A. The meaning of the judgment of the court of final appeal that has been remanded is bound by the court of final appeal, and whether the court can conduct new fact-finding as to the issues on the merits by new evidence or reinforced evidence through pleading (affirmative)

B. Change of facts by new evidence after remand and binding force of the judgment of remand

(c) Time to prepare a document stating an intention of gift under Article 555 of the Civil Act;

A. Although the court to which the case was remanded, is bound by the factual and legal judgment of the court of final appeal as the reason for reversal, the court is bound by the factual judgment of the court of final appeal. The purport is that the court of final appeal is bound by the factual judgment of the court of final appeal as to the matter to be examined ex officio. As such, the court of final appeal to which the case was remanded cannot make a new fact-finding as to the issue on the merits by new evidence or reinforced evidence

B. The binding force of the court of final appeal does not extend to a legal determination made by the reason for reversal, in a case where there is a change in the facts underlying the binding judgment of the court of final appeal as a result of a new submission or reinforcement of evidence by the parties’ assertion during the course of a trial after remanding the case from the court of final appeal.

C. Since there is no legal limitation as to the time to prepare a document expressing the intent of donation under Article 555 of the Civil Act, if the document was not prepared at the time of the formation of the donation contract, and thereafter the document is prepared during the existence of the above contract, then the party may not arbitrarily rescind it as a donation from that time.

(b)Article 406(2) of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 555 of the Civil Code

A. Supreme Court Decision 86Nu2930 Decided August 25, 1987 (Gong1987, 1518), 88Nu6 Decided November 22, 198 (Gong1989, 30), 90Da13697 decided April 23, 1991 (Gong1991, 1456), 86Nu90 decided November 10, 1987 (Gong1988, 102, 1988, 198, 199.

Samho Co., Ltd. and four others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant 1 and one other, Defendants et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee)

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na12655 delivered on December 17, 1991

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

1. Although the court to which the case was remanded was remanded to the court of final appeal is bound by the factual and legal judgment of the court of final appeal as the reason for reversal, it is the purport that the court of final appeal shall be bound by the factual judgment of the court of final appeal only for the actual judgment of the court of final appeal as to the matters to be examined ex officio. Thus, the court of final appeal to which the case was remanded cannot establish new facts as to the issue of the case based on new evidence or reinforced evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2930 delivered on August 25, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 90Da13697 delivered on April 23, 191; Supreme Court Decision 90Da13697 delivered on April 23, 191; Supreme Court Decision 90Da13697 delivered on April 27, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 2008Da29789 delivered on October 27, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 2007Da18479782982.

The grounds for reversal of the second judgment by party members are only based on the facts that the Defendants actually donated the instant real estate to Nonparty 1, and that it does not include the Defendants’ delegation purport as to Nonparty 4-1 and Nonparty 5-1 (a disposal delegation letter). It is nothing more than the judgment on the interpretation of legal act that permits the Defendants to transfer the instant real estate to the Plaintiff, the obligor, and to deprive the Defendants of their opportunity to exercise their right to indemnity as their surety’s owner. After the second remand, the lower court, based on the evidence before and after remand, deemed that the instant real estate was not a substantial donation from Nonparty 1, and that the Defendants lent the real estate in the name of the Defendants to be excluded from sale due to the measures taken on September 27, 200 by the government authorities, and that it was difficult for the Defendants to recognize that the real estate was returned to Nonparty 1, the Plaintiff’s owner, Nonparty 2, and the Plaintiff and a person with a special relationship, who returned to the Plaintiff by means of a new method of disposal of the real estate under the Plaintiff’s name’s right to indemnity.

Such judgment of the court below is different from the judgment of the court below prior to the second remand, and it is based on the recognition of new facts different from those which form the basis of the judgment of reversed and remanded, and thus, the judgment of the party members remanded cannot be deemed to conflict with the legal judgment as the grounds for reversal. The judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles of Article 406 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act concerning the binding force of the judgment of reversed and remanded. Further, the above fact-finding by the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence, such as the theory

2. Examining the evidence established by the court below, the defendants, the title trustee of the real estate of this case, delegated the right to donate the real estate to the Choung Bank under the intention of Nonparty 1, the title truster, and the above Choung Bank, on July 25, 1984 and August 20, 198, recognized that the above real estate was donated on behalf of the defendants to the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants. Such fact-finding by the court below is justified, and it cannot be deemed that the contents such as evidence No. 12-2, No. 3, 4, and evidence No. 13-1, 3, and 5 were rejected or violated. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the probative value of the disposal document, nor did it violate the rules of evidence.

Therefore, even if the Defendants terminated the delegation of the authority to dispose of the above Choung Bank on July 20, 1985 and January 8, 1986, which was after the donation as above, the above donation to the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have been made without the authority, so such judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the termination of delegation, such as theory, and there is no evidence to prove that Defendant 1 cancelled the above donation contract to the Plaintiff on July 20, 1985, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the cancellation of the contract. The judgment of the court below, which rejected the Defendant’s objection to the cancellation of the donation contract on the ground that there is no evidence to prove that Defendant

3. The decision of the court below to the effect that since there is no legal limitation as to the time for the preparation of a document expressing the intent of donation under Article 555 of the Civil Act, even if the document was not prepared at the time of the formation of the donation contract, if the document was later prepared during the existence of the above contract, the parties cannot arbitrarily rescind it as a written donation from that time. As to the self-donation contract on July 25, 1984 and August 20, 198, which was effective until that time, by the Cho Heung Bank Co., Ltd., which represented the defendants, made it impossible for the defendants to dispute the validity of the above donation contract from that time, by lawfully preparing and delivering the document stating the intent of donation under Article 55 of the Civil Act (Ga evidence 9-1 and 2) with respect to the self-donation contract on August 25, 1984, which had been effective until that time, it is in accordance with the purport of the judgment of the first return of party members.

In addition, the evidence No. 9-1 and No. 2 are not prepared by the Plaintiff, a donee, on behalf of the Defendants, the donor, and the Defendants’ assertion that: (a) No. 4-1 and No. 5-1 are prepared by the Defendants on behalf of the Defendants by Cho Heung-ung Bank, a corporation entrusted with the right of donation regarding the instant real estate by the Defendants; and (b) as seen earlier, No. 9-1 and No. 2 were prepared by the donee on behalf of the donor; and (c) the Defendants’ assertion that the donee was forged without authority and cannot be deemed as a lawful gift document is also acceptable. The arguments are

All appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice) Park Young-dong Kim Jong-ho