[1] In a case where the land in question was occupied before it became the property devolving upon the State, and the possession at the time of its commencement was the autonomous possession, whether the possession of the property devolving upon the State property from January 1, 1965 to January 1, 1965 shall be returned to the possession independently (affirmative)

[2] Whether a road is an administrative property solely based on the determination of urban planning and cadastral approval as a road (negative)

[3] Whether the possession of a building site is recognized even if the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building (affirmative)

[1] The possession of the property devolving upon the nature of the source of title constitutes the possession on the other party, but since the property devolving upon the other party not sold by the last day of December 1, 1964 under the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State was the State property from January 1, 1965, the possession of the property devolving upon the State property commenced prior to the property devolving upon the land which was not sold by the last day of December 1, 1965, and the possession at the time of the commencement was the autonomous possession of the land at the time of the commencement, the possession of the land shall be reverted to the possession with the State property independently.

[2] The urban planning decision and cadastral approval of a road as to the land are only limited to the urban planning decision and cadastral approval, but the land is not in the form of an external road, and if the urban planning project is not implemented, it shall not be deemed an administrative property that can not be acquired by prescription.

[3] The land which became a site for a building shall be deemed to be possessed by the owner of the building, and in this case, even if the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building or its site, it shall be deemed to possess the site for the purpose of owning the building.

[1] Article 245(1) of the Civil Act; Article 2 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to Jurisdiction (Act No. 1346, May 29, 1963); Article 5 of the Addenda / [2] Articles 4(2) and 5(2) of the State Property Act / [3] Article 192(1) of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da3917 delivered on February 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 1031), Supreme Court Decision 92Da26819 delivered on February 23, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 1060), Supreme Court Decision 93Da23572 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 277) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Da44395 delivered on September 5, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3343), Supreme Court Decision 94Da30751 delivered on September 29, 195 (Gong195Ha, 195Ha, 3591) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 93Da19639 delivered on September 16, 193 (Gong194, 195Ha, 35919) / [3Da196319496 decided September 196, 19496949395.

E.O. and seven others (Law Firm Seo-gu, Attorneys Landscaping-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Seoul District Court Decision 95Na46554 delivered on July 2, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to the first and fourth points

The possession of the property devolving upon the nature of the title constitutes the possession of another owner, but the property which was not sold by the end of January 1, 1964 under the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State. Thus, as to the property devolving upon the State from January 1, 1965, the possession commenced before it becomes the property devolving upon the State. If the possession was the possession at the time of the commencement of the possession was the autonomous possession, the possession of the land from January 1, 1965, which was the land as state property, shall be reverted to the possession independently (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da3917, Feb. 14, 1992). Since the site of this case is the property devolving upon the State, the argument that the possession of the land of this case was the owner, and therefore, it cannot be accepted that the possession of the land of this case was the possession of the land of this case, and there is no reason to believe that the court below erred in the conclusion of the judgment below since its review.

On the second ground for appeal

The decision of urban planning and cadastral approval of a road as to the land, and if the land is not in the form of an external road, and the land cannot be considered as an administrative property that cannot be acquired by prescription if the urban planning project is not implemented (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da44395, Sept. 5, 1995; 94Da30751, Sept. 29, 195). According to the records, the land in this case was incorporated into a road site as an urban planning decision and cadastral notification on Jan. 24, 1964, and was used as a site for the building in this case without any form of a road, and it cannot be recognized that the land in this case was excluded from a road site due to a change in the urban planning on July 23, 191 without the execution of the above urban planning project. Thus, the land in this case cannot be deemed as administrative property excluded from the acquisition by prescription. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the same purport.

On the third ground for appeal

Land which has become a site for a building shall be deemed to be possessed by the owner of the building, and in this case, even if the owner of the building does not actually occupy the building or the site thereof, it shall be deemed to possess the site for the ownership of the building (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da47282, Jun. 14, 1996).

Therefore, since the building of this case constructed on the site of this case is owned by the plaintiffs, even if all the plaintiffs did not possess the above building and possessed it by the mixed owner of the plaintiff Lee Jong-chul, the site of this case, which is the site of the above building, shall be deemed to have been jointly occupied by the plaintiffs for the purpose of owning the above building. In the same purport, the judgment of the court below that the plaintiffs jointly occupied the site of this case is just, and there is no violation of law such as the theory of lawsuit, and there

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)