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(영문) 대법원 1992. 2. 14. 선고 91다12868 판결
[토지인도][공1992.4.1.(917),1013]
Main Issues

A. Whether the relative's priority over the sale of state property is recognized (negative)

(b) Requirements for the conversion of the possession into the possession independently;

C. The case affirming the conclusion that against the judgment of the court below that rejected the defense of the prescriptive acquisition on the ground that the state property is not subject to prescriptive acquisition, since the possessor's possession is an owner's possession by the nature of title

Summary of Judgment

A. The act of selling state property is a juristic act under private law, and there is no provision on the preferential purchase right such as the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Ownership, so the preferential right of the relative cannot be recognized by law.

(b) For the purpose of converting the possession into the possession frequently, the owner shall indicate his intention to own again with a new title, or to the person who has occupied it to his own;

C. The case affirming the conclusion of the judgment of the court below that rejected the defense of the prescriptive acquisition on the ground that it is not subject to the prescriptive acquisition on the ground that, in the event that the net part of the claimant for the prescriptive acquisition did not occupy it with the permission from the office of administration and applied for an extension of the period of possession upon the expiration of the period of possession, but it continued to occupy it with the notification that it was abolished and became a miscellaneous property of the State, the possession by the above deceased's permission for occupation constitutes a miscellaneous possession due to the nature of the title, and it cannot be deemed that the possession was converted into a miscellaneous possession from the time when it was abolished, and therefore

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 31 of the State Property Act;

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 4291Da117 delivered on May 15, 195 (No. 71) 64Nu122 delivered on December 15, 1964 (No. 12Nu7) 70Da1894 delivered on November 24, 1970 (No. 183Du294 delivered on January 27, 1976) (Gong1976,8975 delivered on May 25, 1982) 81Da195 delivered on May 25, 1982 (Gong1982,601) 88Da95 delivered on April 11, 1989 (Gong1989,738)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and five others

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and four takeovers, the deceased Nonparty 1’s taking over the lawsuit, Defendant 1 and 4 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 87Na1441 delivered on March 21, 1991

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

Reasons

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

According to the records, the defendants' assertion that the part of this case's land (c) and (d) are possessed as the site of the building that the defendants decided without title, as recognized by the court below, and that it is not used as a passage for the land owned by the defendants, such as the land of theory, and that it is not used as a passage for the land owned by the defendants. Thus, the defendants' assertion that the period for prescriptive acquisition of servitude between 20 years has expired on the premise that the above part of land is a passage. Thus, as long as the court below recognized that the above part of land is the site of the building illegally occupied by the defendants, it cannot be affected by the judgment even if the court below did not specify the judgment on

2. We examine the grounds of appeal Nos. 2, 3-2, 3-3.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, although non-party 2, who is the deceased non-party 2's part of the defendants, was the person holding the possession of the land of this case with the permission from the State, the court below determined that since the non-party 3, who is the deceased non-party 3, conspired with the public officials concerned in purchasing the land of this case and purchased the land of this case in the most manner, the above contract constitutes a juristic act contrary to social order and thus the contract is null and void, and if the purchase was discovered in such a fraudulent manner, the above contract should be cancelled. Thus, the defendants' defense that the above contract was cancelled by the above public offering is rejected on the ground that there is no evidence supporting the fact that the land of this case was illegally purchased through the above public offering. After confirming the fact that the land of this case is state-owned property, the court below determined that there is no provision on the preferential purchase right,

In light of the records, the court below's aforementioned determination of evidence cannot be deemed as a violation of the rules of evidence, and since the sale of state-owned property is a juristic act under the private law and there is no provision on the preferential right of purchase as to the right of purchase, the preferential right of the relative is not legally recognized (see Supreme Court Decision 70Da1894 delivered on November 24, 1970). Thus, the court below's judgment to the same purport is just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the status of the possessor of state-owned land or the cancellation of the contract.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

3. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 3-4 (4) and (5).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below agreed to make an objection against the non-party 4 who occupied the land of this case at the time of the purchase, which is the contract for the non-party 4, or for the non-party 4's third party. The defendant's defense that the non-party 4's objection against the above agreement is against the contract of the non-party 4, and even if there was the above agreement as to the defense of the non-party 4, it cannot be deemed as a conditional sale upon cancellation or a contract for the third party, and it cannot be deemed as a contract for the non-party 3, and it does not violate the principle of good faith or the principle of no counter-party 4. The above decision of the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to conditional sale or conditional sale or the contract for the third party, the principle of good faith, or the principle of no counter-party 4. The ground for appeal is without merit.

4. We examine the ground of appeal No. 3-1.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defense by the defendant's legal representative as to the defense that he acquired prescription by occupying the land of this case at 43.0 square meters with the intention of ownership for twenty (20) years, without confirming any fact about the possession or the form thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 245 of the Civil Act, the state property is not subject to the acquisition by prescription, and since the land of this case was originally sold to the non-party 3 on July 31, 1978 and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the name of Dong on August 21 of the same year, since it was not subject to the acquisition by prescription before the above registration fees, it is not subject to the acquisition by prescription and can only proceed with the period of the acquisition by prescription.

According to the records, the land of this case was originally used as a road managed by the construction division, and was opened as a passage. Thus, it was occupied by Nonparty 2, who is the deceased father of the defendants, from the Daegu City, the management agency, with permission to occupy and use the land. The defendant applied for permission to extend the occupancy period to continue possession upon the expiration of the occupancy period (record 523 pages), but it was notified by the Daegu City Mayor as of July 6, 1965 that the land was abolished as of July 19, and was sold to the above non-party 3 on July 31, 1978. Thus, the above non-party 2's possession under the permission to occupy and use the land of this case, which was sold to the above non-party 3, as stated in its reasoning, can not be viewed as holding as a principal possession in the nature of its title, and it cannot be viewed as a new owner or a new owner's intention to use the land as of July 19, 198.

Therefore, regardless of whether the judgment of the court below on Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act with respect to the prescriptive acquisition is unlawful, the conclusion of the court below that rejected the defense of the above prescriptive acquisition is just and does not affect the judgment, and it is not reasonable to point this out as

5. Accordingly, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1991.3.21.선고 87나1441
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