(a) In calculating the prescription period, the total sum of the possession period for the previous land and that for the substitute land; and

(b) Requirements for recognition of the owner who is the content of independent possession;

(a) The possession of the land scheduled for substitution is deemed to be the same as the possession of the previous land, and the land determined for substitution is deemed as the same land as that of the previous land, and if the possession of the land scheduled for substitution and that of the land determined for substitution continue, the occupancy period of both land may be aggregated with respect to the nature of the

B. Since an intention of possession, which is the content of an autonomous possession, may be recognized only when determined by the nature of the title of possession or the possessor expressed his/her intent to hold it against the owner, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to possess the shares owned by the Defendant as owned by the Plaintiff in view of the nature of the title, unless the Plaintiff expressed his/her intent to own the shares of co-ownership of the land substitution corresponding to the Defendant’s ownership, even if the Plaintiff occupies the entire land substitution, in cases where two land owned by the original and

Article 245 of the Civil Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 79Da2344 delivered on March 11, 1980

Cho Ho Bank Co., Ltd., Counsel Kim Jong-type and flowing water

Pohang Trade Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Daegu High Court Decision 80Na633 delivered on October 17, 1980

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal against the plaintiff Kim Jong-sik (Supplementary grounds of appeal against the plaintiff's running water are limited to the extent of supplement in case of the above grounds of appeal).

With respect to the First Ground:

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below held that there is no evidence to acknowledge the plaintiff's assertion that the previous land of the building site of this case, the substitute land of which was determined, was only the land that the plaintiff purchased in installments from the defendant. Rather, this building site was owned by macroficial evidence to 31, 86, 25, and 10, 10, 218, 218, 218, 218, 218, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 29, 29, 37 (2, 3 omitted) of the defendant's (3 omitted), 31, 46, 25, and 10, 1000, 1962, 218, 1962, and 11,000,000,000 won, which were owned by the defendant. Thus, the court below's claim for the registration of substitute land was justified.

The issue is that the Plaintiff purchased the instant site itself from the Defendant, which was not asserted until the time of closing argument in fact-finding proceedings, by examining the claims that are inconsistent with the result of a replotting disposition that became final and conclusive and conclusive and that cannot affect its validity as the court, and thus, cannot be a legitimate ground for

With respect to the second ground:

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, as to the plaintiff's claim for the acquisition by prescription, the court below did not clearly dispute the facts that the plaintiff from around February 1955, 195 as the land for the bank building owned by the plaintiff, which was the land of the bank building owned by the plaintiff, and since the plaintiff possessed from around February 1959 before the completion of the above disposition of the acquisition by prescription, as long as 1/2 shares of the land in this case are registered before the defendant, it cannot be acquired by prescription on the register, and since the disposition of replotting became final and conclusive on December 11, 1962 as to the land in this case, it is merely limited to the land use and profit-making as the temporary use of the land in accordance with Article 58 of the Land Improvement Project Act (Act No. 648 of December 31, 1961), and it cannot be held as an independent possession in view of the nature of the title, and since the ownership of the land in this case was owned by the defendant, the acquisition by prescription period for the plaintiff's claim for acquisition by prescription shall also run over the past two years.

In light of the records, the possession of the land as the possession of the previous land is deemed to be the same as the possession of the previous land, and if the possession of the land as the substitute land is deemed to be the same as that of the previous land, and the possession of the land as the substitute land is continued, the occupancy period of both land may be aggregated with respect to the nature of the acquisition by prescription as pointed out. However, the intention of possession, which is the object of the acquisition by prescription, is determined by the nature of the title of the possession, or the possessor expresses his intention to own it to the owner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4294Da794, Feb. 15, 1962). According to the records, it can be viewed that the previous land owned by the plaintiff, as part of the previous land owned by the defendant, had no intention to own it by dividing it from the defendant on March 30, 1954.

Although the reasoning of the judgment of the court below is somewhat different from the party members, it is just in the conclusion that the plaintiff's possession of the building site cannot be deemed as an autonomous possession of the defendant's shares, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts or the nature of the possession without any evidence.

Therefore, all of the arguments are without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Kang Jong-young (Presiding Justice)