(a) The nature of possession by the person who acquired and possessed real estate by an invalid juristic act with the knowledge that it is null and void;

(b) Whether another owner has completed the registration of ownership transfer under his name and is converted into an independent possession;

C. Whether an educational institution, etc. eligible to apply for a change in the purpose of use of farmland under Article 6(1)4 of the Farmland Reform Act is the owner of farmland

(a) When a person, who has acquired a real estate by an invalid juristic act, becomes aware that such juristic act is null and void, generally the person shall not be deemed to possess it with his intention at the beginning of such possession;

B. In order for the owner to be converted into the possession independently, the nature of the possession shall not change unless he/she expresses his/her intention to hold it again with a new title or to the person who has occupied it to him/her. In this case, it shall not be deemed that the owner has converted into the possession independently by expressing his/her intention to the possessor solely on the fact that the owner has completed the registration of ownership transfer in his/her name.

C. An educational institution that can apply for a change in the purpose of use of farmland pursuant to Article 6(1)4 of the Farmland Reform Act is not required to be the owner of farmland.

(b)Article 197(1) and Article 245(c) of the Civil Code; Article 6(1)4 of the Farmland Reform Act; Article 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act;

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 93Da1039 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1980, 12494 delivered on December 26, 1979) 80Da469 delivered on June 9, 1981 (Gong1981, 1398), Supreme Court Decision 91Da37751 delivered on May 8, 1992 (Gong192, 1818) (Gong1995 delivered on April 11, 1989)

[Defendant-Appellant] Han-Jon et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-appellee and two others

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 others (Attorney Shin Jong-chul, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 92Na656 delivered on July 15, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

The defendants' attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

In addition, the presumption of possession with autonomy is identical to the theory of lawsuit, but if a person who acquired real estate from another person by any juristic act becomes aware that the juristic act is null and void, it cannot be deemed that the person had possession with the intention of ownership at the beginning of such possession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 72Da1856, Dec. 12, 1972; 80Da469, Jun. 9, 1981; 91Da3751, May 8, 1992; 91Da37751, May 8, 1992). In addition, the presumption of possession with intention to convert the possession with the intention of ownership of another person or with the intention of possession of another person, the nature of the possession cannot change unless the person who acquired it with the intention of ownership expressed his intention to own it to the person who occupied it with the intention of ownership (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Da2317, Mar. 26, 1985).

According to the facts established by the court below, since the land of this case was leased from the plaintiff foundation before the Farmland Reform Act was enforced, it has been used as a practice area for the National Agricultural High School under its control. Thus, it is reasonable to view that the defendant who leased the land of this case was aware that the above disposition of farmland distribution was void as to the land of this case excluded from the object of purchase of farmland due to the change in the purpose of use of farmland of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at the time of distributing the land of this case, and since it cannot be deemed that the defendant Cheongnam-do occupied the land of this case as the intention of ownership since it was distributed the land of this case, and it cannot be deemed that the defendant Cheongnam-do occupied the land of this case as the intention of ownership merely with the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the defendant's name, it is proper and proper, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to autonomous possession (However, since the land acquisition of this case was made in the form of farmland distribution, the part of the court below's judgment that did not affect the defendant's fundamental property of this case.

2. On the second ground for appeal

Since it is not necessary for educational institutions, etc. to apply for the change of purpose of use of farmland pursuant to Article 6 (1) 4 of the Farmland Reform Act, it is legitimate to grant permission for the change of purpose of use of farmland through an application under the name of a budgetary and agricultural high school under the defendant's jurisdiction, and therefore, the land in this case is excluded from the object of purchase of farmland pursuant to the Farmland Reform Act due to the above granting permission. As such, it is null and void because the above granting permission for change of purpose of use of farmland is based on the application of a person who is not a farmland owner, or the land in this case was purchased by the government and lost its ownership because the plaintiff foundation lost its ownership due to the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act, the argument that the existing lease relationship between the plaintiff foundation and the defendant Chungcheongnam-do has ceased to exist is based on the premise. There

3. On the third ground for appeal

The above Board of Education, which is strictly divided between the property under its jurisdiction and the defendant Chungcheongnam-do, under the premise that the subject who received the instant land distribution is not the defendant Chungcheongnam-do but the defendant Chungcheong-do Education Committee, was not aware that the said farmland distribution was null and void, is based on the facts contrary to the judgment below's recognition, and it cannot be an issue of whether the Board of Education or its affiliated high school's recognition is recognized or not, as seen in the above, on the last day where the defendant Chungcheongnam-do was deemed to have known that the said farmland distribution was null and void. There is no reason to discuss.

4. On the fourth ground for appeal

The plaintiff's argument on the interruption or approval of the statute of limitations is merely a assumptive argument where the defendants' assertion on the interruption or approval of the statute of limitations is accepted, and there is no reason to view it further

5. All appeals are dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing Defendants. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)