(a) Medical doctor's duty to explain;

(b) requirements for the discharge of doctors by household acceptance;

C. Effect of the doctor's violation of the duty of explanation

A. Although a doctor is not necessarily obligated to completely recover from a disease, he/she is obligated to take adequate measures for treating a disease with the best care, and is also obligated to perform surgery for a patient as well as to perform surgery for a patient, and includes bodily harm to the body of a patient. Thus, barring any other special circumstances, a doctor is obligated to give the patient an opportunity to voluntarily determine whether to accept a surgery or medication by explaining in advance important matters for the decision-making of the patient, such as symptoms of a disease, treatment method and content of treatment, necessity, the patient’s life and anticipated risks and side effects, etc., unless there is any negligence on the part of the doctor in the treatment. If a doctor fails without such explanation and without such consent, he/she commits an unlawful act infringing on the patient’s right to consent even if there is no negligence on the part of the doctor in the treatment.

(b)the exemption of a physician by the so-called assumptive consent that the patient gave consent to the medication even if the patient gave a correct explanation from the doctor is allowed only when the patient’s consent is clearly anticipated as a defense of the doctor.

C. In a case where the right of consent to the medication was violated even if the victim did not have any negligence in the medical treatment of the doctor, if the right of consent to the medication was violated, the victim suffered mental suffering due to the side effects of the medicines that were not predicted in the time of the violation, and/or the family members suffered the above suffering together. In such a case, even if the victim did not have any liability for compensation for property damage caused by physical disability, the corporation operating the hospital is liable to pay consolation money for the above mental suffering to

Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act

A.C. Supreme Court Decision 93Da60953 delivered on April 15, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1440). Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1136 delivered on April 28, 1987 (Gong1987, 873) 91Da36710 delivered on April 14, 1992 (Gong192, 1573)

Plaintiff 1 and five others, Attorneys Jeon Jae-in et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee)

[Defendant-Appellant] Hanyang School and one other (Attorney Kim Dong-dong et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na55669 delivered on May 12, 1992

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiffs' claim for consolation money against the defendant Hanyang Institute is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to Seoul High Court

All of the appeals by the plaintiffs against Defendant Hanyang Institute of Education and the appeals by the plaintiffs against Defendant Korea Institute of Education are dismissed. The costs of appeal by each of the appeals are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal.

1. As to the Korea Institute of Hanyang School:

A. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that Defendant 1’s treatment of the above-mentioned school juristic person (hereinafter “Defendant 1”) did not consent to the treatment of the Plaintiff on the ground that it was entirely impossible for the Plaintiff to use the above-mentioned 7th anniversary of the 1983 emergency treatment, and that the treatment of the Plaintiff’s 3th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 0th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 0th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 3th anniversary of the thirical treatment.

B. Although a doctor is not necessarily obligated to completely recover from a disease, he/she is obligated to take full measures for treating a disease with the best care, and is also obligated to perform surgery for a patient as well as to perform surgery for a patient, and as such, a doctor is obligated to provide a patient with an opportunity to voluntarily determine whether to accept a surgery or medication by explaining in advance important matters for the decision-making of the patient, such as symptoms of a disease, treatment methods and details of treatment, necessity for treatment, risks to life and anticipated side effects, etc., unless there is any negligence on the treatment, and even if it is done without such explanation, it would be an unlawful act that infringes on the patient’s right to consent even if the doctor does not have any negligence on the treatment.

C. From this point of view, we examine the judgment of the court below in sequence.

(1) First, the judgment below denying the duty to explain by Nonparty 1 is just and acceptable, as long as the above Plaintiff’s life was administered prior to recovery of consciousness under a critical condition, and it is urgent because it was impossible to explain prior to recovery of consciousness.

(2) However, it is difficult to accept the judgment below that the above plaintiff did not have an obligation to explain the progress of treatment and the possibility of side effects even after the recovery of consciousness.

(1) There is no ground to deem that there is an urgent situation beyond time to explain even according to the ruling of the court below.

② In light of the following: (a) the scope of side effects of the above medication is broad; and (b) when the above medication took place, the Defendant Korea Business Institute Co., Ltd., which was the manufacturer and seller of the above medication, has already been reported to the medical community; (c) the above Plaintiff’s warning of such side effects was recognized by the lower court; and (d) the above Plaintiff’s side effects indirectly listen to the explanation of the drug through ordinary doctors; and (e) the above side effects are not only irrecoverable but also significant to the Plaintiff; and (e) the above Plaintiff’s side effects cannot be readily determined as non-pacted; and (e) it cannot be said that the obligation to explain is exempted solely with the scarcity of the possibility of the occurrence; (b) even if there was no signs of such side effects or merger after the treatment, it is necessary to explain the possibility of the side effects, etc. thereafter; and (e) if prior examination or prevention methods were not specifically known to the medical community, the possibility of consent to the medication should be given more in light of the patient’s significant side effects.

(3) The patient's immunity by the so-called assumptive consent that the patient gave consent to the medication even if the patient gives a correct explanation from the doctor is permitted only when the patient's consent is clearly anticipated. According to the records, there is no assertion on this matter by the defendant corporation and the patient's right to self-determination cannot be denied on the ground that there is no other alternative treatment method in the patient's entry place as stated in the judgment of the court below, just because the patient did not have any other alternative treatment method in consideration of the above side effects, it is presumed that the patient's consent to the medication was clearly excluded from all the possibilities

D. Ultimately, in the event that the right to consent to the medication was violated due to the non-party 1's violation of the duty to explain even though the non-party 1 was not negligent in treatment, the above plaintiff 1 suffered mental suffering due to the side effects of the medicines not predicted due to the illegal act, and the remaining plaintiffs who are his family members also suffered the above suffering. In such a case, the defendant corporation is liable to pay consolation money for the above mental suffering to the plaintiffs even if the above plaintiff 1 did not have any liability to compensate for property damage caused by the

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle of the duty of explanation and affected the judgment as to the consolation money portion of the plaintiffs' defendant corporation. Accordingly, the appeal by the plaintiffs is justified and the remainder is without merit.

2. As to Defendant Korea Institute of Training Inc.

We affirm the judgment of the court below that the court below did not neglect the investigation and research on the errors in the design, manufacturing process, and side effects after sale, which were administered to the above plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant company") by comparing the evidence used by the court below with the records, and did not neglect the above plaintiff's duty of use instruction and warning in order to prevent the misuse or abuse, as well as the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as pointed out. The plaintiffs' appeal on this part is without merit.

3. Accordingly, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant corporation is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. The remaining appeal by the plaintiffs against the defendant and the appeal by the plaintiffs against the defendant company is without merit. The costs of appeal dismissed are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)