(a) The burden of proving the intention of possession, which is the requirement for the acquisition by prescription;

B. Whether the presumption of possession with autonomy should be reversed in a case where the possessor’s source of possessor’s right is not acknowledged (negative)

C. The meaning of possession with respect to prescriptive acquisition

D. The case holding that the defendant's possession of the above site is not converted into the possession of a third party on the ground that the above non-party 1 received a letter from the head of the branch office that he would confirm that the above site was owned by the defendant association while the non-party 1 occupied the site as the site of the building of the branch office, and he would transfer it to him, etc.

A. In the case of prescriptive acquisition, the intention of possession, which is the requirement for possession with intention to hold it objectively, is determined by the nature of the source of possessory right, but if the nature of the source of possessory right is unclear, it is presumed that possession with intention to hold it independently pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Therefore, the possessor does not have the responsibility to prove the nature of the source of possessory right to support the possession with intention to hold it independently, and there is the burden of proof

B. Even if the possessor asserts his/her right to possession, such as purchase and sale, but this is not recognized, the presumption of possession with autonomy cannot be reversed or deemed as the possession with the nature of the possessor’s possession.

(c) In the case of prescriptive acquisition, possession means a possession with the intent to control the same owner, and it does not mean a legally entitled title, that is, the ownership, or an possession with the belief of having ownership.

D. The case holding that the defendant's possession of the above site is not converted into the possession of a third party on the ground that the above non-party 1 received a letter from the head of the branch office that he would confirm that the above site was owned by the defendant association while the non-party 1 occupied the site as the site of the building of the branch office, and he would transfer it to him, etc.

Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Da8312 delivered on December 26, 1990 (Gong1991, 614), 91Da8593, 8609 delivered on June 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 1909).B. Supreme Court Decision 89Meu1840 delivered on March 9, 1990 (Gong1990, 870), 91Da6139 delivered on July 12, 1991 (Gong1991, 2149).B. (A) Supreme Court Decision 85Da230 delivered on April 14, 1987 (Gong1987, 779).

Plaintiff-Appellant Kim Yong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Attorney Lee Jae-hoon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant of the Gyeongbuk-do Cooperatives

Daegu District Court Decision 90Na1166 delivered on November 7, 1990

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that, on January 12, 1981, the defendant association's possession of the land of this case was completed on the land of this case and it did not constitute the plaintiff's ownership transfer registration of the land of this case, since the defendant association's possession of the land of this case was completed on the ground of the expiration of 20 years since the defendant association's possession of the land of this case and the possessor's possession of the land of this case would be presumed to have been jointly and openly possessed with the intent of ownership transfer as owned by the defendant association on January 12, 1981.

(2) In the case of acquisition by prescription, an intention of possession, which is the requirement for possession with intention to hold possession, is objectively determined by the nature of the source of possession right, but if the nature of the source of possession right is unclear, it is presumed that the possession with intention to support the possession with intention to hold possession is presumed pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Thus, the possessor is not liable to prove the nature of the source of possession right, and there is no burden for the other party who asserts the possession with the reversal of the legal presumption as above. In the case where the possessor asserts the right of possession with intention to hold possession, such as the purchase and sale, but this is not recognized, the presumption of possession with intention to hold possession cannot be reversed or it cannot be deemed as the owner with the nature of the source of possession, or as the owner with the intention to hold possession with the same intention to hold possession with the same intention to control the owner. In this context, it is not the case where the possessor has the legal title or the ownership of ownership.

(3) According to the records, among the evidence submitted by the plaintiff as to the fact that the possession of the defendant association is the possession of a third party, the non-party 2's statement is merely about the circumstance that the students in the mountain zone were to purchase the site of this case, and according to the witness examination protocol as to the non-party 3, he stated that the non-party 4, who was the head of the office of the defendant association, at the time when the non-party 4 had known the site of this case as the personal property of the union members, had been registered in the name of the defendant association as of 1976, and that the non-party 4 had been inevitably registered in the name of the defendant association. Rather, the non-party 5 stated that the promotion committee did not directly manage the building of this case, and it is difficult to view that the non-party 6 stated that the non-party 7, who was the witness of this case, was to use the land of this case as the personal property of the union members, and that the non-party 4, who was the defendant association's office of this case, did not use the credibility and it.

(4) As seen earlier, the lower court confirmed the factual basis that the Defendant Cooperative built the instant building and subsequently acquired it from the original owner of the instant building, and the Plaintiff contests it as the Plaintiff’s principal. However, even if Nonparty 7, the head of the office of the Defendant Cooperative, at the time, knew that the instant building was owned by the Defendant Cooperative, and that Nonparty 7, the head of the office of the headquarters of the Defendant Cooperative, was possessed by the Defendant Cooperative, at the time, would be apparent in the record. Therefore, the possession of the instant building does not directly lead

(5) In light of the reasoning of the judgment below, the plaintiff's assertion of possession of the land of this case was rejected, and there was some explanation by class students as if they were donated to the defendant association. However, considering the reasoning of the judgment below as a whole, the land of this case was prepared by class students, and the above non-party 7 knew that class students in this case donated the land of this case to the defendant association, and occupied the land of this case by using the building of this case. Thus, the court below cannot accept the argument based on the premise that the facts that class students donated the land of this case to the defendant association were confirmed. Further, even if the defendant association received a letter from the non-party 4, who was the head of the office of the defendant association at the time of commencement of possession of the land of this case from the non-party 4, which was the head of the office of the defendant association, to confirm that the land of this case was owned by the students in this case and will be transferred to transfer according to the demand of the students in this case, this is not the conversion of possession of the land of this case to the plaintiff association.

(6) Ultimately, the defendant union's possession of the site in this case is presumed to be an independent possession, and the court below's acceptance of the objection against the prescriptive acquisition by the defendant union as to the site in this case under such judgment is just and there are no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the intention of ownership, or in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the mistake of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, failure to exhaust all necessary deliberation, and the judgment of the court below, which found the facts not based on evidence, such as the mistake of facts

(7) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-sung (Presiding Justice)