[1] The case where the presumption of possession with independence is reversed

[2] The case holding that the presumption of autonomous possession was reversed in a case where a resident who lost a house due to flood was aware of the state-owned land which was allowed to be settled and constructed a house on the land as part of the state-owned land

[1] The issue of whether the possessor's possession is an independent possession is determined by the nature of the source of possessor's right which is the cause of the acquisition of possession or by all circumstances related to the possession. Thus, if it is proved that the possessor acquired the possession on the basis of title which appears to have no intention to own by nature, or if objective circumstances are proved that the possessor cannot be viewed as possessing with an intention to exercise exclusive control like his/her own property by removing another's ownership from his/her own property in an external and objective manner, the presumption of autonomous possession is broken, and if it is proved that the possessor has no legal requirements such as a juristic act which may cause the acquisition of ownership at the time of the commencement of possession without permission, barring any special circumstances, even if the possessor proves that he/she occupied the real estate owned by another person without permission without permission even though he/she does not have an intention to reject the ownership of another person and have no intention to possess it. Accordingly, the presumption of possession with the intention to own is broken.

[2] The case holding that, in a case where a local government allowed residents who lose their houses by flood to build houses on a State-owned land, the local government should not be deemed to have allowed such residents to use houses free of charge, so there is no difference in the circumstance that the residents had occupied neighboring land without compensation even if they knew that they had occupied the State-owned land, and in such a case, the presumption that the possession was the intention of possession was broken.

[1] Articles 197(1) and 245(1) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 197(1) and 245(1) of the Civil Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da54016 decided Aug. 11, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3122), Supreme Court Decision 95Da28502 decided Jan. 26, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 742), Supreme Court Decision 97Da32901 decided Oct. 24, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 3614) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 96Da29410 decided Nov. 8, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 3547), Supreme Court Decision 96Da50520 decided Apr. 11, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 196Da196979 decided Aug. 26, 197) 96Da52979 decided Apr. 16, 197

Plaintiff

Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff and nine others

Changwon District Court Decision 96Na3825, 3832 delivered on December 12, 1996

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Changwon District Court Panel Division.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 6 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 3 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 3 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 were the non-party 98.

However, since the issue of whether the possessor's possession is an autonomous possession in the acquisition by prescription shall be determined externally and objectively by the nature of the source of the possessor's right which is the cause of the acquisition by possession or by all circumstances related to the possession, if it is proved that the possessor acquired the possession on the basis of the title which appears to have no intention to own due to its nature, or if objective circumstances were proved that the possessor cannot be viewed as possessing with the intent to exercise exclusive control as in his/her own property by removing another's ownership from his/her own property through the external and objective perspective, the presumption of autonomous possession is broken. The possessor is deemed as not having the intention to reject the ownership of another person even in cases where it is proved that the possessor illegally occupied the real property owned by another without the knowledge of the absence of such legal requirements without the legal act or any other legal requirements that may cause the acquisition by the possessor at the time of the commencement of possession, barring any special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da28625, Aug. 21, 1997).

However, according to the evidence revealed in the oral argument of this case, even if the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were to be the non-party 6's residential address on May 31, 195, the ownership transfer registration was completed in the non-party 6's future on the same day, and on March 28, 1975, the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were to be the non-party 6's residential address on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's residential area on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's residential area on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 2's residential area on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's residential area on the non-party 6's residential area on the non-party 2 omitted.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the presumption of intention of possession, which is the requirement of independent possession, and the presumption of intention of possession, and the failure to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The grounds of appeal assigning this error are with merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)