(a) The validity of amended rules of employment without consent by collective decision-making method of a workers group;

B. Method of collective decision-making under Paragraph (a) above

(c) Whether a person has received a retirement allowance under an invalid provision of remuneration without objection and ratification of a provision of remuneration;

A. When the preparation or revision of the rules of employment under Article 95(1) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 4099, Mar. 29, 1989) imposes unfavorable working conditions by depriving workers of their rights or interests, the consent by the collective decision-making method of a labor group that was subject to the previous conditions of employment or the rules of employment is required, and without such consent, the revised rules of employment is invalid unless it is recognized that it is reasonable by social norms.

(b) Collective decision-making method is not necessarily a method of holding a meeting by which all workers of a business or workplace are bound to gather opinions from workers by exchanging opinions among workers under the condition that the employer's involvement or interference by unit department of a business or workplace is excluded, and it is also permissible to gather opinions as a whole after gathering them.

C. At the time of signing a collective agreement, a trade union or employee of a government-invested institution provided that the remuneration provision was valid, and even if there was no objection from the employee who received retirement allowances under the said remuneration provision, it cannot be deemed that there was an amendment of invalid remuneration provision merely for such reason.

Article 95(1) of the former Labor Standards Act

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 92Da39778 delivered on January 15, 1993 (Gong1993,710) (Gong1993,710). Supreme Court Decision 92Da49324 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993,863). Supreme Court Decision 89Meu24780 delivered on March 13, 1990 (Gong1990,82), Supreme Court Decision 91Da45165 delivered on December 22, 1992 (Gong193,546). Supreme Court Decision 91Da2505 delivered on February 25, 1992 (Gong192,1125c). 91Da4692935 delivered on September 14, 1992 (Gong192,125).

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Choi Han-sil, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na47214 delivered on February 24, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

In a case where the preparation or revision of the rules of employment under Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act imposes unfavorable working conditions by depriving an employee of his rights or interests, the consent is required by the collective decision-making method of a labor group to which the previous rules of employment or the rules of employment had been applied, and without such consent, the revised rules of employment has no validity unless it is deemed reasonable by social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 89Meu24780, Mar. 13, 1990; 92Da39778, Jan. 15, 1993).

According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the salary regulations of this case, which was revised by the defendant Corporation as of January 27, 1981, were changed to the disadvantage of its employees, and there was no consent from the employees belonging to the defendant in collective decision-making method. As the above salary regulations were pointed out in the lawsuit, since government-invested institutions, including the defendant Corporation, such as the government-invested institutions, have been operating in an unreasonable manner, such as when the payment rate of retirement allowances for their employees was too high compared to the general public, and have been settled rapidly, even if the payment rate of retirement allowances for their employees was increased due to the increase of the national tax burden, it was corrected, and it was made through a resolution of the board of directors with the assistance of other state-owned enterprises in accordance with the policies of the government-invested institutions to correct it and avoid the proper operation of the state-owned enterprises, and even if there was no objection from the employees who received retirement allowances under the revised salary regulations after the amendment, it cannot be viewed that there was no error in the misapprehension of the rules of employment 972, or 97.2.

The theory argues that the labor union of the defendant Corporation was not formed at the time of the amendment of the above remuneration provision, and that there was real difficulty in obtaining the consent of employees in accordance with the collective decision-making method due to the characteristics of the business, which is the broadcast media. However, the above collective decision-making method is not always accepted, since the above collective decision-making method is not limited to the method of holding a meeting by gathering the opinions of employees at one time at one business or workplace, but also a method of gathering the opinions by exchanging the opinions among the workers under the circumstances where the employer's involvement or interference is excluded by unit department of the business or workplace, and it is also allowed to gather the opinions as a whole (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da25055, Feb. 25, 1992; 92Da39778, Jan. 15, 19

Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, on May 20, 198, the labor union was established in the defendant Corporation and entered into a collective agreement and wage agreement with the defendant Corporation around September 14, 198, and most workers belonging to the defendant Corporation did not clearly recognize the invalidity of the above revised regulations due to procedural defects, not only at the time of the amendment of the remuneration regulations of this case but also until the conclusion of the collective agreement. There was no objection to the validity of the revised regulations of the defendant Corporation and the labor union at the time of collective bargaining, or any objection to consent or ratification after the adoption of the revised regulations of other government-invested institutions similar to the defendant Corporation. In light of the Supreme Court's judgment on early 199 as to the retirement allowance regulations of the defendant Corporation, the court below was aware that the revised regulations of the defendant Corporation were null and void. Accordingly, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the retirement allowance payment rate of the defendant Corporation or by failing to obtain the consent of the labor union to enter into the above revised regulations into a collective agreement with the defendant Corporation and the labor union.

When the labor union or employees of Defendant Corporation concluded a collective agreement with the Corporation, the provision on remuneration of this case, which was in force at the time of the conclusion of the collective agreement, was deemed valid, and it cannot be deemed that the amendment of the provision on remuneration of this case was ratified solely for such reasons that there was no objection from the employee who received retirement allowances under the provision on remuneration of this case (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da46922 delivered on September 14, 192; Supreme Court Decision 92Da32357 delivered on November 27, 192; 92Da32357 delivered on September 27, 1992). In addition, it cannot be said that there was no reason to conclude that the labor union formed after the amendment of the above provision on remuneration of this case, concluded a collective agreement with the Corporation, and "the Corporation is unable to reduce the current working conditions under any pretext or because it comes to fall short of the Labor Standards Act, and thus becomes null and void."

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)