[1] In a case where the person who completed the registration of preservation of ownership due to the restoration of destruction and the person whose land was assessed, or the nominal owner prior to the destruction are different, the presumption of such registration

[2] The presumption of the right in the owner's column of land cadastre restored before the amendment of the Cadastral Act on December 31, 1975

[3] In a case where the date of receipt, receipt number, and cause date of the former registration are indicated individually in the registration for recovery of loss, whether the presumption of existence is recognized

[4] Where the presumption power of registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Transfer of Real Estate Ownership is reversed, and the degree of proof

[1] Where a person who has completed registration of preservation of ownership due to recovery after the registration is destroyed or lost is presumed to be a legitimate owner, but where a third party has discovered the relevant land, or there is another person who has made registration of preservation of ownership on the register before destruction or where he/she denies the transfer, the presumption of registration of preservation of ownership due to recovery is broken unless it has been completed under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Forest Ownership or under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Real Estate, so the registration shall become void unless the registered titleholder specifically conforms to the substantive relationship, or

[2] The land cadastre restored before the amendment of the Cadastral Act on December 31, 1975 is nothing more than arbitrarily restored for the convenience of taxation without any legal basis, and even if the name is indicated in the owner column, the presumption of right cannot be recognized in that description.

[3] Even if the date of receipt, receipt number, and cause date of the former registration were stated respectively as unclear in the registration for the recovery of destruction, the presumption is recognized unless there are any particular circumstances.

[4] Since registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Real Estate is presumed to be completed in accordance with the legitimate procedure under the same Act, it shall be presumed that the registration is in accordance with the substantive relationship. Thus, there is a burden of proof against the person who asserts the cancellation of the registration, but the other party bears the burden of proof against the person who makes a lawsuit for the cancellation of the registration, but when it is proved to the extent that the other party is false or that the substantial contents of the guarantee or written confirmation are not true, the presumption power of registration shall be deemed to have been reversed, and the degree of proof of falsity

[1] Articles 24 and 79 of the Registration of Real Estate Act, Article 186 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 13 of the Cadastral Act / [3] Article 80 of the Registration of Real Estate Act, Article 81 of the Registration of Real Estate Act / [4] Articles 6 and 10 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Real Estate Ownership, Article 186 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 81Da505 delivered on December 26, 1984 (Gong1985, 242), Supreme Court Decision 91Da20159 delivered on October 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 2705), Supreme Court Decision 93Da5704 delivered on March 11, 1994 (Gong1994, 1187) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Da4947 delivered on April 13, 1993 (Gong1993, 1382 delivered on September 14, 1993), Supreme Court Decision 93Da1579 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong1993, 1979) 93Da297989 delivered on August 29, 195 (Gong1993, No. 27699)

Plaintiff 1 and three others

Defendant 1 and one other (Attorney Kim Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

An independent party intervenor 1 and four others

Seoul District Court Decision 94Na32435, 40979 delivered on May 19, 1995

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Although a person who has completed registration of preservation of ownership due to recovery after the registry was destroyed or lost is presumed to be a lawful owner, in cases where a third party has discovered the land, or where there is another person who has conducted registration of preservation of ownership on the registry before the destruction or loss and that third party denies the transfer, the presumption of registration of preservation of ownership due to the recovery has broken down unless it is completed by the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Forest Ownership or by the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Transfer of Real Estate Ownership, etc., so unless the registered titleholder specifically conforms to the substantive relationship or fails to assert or prove the fact of acquisition by succession, the registration becomes null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Da505, Dec. 26, 1984; 93Da5704, Mar. 11, 1994; 93Da5704, Dec. 31, 1975; 2009Da13975, Dec. 31, 1975).

However, each old land register (the No. 2, 4, and 6 of the disease No. 2) cited by the arguments was restored to the original land register before the amendment of the above Cadastral Act. Thus, even if the name of the deceased non-party 1 was stated in the owner's column, it cannot be deemed that the entry alone became a situation in the name of the above non-party 1 or that the registration of ownership preservation was completed in the name of the deceased non-party 1 or a third party on the registry of the real estate of this case before the destruction.

In addition, the fact that even if the date of receipt, receipt number, and cause date of the former registration were written as unclear in the registration of recovery of destruction, the presumption of capacity is recognized unless there are any particular circumstances, is established since the en banc Decision 80Da3286 Decided November 24, 1981.

Therefore, the court below's decision to the same purport is just, and there is no reason to discuss the issue. The court below's decision to the same purport is justified.

The Second Ground of Appeal

Since registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Real Estate Ownership is completed in accordance with the lawful procedures prescribed in the same Act and is presumed to be consistent with the substantive relationship, there is the burden of proof against the person demanding the cancellation of the registration, but when the other party's substantive contents in a guarantee certificate or written confirmation, which forms the basis of the registration, are false or proven to the extent that substantive contents are not true, the presumption power of registration shall be deemed to have been reversed, and the degree of proof of the falsity of a guarantee certificate, etc. shall not be sufficient to the extent that the judge convictions the judge (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da39116, Feb. 10, 1995).

In addition, even if the evidence presented in the pleading is examined by comparing it with the record, there is no sufficient evidence to acknowledge that Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, who succeeded to his possession, possessed the real estate of this case for not less than 20 years, and thus, the court below's rejection of the defendants' defense of the prescription of possession is justifiable. The arguments are without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)