(a) Purport of the law demanding entry of “day”, “place”, and “method” as a method specified in the facts charged;

B. Whether a prosecution without specifically indicating the three elements of Paragraph (a) is invalid

(c) The meaning of "criminal organization" as provided in Article 4 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

(d) The meaning of the authenticity of the protocol in which the prosecutor made the statement of the suspect or any person other than the suspect;

A. The "date" of the crime referred to in Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides the specific method of the facts charged, requires a statement to the extent that it does not conflict with double prosecution or prescription, and the "place" requires a statement to the extent that it does not conflict with territorial jurisdiction, and the " method" requires a statement to the extent that it expresses the elements of the crime, and the legislative purport of the law requiring that it be equipped with three specific elements of the facts of the crime charged is to limit the scope of the defendant's defense to facilitate the defense right by limiting the scope of the defendant's defense, so the facts of the prosecution shall be stated to the extent that it can identify the specific facts that meet the above three specific elements and are different from the facts.

B. Even if there is a case in which the date, time, place, method, etc. of a crime are clearly stated in the indictment, if it does not go against the extent that it is necessary to write the "day", "place", and "manner" as stated in subparagraph (a), and if it is deemed that the overall indication of three elements is unavoidable in light of the nature of the crime charged, and it does not interfere with the defendant's exercise of his/her right to defense, the indictment shall not be deemed null and void as a violation of

C. The crime organization provided for in Article 4 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act refers to a organized body with a continuous and minimum ventilation system, which is formed by many specified persons, with the common purpose of committing a crime provided for in the same Act.

D. A protocol in which a prosecutor made a statement of a suspect or a person other than a suspect may be admitted as evidence when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of its formation ought to be deemed to include the formal formation of protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the substantive formation of protocol that the protocol is written in accordance with the contents of the statement.

Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 4 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act; Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 89Do112 delivered on June 13, 1989 (Gong1989, 1103) (Gong1991, 2878 delivered on October 25, 1991) 92Do256 delivered on April 24, 1992 (Gong1992, 174 delivered on November 24, 1992). Supreme Court Decision 92Do2432 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong193Sang, 307) (Gong192, 2318). A. Supreme Court Decision 92Do2636 delivered on January 19, 193 (Gong192, 2318)

Defendant 1 and seven others

Defendants

Attorney Lee Byung-chul et al.

Gwangju High Court Decision 94No302 delivered on June 10, 1994

All of the defendants' appeals are dismissed.

The number of detention days after the appeal shall be 50 days each included in the original sentence (in the case of the defendant's assistance, the punishment against the first offense in the judgment) of the defendants.

1. Defendant 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and state appointed defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined.

(1) Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides the specific method of the facts charged, requires a statement to the extent that it does not conflict with the time limit for double prosecution or prescription, and “place” requires a statement to the extent that the elements of a crime are specified. The purport of the law requiring three specific elements of the facts charged is to limit the scope of the defendant’s defense and to facilitate the defense right by limiting the scope of the defendant’s defense. Thus, the facts charged are to be stated to the extent that it is possible to distinguish the specific facts that meet the above three specific elements of the crime (see Supreme Court Decision 89Do112, Jun. 13, 1989). Thus, even if the date, time, place, method, etc. of the crime are stated in the indictment specifically, if it is not contrary to the extent that the defendant’s defense right can be exercised, it does not go against the extent that the time, place, and method of the crime are stated “date” as mentioned above, and it appears that it does not interfere with the execution procedure of the prosecution.

According to the records, the facts charged of the establishment of the crime organization of this case is established in collusion with the Defendants, from the lower police officer on October 1, 1991 to the lower police officer on November 1, 1992, by establishing the leading authority of the violent world in the leisure region in the leisure region in the leisure village, and the name of the organization in the leisure village, such as gathering of fish and shellfish living in the neighboring protected waters, and for the purpose of undermining the right to control such right, the name of the organization in the leisure village in the leisure village, etc. shall be deemed to be a "new citizen strike" and the name of the organization shall be deemed to be a "new citizen strike"; Defendant 8 shall be an advisory officer; Defendant 3, and 4 shall be an assistant officer; Defendant 2, etc. shall be an act-level executive officer; and Defendant 2, etc. shall be deemed to have constituted an "civil citizen strike" organization with the name of force force, the date, place, method, etc. of the crime, and shall not be justified.

(2) Examining the evidence adopted by the court of first instance, which was maintained by the court below in accordance with the records, the court below is just that the court below constituted a crime group consisting of Defendant 1’s leader, Defendant 3, 4, 5, and 8 as an executive member, Defendant 2, 6, and 7 as an acting member, Defendant 1’s attack against Defendant 1 and 2, Defendant 4’s attack against Defendant 3, Defendant 4’s attack against Defendant 6’s injury, Defendant 5’s injury, Defendant 5’s injury, Defendant 6, Defendant 7’s threat against Defendant 2’s injury, damage, and injury, and there is no error of law of misconception of facts against the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit.

The crime organization provided for in Article 4 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act refers to a combination that is organized with a continuous and minimum command system formed by many and specified persons under the common purpose of committing a crime provided for in the same Act (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do2432 delivered on November 24, 192).

As duly determined by the court below, Defendant 1, etc. established the right to lead the violent world and formed a "new citizen strike" under the name of Defendant 1 as an executive member, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, 5, and 8, and Defendant 2, Defendant 6, and 7, etc., with the intent to exercise the right to object, such as gathering fish and shellfish living in nearby waters and to exercise the control over such right by establishing the power to lead the violent world, and as such, Defendant 1 et al. formed a "new citizen strike" under the name of acting as an executive member, Defendant 2, 6, and 7, etc., and followed the guidelines for organized life and the action guidelines by taking advantage of the organization as an absolute measure to comply with the organization's order, and performed violent acts such as violence, intimidation, threat, threat, threat, damage of property, etc., and thus, the organization "new citizen" can be deemed as a combination with the common action system within the organization. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude it as a criminal organization under Article 4 of the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act.

2. Defendant 8 and his defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined together.

(1) A protocol in which a prosecutor made a statement of a suspect or a person other than a suspect may be admitted as evidence when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. The authenticity of the formation here means the authenticity of the protocol including the formal formation of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the substantial authenticity that the protocol is written according to the contents of the statement (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do2636 delivered on Jan. 19, 1993).

According to the records, it is recognized that the victim 5 and 8's statement of the prosecutor's preparation of evidence of the first instance court maintained by the court below on the date of the first instance court's trial that the victim 5 and 8 entered the above protocol as the victim's statement, signature, unmanned, and its contents. Thus, the court below was legitimate to adopt each protocol of the prosecutor's preparation of the victim 5 and 8 as evidence of guilt against the defendant, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit.

On the other hand, Defendant 8's written statement of Defendant 8 of the public prosecutor's protocol consented that the defendant can be admitted as evidence at the third public trial of the court of first instance, and it is recognized that there is a seal, signature or seal of the defendant in the written statement, so the above written statement can be admitted as evidence. Thus, the court below's measure that the court below adopted the above written statement as evidence of guilt against the defendant is legitimate, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit. However, among the above written evidence, the prosecutor's written statement of Defendant 6 of the above written statement of Defendant 6 of the public prosecutor was not consented to it at the public trial of the defendant or his defense counsel, and it is not recognized as the authenticity by the defendant's written statement of Defendant 6, which is not admitted as evidence. Thus, it is reasonable to discuss this point, but it is sufficient to recognize the criminal facts of this case by the remaining evidence except the above written statement as seen below. Thus, the illegality of the above written statement as evidence does not affect the judgment and thus it cannot be accepted.

(2) Examining the remaining evidence of the court of first instance, which was maintained by the court below in accordance with the records, except for the written statement as to Defendant 6 prepared by the prosecutor, the court below acknowledged the fact that Defendant 1, etc. was in charge of opinion-raising and supporting the organizational activity expenses when determining the important matters of the organization and operation as an advisory member, and it did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the executive officers under Article 4 subparagraph 2 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, since Defendant 1, etc. established the leading authority of the local violent community of this case with respect to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, and a crime organization with a command command system for the purpose of exercising violence, such as gathering fish and shellfish in neighboring protected waters, and for the purpose of exercising the control over it.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and some of the detention days after the appeal against the Defendants are to be included in each original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)