A. Whether Article 11 of the Short-Term Finance Business Act is an effective provision (negative)

B. The meaning of and criteria for determining acts within the scope of purpose in corporate legal capacity

C. Whether the application for resumption of pleading is dismissed and the hearing is unlawful

A. Article 11 of the Short-term Finance Business Act is appropriate to leave the company's autonomy to the finance management business of the short-term finance corporation, the original profit-making corporation. However, due to its public nature according to its financial intermediary function, it gives more opportunities to extend loans to a certain person by regulating excessive financing of a specific person. Therefore, this provision is deemed to be the so-called regulation, and even if the fund management was conducted in violation of this provision, it does not affect the validity of private law.

(b) The corporation’s ability to exercise rights is limited by the law which served as the basis for the incorporation of the corporation and the purpose of its articles of incorporation, but acts within the scope of that purpose are not limited to the purpose itself as specified in articles of incorporation, but to all necessary acts directly or indirectly in the achievement of that purpose, including all necessary acts, and whether it is necessary for the achievement of the objective, should be determined abstractly according to the objective nature of the act, not by the actor’

C. Whether to accept an application for the resumption of pleadings by the parties falls under the discretion of the court. Thus, in a case where the parties were sufficiently able to submit their defenses, but failed to do so for the purpose of defense and proof after the closing of pleadings, the court did not accept the application for the resumption of pleadings and cannot be deemed to constitute an illegal cause for the failure of hearing.

Article 11 of the Short-term Finance Act, Article 34 of the Civil Act, Article 132 of the Civil Procedure Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1349 Decided September 8, 1987: Supreme Court Decision 80Meu2475 Decided November 10, 1981

Dongbio-Ba Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant

Attorney Lee Il-sung et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Daegu District Court Decision 85Na187 delivered on April 23, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to the First Ground:

Article 11 of the Short-term Finance Business Act prohibits a short-term finance company from operating funds exceeding 25/100 of its capital, reserves and other surplus to the same person except for the case where the approval of the Minister of Finance and Economy is obtained, in principle, by prescribing that a short-term finance company is prohibited from operating funds exceeding a certain limit to the same person. The purport of this provision is that a short-term finance company, which is the original profit-making corporation, is in charge of the company's autonomy, but it is reasonable to leave the fund operation business of the short-term finance company to the company. However, due to its public nature arising from its financial intermediary function, it gives more opportunities to extend loans to a more person. Therefore, this provision shall be considered as the so-called regulation regulation, and even if the operation of funds was conducted in violation of this provision, it shall be understood

On the other hand, Article 10 of the Act does not directly relate to the issuance, acceptance, guarantee, and sale and purchase of bills and notes of a short-term finance company in order to faithfully meet the company's capital. Thus, even if the loans have been granted to the same person beyond the limit under Article 11 of the Act, if it is certain that the same person will be able to recover from the credit or collateral, it would bring profit on the fund management, and it would prevent the aggravation of the company's capital structure in accordance with his credit or collateral by regulating the credit and credit for the same person, it would be considered as only an incidental and anti-private effect resulting from the regulation.

If the above provision does not regard it as above and the so-called "effective regulation" is null and void, a person subject to the management of funds should confirm daily limit, and even if the company did not adjust its regulation limit for its internal reasons, it would be able to assert its invalidation on the ground that it exceeded the regulation limit for itself, thereby significantly violating good faith and fairness between the parties to transactions.

In addition, Articles 23(3)1 and 25 of the above Act provide that a person who violates Article 11 of the above Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 200,000 won, and their interpretation does not change.

After all, the court below's decision that Article 11 of the above Act is only a regulation law on the grounds of its stated reasoning after reviewing various features from the legislative purpose of the law and the fairness and trust of the safety transaction parties in transaction as to the above provision of Article 11 of the above Act. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of Article 11 of the above Act as alleged.

In addition, the legal capacity of a company is limited by the law that served as the basis for the incorporation of the company and the purpose of the articles of incorporation of the company, but acts within the scope of the purpose should not be limited to the purpose itself specified in the articles of incorporation, but to determine whether it is necessary directly or indirectly for the achievement of the purpose including all necessary acts and whether it is necessary for the achievement of the purpose, depending on the objective good faith of the act. It is not determined by the subjective and specific intent of the actor (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1349 delivered on September 8, 1987). In addition, the court below did not incorporate the above provisions into the effective provision as the valid provision. In this regard, it is just that the court below held that the guarantee act of the defendant representative is included in the

With respect to the second ground:

A. Upon examining the judgment of the court below along with the record, it is clear that the court below omitted the judgment on this issue even though the defendant asserted that the defendant "to offset against the defendant company as the amount of the opposing claim following the cancellation because the amount of the opposing claim is 1 billion won since he had cancelled the retirement insurance for employees of the plaintiff company on October 26, 1983" (referring to the preparatory brief of July 2 of 1984 in the same year of the defendant company stated at the date of first instance on July 5 of 1984).

However, according to the evidence evidence No. 3 as stated by the court below, the above insurance company of the defendant principal can only cancel the insurance contract with the consent of the employee who is the beneficiary of the insurance in order to cancel the insurance contract. The testimony of the non-party No. 1 by the witness of the court of first instance is not sufficient to acknowledge that the above insurance contract was lawfully cancelled even to some of the beneficiaries who agreed to cancel the insurance contract with the consent of the plaintiff's part of the beneficiary, and the testimony of the non-party No. 1 is insufficient to recognize that the above insurance contract was lawfully cancelled, and there is no other evidence that the above contracting company did not exercise its right to cancel the insurance contract with the consent of all the members who are the beneficiary of the above non-party No. 1 even though the court below omitted the judgment of the non-party No. 1's testimony, and even if the defendant's assertion on cancellation of the insurance contract was included in the plaintiff's exercise of right to cancel the insurance contract, the non-party No. 3's statement on this point is rejected by the plaintiff No. 181.

Therefore, the defendant's defense of the right of set-off cannot be rejected due to the existence of the automatic claim, i.e., the existence of the right to claim the return of insurance money due to the cancellation of the contract, and therefore, it cannot be said that the court below neglected the testimony of the above witness 1 and the judgment on the defendant's defense of set-off.

The assertion is groundless.

B. Whether or not a party's application for resumption of oral argument is subject to the court's discretion. Thus, if the party failed to submit his defense despite sufficient opportunity to do so, the court did not accept the application for resumption of oral argument for the defense and proof after the closing of oral argument, and it cannot be deemed that it constitutes an illegal cause for failure of oral deliberation (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2475 delivered on November 10, 1981).

According to the records, the defendant asserted that, inasmuch as the retirement insurance contract was cancelled between the mining life group members and the plaintiff in the above preparatory document on July 2, 1984, the defendant set off the amount equivalent to the amount of money claimed by the plaintiff with the right to claim the return of the premium as the automatic claim. Accordingly, even if the plaintiff's claim is based on the defendant's assertion itself in the preparatory document on the same day stated at the fourth hearing date of the court of first instance on July 19, 1984, it is obvious that the defendant's automatic claim is the mining name group members, and therefore, the defendant's automatic claim is not a ground for set-off with the automatic claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the first instance court of this case is dismissed with the same purport.

Nevertheless, after filing an appeal against the above judgment, the appellate court only set off the claim for the return of insurance premium against the plaintiff by the non-party Mine Construction Co., Ltd., the guarantor whose reorganization claim extinction is prohibited by the decision of reorganization of a company among the above light group companies, and the first pleading was initiated on September 18, 1985, which had been in progress eight times until March 19, 1986, the defendant did not take any measures to make the plaintiff's claim for the return of insurance premium as the defendant's automatic claim. Since the non-party 4 applied for the resumption of the pleading to the defendant on March 25, 1986 on the ground that it is the witness only after the argument of this case was concluded, the court below did not accept the plaintiff's claim for the return of insurance premium to the non-party Mine Construction Co., Ltd., the right to request the return of insurance premium against the plaintiff from among the light group companies, and did not accept the plaintiff's claim for the return of the above insurance premium from the defendant's non-party 4.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-hee (Presiding Justice)