative)

(c) Presumption of the abolition of use solely because the public property is not provided for its original purpose (negative)

(a)In accordance with the Education Act before the amendment on January 6, 1962, affairs pertaining to public national schools in the Gun are under the jurisdiction of the educational district, and therefore, the school facilities, their sites, playgrounds, and practice areas were owned by all the educational districts. After that, the Education Act was amended on January 6, 1962, the educational district was abolished, and all the properties owned by the educational district under the Addenda were succeeded by the Gun.

(b) An immovable property owned by a State or a public organization, which is officially used for its administrative purpose, shall not be subject to acquisition of ownership due to the possession of a private person unless it is publicly abolished.

C. It cannot be presumed that a management agency’s intent to disuse the public property has existed solely on the basis of the fact that the public property has lost its original nature and is not offered for its original purpose.

A. Articles 15 and 27 of the former Education Act (amended by Act No. 228 of Dec. 1, 1951), Articles 6 and 30(b) of the Education Act. Article 5(2) of the State Property Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 80Da1778 delivered on January 13, 1981, 68Da1198 delivered on August 30, 1968, 73Da557 delivered on February 12, 1974, 69Da340 delivered on May 27, 1969

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Park Jong-dae, Counsel for the office of education of the Gyeong-do Education Committee

Daegu District Court Decision 79Na92 delivered on December 21, 1979

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

With respect to No. 1:

Based on the premise that the ownership of this land used as a teacher's housing site at a military school of 1952 and around October 1952, the lower court ordered the Defendant to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration on the ground that the Plaintiff acquired ownership of this land for 20 years on October 15, 1972. However, Article 15 of the Education Act, which was in force at the time of 1952 (amended by Act No. 228, Dec. 1, 1951), provides that the educational district shall be established in the Gun, and Article 16 shall be an educational district. The education district shall be established in the first Do governor, the second Do governor, and the Minister of Home Affairs, and Article 17 of the Education Committee shall be established in the 19th Do governor, the second Do governor, and the Ministry of Home Affairs, and Article 17 of the Education Committee shall be established in the 19th Do governor's 20th 3th son's 3th son's 3th Do.

Therefore, it is clear that the ownership of the land in this case, which was the site of the above public school, belongs to the achievement group through education districts in the achievement group. Therefore, even if the plaintiff acquired prescription against the land in this case, it is reasonable to argue that the court below's ordering the defendant to perform the above obligation is an illegal measure because it erred by misapprehending the legal principles on attribution of school property by failing to exhaust all deliberation on the Education Act.

With respect to the second ground:

A state-owned or public organization's property cannot be an object of acquisition of ownership due to a private person's possession unless public use is abolished (Supreme Court Decision 68Da1198 delivered on Aug. 30, 1968; Supreme Court Decision 73Da557 delivered on Feb. 12, 1974). It cannot be presumed that a government-owned or public organization's property has an intention to disuse the property (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da340 delivered on May 27, 1969). The lower court determined that the land was currently used as a site, but it was destroyed at the time of the six-25 incident, and that the land was occupied to the non-party and thus, it did not constitute an unlawful act of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the property for which the Defendant continued to occupy and sell the land for a long time since it was occupied by the non-party and it continued to have been used for the purpose of the public use (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da340 delivered on May 27, 196969).

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)