[1] Where the presumption of registration made under the former Act on Special Measures for the Transfer of Real Estate Ownership is reversed

[2] Where the other party asserts that he/she was donated by the title truster and the other party was the former registered titleholder with respect to the claim for cancellation of the registration of Paragraph (1) on the ground that there is no sale fact stated in the letter of guarantee, whether the letter of guarantee is deemed as false (affirmative)

[1] If it is proved to the extent that the substantial contents of a letter of guarantee or a written confirmation under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Real Estate Ownership are not true, the presumption power of registration shall be reversed.

[2] In a lawsuit seeking cancellation of ownership transfer registration completed pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Real Estate Ownership on the ground that there is no transaction fact recorded in the guarantee certificate, if the other party is the title trustee and himself/herself was directly donated by the former title trustee but for convenience, he/she was prepared a guarantee certificate as if he/she was purchased from the former title trustee, who was a title trustee, and received a written confirmation, and claimed that the registration of ownership transfer was completed pursuant to the same Act, it shall be deemed that the presumption of ownership transfer registration was broken because the substantial contents of the alteration of rights in the guarantee certificate are not consistent with the truth.

[1] Articles 6 and 10 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Transfer, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate / [2] Articles 6 and 10 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Transfer, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate / [3] Articles 6 and 10

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da47253 delivered on March 27, 1992 (Gong1992, 1394) Supreme Court Decision 95Da4792 delivered on October 11, 1996 (Gong1996Ha, 3305) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 92Da31804 delivered on January 19, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 724), Supreme Court Decision 93Da57490 delivered on March 11, 1994 (Gong194, 1185) (Gong195Sang, 1307)

Plaintiff (Attorney Choi Young-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Shin Shin-chul et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Jeonju District Court Decision 95Na491 delivered on June 27, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) If it is proven to the extent that the substantial contents of a letter of guarantee or written confirmation under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Real Estate are not true, the presumption power of registration is reversed.

The court below held that the above non-party 1 purchased each real estate of this case from the non-party 2 on October 1, 1969 and actually owns it. The defendant purchased each real estate of this case from the non-party 1, and entrusted the above non-party 2 with the title of the non-party 3, who purchased each of the real estate of this case from the non-party 2. The above non-party 3 was delivered the above non-party 1 to the non-party 1, who is the son's son before the death. The above non-party 2 and the non-party 3 obtained the above non-party 3's maintenance, so that the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the above non-party 1's name and the non-party 1's ownership transfer registration was not made under the above non-party 2's name, and it is not reasonable to find that the above non-party 1's ownership transfer registration was invalid, and it is not consistent with the legal principles as to the above non-party 1's ownership transfer registration.

(2) Meanwhile, according to the records, the non-party 2, who was the head of the family, died first of the above non-party 8 and was not the head of the household at the time of the death. Accordingly, it is evident that the non-party 1, the head of the above non-party 2, cannot become the heir of the above non-party 2. Thus, this does not constitute the "where the heir of the property" under the proviso of Article 1009 (1) of the Civil Code before the amendment, and thus, in calculating the share of inheritance of the above non-party 1, it shall not be added to 50 percent of the unique share of inheritance in accordance with the additional provision of the family heir's share of inheritance (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da3092 delivered on May 26, 1981). In the same purport, the court below was just in calculating the share of inheritance of the above non-party 1, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to inheritance share such as theory.

(3) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)