[1] Whether an appeal filed against the deceased person prior to the filing of the lawsuit is lawful (=applicable law)

[2] The meaning of false letter of guarantee or written confirmation that the presumption of registration is reversed under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer, and the method of determining its falsity

[3] The case holding that the presumption power of ownership transfer registration under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer cannot be deemed to have been reversed merely because the registered titleholder claims that the cause of acquisition and transfer registration of ownership transfer are different from the cause of registration for ownership transfer

[1] The judgment of the court below based on the judgment on the merits is to be null and void as a matter of course, with excessive emphasis on the fact that a party had already died before the filing of the lawsuit and had already cancelled resident registration. However, the appeal filed against the deceased person in light of the fact that a civil lawsuit is in the intrinsic form of conflict between the parties, cannot be allowed. Thus, the appeal filed against the deceased person as

[2] The registration completed pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Real Estate (Act No. 3094, Dec. 31, 197) shall be presumed to be a registration in conformity with the substantive legal relationship. The presumption of registration of ownership transfer or registration of real estate transfer shall not be broken unless a letter of guarantee or confirmation under the above Act on Special Measures is proved to be false or forged, or not legally registered due to other reasons. The false letter of guarantee or confirmation refers to a letter of guarantee or confirmation that the substantial contents of the reason for the change of right are inconsistent with the truth. Since the above Act permits registration that is inconsistent with the process of the change of right against the actual transferee of real estate, even if the entry of the name of the seller or the date of purchase in the letter of guarantee or confirmation is different from the actual one, or only the current status of right is omitted and the specific reason for the change of right is stated, it shall not be deemed that the legitimate presumption of registration is not sufficient. However, if it is proven that the registration is not true by other material facts.

[3] The case holding that the presumption of ownership transfer registration under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer of Real Estate cannot be deemed to have been reversed solely on the ground that the registered titleholder claims that the grounds for registration of ownership transfer and the grounds for registration of ownership transfer are different from the grounds for registration of ownership transfer in the letter of guarantee

[1] Articles 383 and 395 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 7 and 10 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate; Article 186 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 7 and 10 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate; Article 186 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 7 and 186 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate; Article 186 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 81Meu53 decided Oct. 12, 1982 (Gong1982, 1084), Supreme Court Decision 86Meu76 decided Jul. 22, 1986 (Gong1986, 1109), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu9606 decided Jan. 11, 1994 (Gong1994, 739) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da37157 decided Jan. 17, 1992 (Gong192, 865), Supreme Court Decision 97Da162, 17179 decided Jul. 25, 197 (Gong197Ha, 2711), Supreme Court Decision 97Da37975 decided Oct. 25, 197 (Gong199, 2711).

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and eight others

Gwangju High Court Decision 99Na7472 delivered on June 1, 2000

The appeal against Defendant 3 is dismissed, and the remaining appeals against the Defendants are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

1. As to the appeal against the defendant 3

According to the records, since Defendant 3 had already died and cancelled resident registration on August 28, 1997, prior to the filing of the lawsuit in this case, it is recognized that the judgment of the court below was erroneous and void. However, in light of the fact that civil litigation is in the principal form, the appeal against the deceased person is not permissible. Thus, the appeal of this case filed against the deceased person as the other party is unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Meu53, Oct. 12, 1982; 93Nu9606, Jan. 11, 1994).

2. As to the remaining Defendants’ appeal

The court below determined that the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s registration of ownership transfer under the name of Defendant 1 based on the following facts: (a) as long as the registration of ownership transfer of this case was completed under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Real Estate Ownership (amended by Act No. 3094, Dec. 31, 197; hereinafter referred to as the “Special Measures Act”) with respect to the land before subdivision of this case, it is presumed that the registration of ownership transfer of this case complies with the substantive relationship, which was completed in accordance with due process prescribed in the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership (in this case, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant 1 was donated to the former owner of the land before subdivision of this case on Oct. 25, 1968, rather than the former owner of the land before subdivision of this case on Oct. 1965, 196).

A registration completed under the Act on Special Measures is presumed to be a registration consistent with the substantive legal relationship, and unless it is proved that a false or forged letter of guarantee or written confirmation under the aforesaid Act is false or forged, or that the registration for preservation of ownership or a registration for transfer is not legally registered due to other reasons, the presumption of the registration for transfer is not broken. Here, a false letter of guarantee or written confirmation refers to a letter of guarantee or written confirmation that the substantial contents of the reason for change of rights are inconsistent with the truth. In light of the fact that the aforesaid Act permits a registration that is inconsistent with the process of change of rights to the de facto transferee of the real estate, even if the name of the seller or written confirmation is different from the real, or the date of the purchase is omitted, and only only the current status of rights are stated in the written guarantee, it cannot be said that the legal presumption of the registration is broken (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da3757, Oct. 10, 197).

According to the records, Defendant 1 asserted that the land prior to the division of this case was not purchased from Nonparty 1 on October 25, 1968, but was donated by the above Nonparty 1 on or around 1956, and the cause for registration of acquisition and transfer of ownership on the guarantee document is different from that of the grounds for registration of transfer of ownership. However, as long as there is no other data to doubt that the substantial contents of the guarantee document are not true, such circumstance alone cannot be viewed as the presumption of ownership transfer registration of this case. In light of the above legal principles, the judgment of the court below with the same purport is just, and it is acceptable to accept the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below in light of the records on the premise that the burden of proof exists. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the presumption of ownership transfer registration and the reversal thereof under the Act on Special Measures, or by misapprehending the rules of evidence, or by violating the rules of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the ground for appeal.

3. Therefore, the appeal against Defendant 3 is dismissed. The remaining appeals against the Defendants are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Jae-sik (Presiding Justice)