(a) Effect of distribution of farmland to local governments without revocation of a disposition to change the purpose of use of farmland by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry;

B. Whether the disposition of distributing farmland can be seen as including the disposition of revoking the above disposition of revoking the purpose of use for the above purpose of use

(c) The nature of possession by the person who acquired and possessed real estate by an invalid juristic act with the knowledge that it is null and void;

(d) Whether it can be deemed that only a person who has completed the registration of ownership transfer under his name has been converted into an independent possession

A. In accordance with Article 6(1)4 of the Farmland Reform Act and Article 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the distribution of farmland to local governments which are not self-employed farmers as prescribed by the same Act is automatically null and void under the condition that the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry permits the change of the purpose of use of land and the revocation of a permit to change the purpose of use of land.

B. In the above case, the disposition of distributing farmland does not necessarily include a disposition revoking the purpose of use, change, or permit of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.

(c) Where a person who acquired real estate due to an invalid juristic act starts to possess the real estate upon delivery with the knowledge that such juristic act is null and void, the possession of the real estate shall not be deemed to have been commenced with the intention of its owner

D. The nature of the possession does not change unless the possessor, due to a new title, re-enters the possession with his intention to own, or unless he expresses his intention to hold it to the person, and it cannot be deemed that the possessor has converted into possession with intention to hold it autonomously by expressing his intention to hold it on his own.

(a)Article 6(1)4 of the Farmland Reform Act; Article 9(c) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act; Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act;

A.C. Supreme Court Decision 92Da37871 delivered on July 16, 1993 (Dong) 67Da1220 delivered on October 31, 1967 (Gong153) Da. 79Da1806 delivered on December 26, 1979 (Gong1980, 12494) 80Da469 delivered on June 9, 1981 (Gong1981, 1398), 91Da3751 delivered on May 8, 1992 (Gong192, 1818), 88Da95 delivered on April 111, 1989 (Gong1989, 738), 197Da137539 delivered on April 13, 195 (Gong1989, 19738), 2503Da197537, May 13, 1975)

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Chungcheongnam-do et al. and four others

Daejeon District Court Decision 91Na5790 delivered on November 25, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

1. Determination on the second ground of appeal by Defendant Chungcheongnam-do et al. and by the remaining Defendants

As argued by the Defendants, even if Defendant Chungcheongnam-do completed the repayment of the land of this case (three parcels, one thousand and three hundred and thirty39 square meters before it was divided) around April 20, 1965 pursuant to the Farmland Reform Act, the court below held that the distribution of farmland to local governments, other than the self-employed farmers as prescribed by the same Act, is naturally null and void under Article 6 (1) 4 of the Farmland Reform Act and Article 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, although the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry permits the change of the purpose of use of the land of this case and the change of the purpose of use of the land of this case is not revoked, and even under Article 6 (1) 4 of the same Act, local governments can receive farmland distribution in accordance with the same Act, and it cannot be deemed that the land of this case was included in the disposition revoking the change of the purpose of use of farmland distribution to Defendant Chungcheongnam-do, and that there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the records and evidence related to the farmland reform and the legal principles pertaining to 167197.16.

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 1

Even if Defendant Chungcheongnam-do completed the repayment of the land of this case with the allocation of farmland, as long as it is justified to have judged that the disposition of distribution of farmland of this case was null and void, the court below did not clearly determine whether the above Defendant actually received the distribution of farmland as in the theory of lawsuit, but it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law that found the facts affecting the judgment by violating the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and the judgment of the court below as to the point where the theory of lawsuit was pointed out (the above Defendant did not at all compensate the Plaintiff for the distribution of farmland of this case) is just in light of the relation of the evidence as stated by the court below, and there is no error of law that found the facts erroneous in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no reason to support the conclusion of the judgment

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 3

A. In a case where a person who acquired real estate through an invalid juristic act begins to possess the real estate upon delivery with the knowledge that the juristic act is null and void, the possession cannot be deemed to have commenced with the intention of ownership unless there are special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da469, Jun. 9, 1981; 91Da37751, May 8, 1992; 91Da37751, Apr. 15, 198). The possessor shall not change the nature of possession unless he/she re-enters possession with the intention of ownership or expresses his/her intention to hold it to the person who acquired the real estate to own it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Meu2317, Mar. 26, 1985; 8Da95, Apr. 11, 1989).

B. According to the facts established by the court below, since it is clear that the defendant Chungcheongnam-do leased the land of this case from the plaintiff before the Farmland Reform Act was enforced on June 21, 1949 and used it as school practice areas, the above defendant was not commencing to occupy the land of this case with the intention of ownership, and the above defendant, the local government which leased the land of this case, was aware that the farmland distribution disposition of this case, which was made to himself, is null and void as a matter of course without the cancellation of the permission to change the purpose of use of farmland of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, at the time when the land of this case was distributed farmland of this case. Thus, the above defendant cannot be deemed to have occupied the land of this case with the intention to own it with the farmland distribution, and the fact that the above defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer under his name with respect to the land of this case cannot be deemed to have

C. Thus, although the reasoning of the judgment of the court below is not somewhat insufficient, the court below's rejection of the defendants' assertion that the period of acquiring real estate ownership due to possession has expired at the expiration of 20 years from the date when the above defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer under his own name on the land of this case, or at the expiration of 10 years from the date when the land of this case was distributed as farmland, is justified. Thus, the court below's conclusion is just, and it is not acceptable to accept the argument that the judgment of the court below erred in violation of the rules of evidence or erred in the misapprehension of legal principles

4. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 4

The theory of lawsuit is against the defendants' assertion that the defendant Chungcheongnam-do acquired the ownership of the land of this case after the lapse of the period for acquiring the ownership of the land of this case due to the possession, on the premise that the court below did not determine it. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the theory of lawsuit.

5. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon-young (Presiding Justice)