[1] Whether the scope of the clan members who are the object of convening a clan meeting should be determined by the clan member in the case where the clan member was published (affirmative with qualification)

[2] The validity of a resolution of the general meeting of a clan, which lacks the method of convening convening the general meeting of a clan and the notification of some members of a clan (negative)

[3] Whether the exercise of voting right by proxy submission is permissible in the method of resolution by a clan general meeting (affirmative)

[4] The meaning of "a case where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of an obligation" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

[5] In a lawsuit seeking monetary payment, where the first instance court accepted only a part of the Plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the remainder of the claim, the period during which the Defendant is deemed reasonable to dispute as to the existence or scope of the obligation (= until the judgment of the first instance court is rendered)

[1] It is reasonable to determine the scope of the clan members subject to a notification for convening a clan meeting, unless there are special circumstances, such as errors in the descriptions of the clans, if the clans were published.

[2] Unless there are special circumstances, a clan general meeting shall be held after determining the scope of the members of the clan who are subject to a notification of convening a meeting, and each person shall be given an opportunity to participate in the meeting, discussion, and resolution by individually convening a notification of communication to all the members of the clan who reside in the Republic of Korea, and their whereabouts are clear. There is no resolution of the clan general meeting held without a notification of convening a meeting to some members of the clan, but the method of convening a meeting shall not be necessarily required in writing directly, but it shall be done orally or by telephone, and it shall be done only through other

[3] In the method of resolution by the general meeting of clans, a member of the clan may exercise his/her right to vote in writing or by proxy, so it is allowed to exercise the right to vote on the appointment of the representative of the clan in accordance with the proxy system for other members present without being present at the general meeting of the clans.

[4] Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "a case where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation" refers to a case where there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, the issue of whether it is unreasonable to dispute above can be deemed as a matter of fact finding and evaluation of the court with respect to the case in question.

[5] In a lawsuit seeking monetary payment where the first instance court accepted only a part of the plaintiff's claim and rejected the remainder of the claim, the defendant, barring any special circumstance, shall be deemed reasonable to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment of the first instance is rendered, and thus, the statutory interest rate under Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings shall not apply to damages for delay on the cited amount until the judgment of the first instance is rendered

[1] Articles 31 and 71 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 31 and 71 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 31, 73(2), and 75 of the Civil Act / [4] Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings / [5] Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Da42439 delivered on March 9, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 152), Supreme Court Decision 93Da514 delivered on May 10, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1654), Supreme Court Decision 98Da6068 delivered on May 25, 199 (Gong1999Ha, 1255) 2] Supreme Court Decision 78Da1436 delivered on December 13, 1979, Supreme Court Decision 86Da2654 delivered on June 23, 198 (Gong1987, 194, 194, 294, 294, 196Da2654 delivered on June 23, 197)

Analym Korea Association (Law Firm Sami General Law Office, Attorneys Kim Young-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and six others (Attorney Han-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 98Na53518 delivered on March 10, 1999

1. Of the part against the above defendant as to the conjunctive claim against the defendant 7, the part of the judgment below ordering the plaintiff to pay in excess of 26,775,90 won per annum from March 11, 1998 to August 20 of the same year, and 25 percent per annum from the next day to the date of full payment. The part corresponding to the above cancellation in the judgment of the first instance shall be revoked, and the part of the plaintiff's claim shall be dismissed. 3. The remainder of the appeal by the defendant 7 and the remaining appeals by the defendants shall be dismissed. 4. The total costs of the lawsuit between the plaintiff and the defendant 7 shall be five minutes, and the remainder shall be borne by the plaintiff and the remaining defendants, and the costs of appeal between the plaintiff and the remaining defendants shall be borne by the remaining defendants.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. It is reasonable to determine the scope of the clan members who are subject to a notification for convening a clan meeting, unless there are special circumstances such as errors in the descriptions of the clans, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da6068, May 25, 1999; 93Da51454, May 10, 1994). Thus, the court below is just in finding the fact that the clan members of the plaintiff clan are currently 50 members of the plaintiff clan according to the descriptions of the clans, and there is no error in the misapprehension of facts against the rules of evidence as alleged in the arguments. The appeal by the defendants in this part is without merit.

In addition, the general meeting of a clan shall, unless there are special circumstances, determine the scope of the members of the clan who are subject to notification of convening the meeting and debate, and provide each person with an opportunity to participate in the meeting and debate and resolution by individually convening a notification of communication to all the members of the clan who are able to reside in the Republic of Korea, and the resolution of the general meeting of a clan held without the notification of convening the meeting is invalid. However, the method of convening the meeting shall not be required in writing directly, but it shall be done orally or by telephone, and it shall be done only through another clan or by telephone (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 86Da2654, Jun. 23, 1987; 78Da1436, Dec. 13, 1978). The court below's reasoning that the defendant's notification of the name of the members of the clan was not a legitimate reason for the appeal to the members of the clan who are not the head of the clan at the time of the general meeting of clans as of October 27, 1996.

In addition, the decision of the general meeting of the clans is just in holding that the delegation of voting rights to the members of the 11 member of the 11 member of the 11 member of the 11st member of the 11st member of the 193 clans is valid, since some members of the 3th member are entitled to vote in writing or by proxy, and it is also allowed to exercise the right to vote on the appointment of the representative of the 11 member of the 11 member of the 11 member of the 11st member of the 10th member of the 193 clans by the proxy submission method for other members present (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da44902, Jan. 26, 1993; 91Da25383, Nov. 8, 1991) in the resolution of the general meeting of the 19 clans

2. In accordance with the evidence established by the court below, the court below found that the forest land in this case was owned by the plaintiff clan and owned by 13 persons including the non-party, etc. for convenience, and that each share transfer registration made in the name of the non-party among the above forest land was not sold by the non-party to the above defendants, and that it was made against his will despite the non-party's granting the disposal authority or not consented to the disposition, and that the possession of the part in this case among the above forest land in this case among the above forest land in the defendant 7, the title trustee cannot be viewed as an independent possession due to the nature of the title. On the basis of the records and records, the court below's fact-finding and judgment are just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the misconception of facts against the rules of evidence, the title trust and the independent possession as alleged. There is no ground for appeal by the defendants in this part.

3. "Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings refers to the time when there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, the issue of whether the dispute is unreasonable can be deemed to relate to the fact-finding and evaluation by the court concerning the case in question. However, in a lawsuit seeking monetary payment, if the first instance court accepted only part of the Plaintiff's claim and dismissed the remainder of the claim, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable for the Defendant to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment of the first instance is rendered, and the statutory interest rate under Article 3 (1) of the above Act shall not apply to delay damages on the cited amount until the judgment of the first instance is rendered (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da64103, Feb. 23, 199; 9Da64234, Feb. 17, 1995).

Therefore, in this case, while the first instance court accepted only a part of the plaintiff's conjunctive claim against the defendant 7 and dismissed the remainder of the claim, it is erroneous to apply the statutory interest rate of 25% per annum as stipulated in the above Special Act even from the next day of the delivery of a copy of the complaint to the day of the decision. Thus, the court below should have revoked the cited part of the above defendant's appeal, which exceeds the annual 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act during the above period, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages for delay. However, the court below erred by misapprehending the above legal principles. Meanwhile, since the court below maintained the first instance court's own cited amount, it is reasonable to see the existence and scope of the obligation to perform the above cited amount, and therefore the above defendant's damages for delay from the next day of the judgment of the court of first instance to the day of the decision of the court below as stipulated in the above Special Act.

Ultimately, there are some grounds for appeal by the above defendant disputing the cited damages for delay. Among the ancillary claims against the above defendant, the part against the above defendant among the part against the above defendant among the conjunctive claims against the above defendant cannot be exempted from reversal, and this part is deemed sufficient for the Supreme Court to see it, and therefore, it is decided to self-determination in accordance with Article 407 of the

Thus, Defendant 7 is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum prescribed by the Civil Act and 25% per annum from the next day to the next day of August of the judgment of the first instance, which is the date on which the delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case, which the court below acknowledged by the court below as follows: from March 11, 1998, it is obvious that Defendant 7 is the next day for the delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case, and from August 20 of the same year, it is reasonable to dispute about the existence or scope of the obligation to perform; therefore, Defendant 7 is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 26,775,90 won per annum as determined by the court below; since the plaintiffs' conjunctive claim against the above defendant in the judgment of the first instance as to the conjunctive claim against the above defendant is justified, the part exceeding the above cited part is revoked, and the plaintiff's conjunctive claim against the above defendant is dismissed.

4. Therefore, Defendant 7’s final appeal is partly reasonable, and the Supreme Court has accepted it and decided to render the final judgment as per Disposition 1 and 2. The remaining final appeal by the above Defendant and the remaining Defendants’ final appeal are all dismissed as it is without merit. The total costs of the lawsuit between the Plaintiff and Defendant 7 are shared. The costs of the lawsuit between the Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-sik (Presiding Justice)