(a) The case holding that the presumption of self-ownership has been reversed where an application for purchase of State property is filed before and after the completion of prescription and the indemnity has been paid without any objection to the competent authority;

(b) The case holding that it has renounced the prescription benefits in case where it has concluded a loan contract for State property with the payment of indemnity to the competent authority without any objection, after the completion of the prescriptive acquisition;

(a) The case holding that the presumption of possession independently has been reversed in case where an application for purchase of State property is filed before and after the completion of prescription and the indemnity is paid without any objection to the competent authority;

(b) The case holding that, after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, a debtor has renounced the prescription benefits in cases where he/she paid indemnity to the competent authority without objection, due to illegal occupancy;

(a) Article 245(1)(a) of the Civil Act; Article 197(1)(b)

A. Supreme Court Decision 93Da37397 decided Jun. 14, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1944) (Gong1995Ha, 3122), 94Da32511 decided Nov. 22, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 777) (Gong195Sang, 185Sang, 1854)

Attorney Lee Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na17064 delivered on November 11, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. The existence or absence of the possessor’s intention, which is the requirement for prescriptive acquisition, is determined by the nature of the possessor’s source of possessor’s right. However, if the nature of the possessor’s right is not clear, it shall be presumed to be possession independently pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, but if it is proved that the possessor’s intention, i.e., intent to exercise exclusive control by excluding another’s ownership, cannot be viewed as possession with the intention to exercise exclusive control as his own property, it shall be reversed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 90Meu21381, Nov. 13, 1990; 93Da37397, Jun. 14,

As duly admitted by the court below, one land listed in the attached list of the judgment below (hereinafter referred to as the "one land" in this case) and two land (hereinafter referred to as the "two land" in this case) are the defendant's ownership and have originally been installed as oil tank facilities of the US military. From May 3, 1969 to May 3, 1969, the plaintiff church left the land as public land without a manager, and occupied the land for the church building and the land without permission. The plaintiff's right to purchase the one land in this case before May 3, 1989, which was due to the expiration of the prescription period of the plaintiff's assertion, and the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff's sale of state property on July 22, 199, and the contract was not concluded, and the plaintiff's right to purchase the land again with the Incheon Special Metropolitan City Mayor and Metropolitan City Mayor without any specific legal principles as to the plaintiff's right to purchase the land within the presumption period of 15th, 198.

In addition, the part of the judgment of the court below that the plaintiff renounced the statute of limitations interest on the land of this case is nothing more than an additional part, and the propriety of the above judgment does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

The appeal on this point is without merit.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below concluded a loan agreement with a pension of 2,410,00 won from November 11, 1991 after the expiration of the period for acquisition by prescription, and concluded the loan agreement with the Plaintiff at the time of the conclusion of the loan agreement. After the expiration of the period for acquisition by prescription, the plaintiff applied again for the loan agreement on June 10, 1992 after the expiration of the period for the loan agreement, and paid the loan fee of 2,227,110 won to the Plaintiff without title. The plaintiff paid it without any particular objection to the Plaintiff. The plaintiff applied for the loan of this case to the head of Incheon Metropolitan City, Incheon Metropolitan City, for the use of the land of this case as the site for a church room for young children and a house, and made all payment of the loan fee of 2,410,000 won to the Plaintiff. The decision of the court below is justified in finding that there is no error of law in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the waiver of prescription interest.

In addition, the precedent of the party members cannot be appropriate to invoke the case in this case on the other hand.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)