(a) Whether service on a person detained in a prison or detention house is effective if it is served on the warden;

B. Where it cannot be deemed unlawful even if the procedure of trial was not suspended despite a change in the facts charged

C. Specific degree of the facts charged

(d) Where a public official falls under “using his status” as prescribed in Article 132 of the Criminal Act;

(e) The method of recognizing the amount of the accepted bribery in case where he has received the accepted bribery; and

(a) Service on a person detained in a prison or detention house shall take effect, regardless of whether it is delivered to the detained person, if it is served on the warden;

B. Article 298(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that, in a case where the alteration, etc. of facts charged is likely to increase disadvantage of the defendant, the trial proceedings may be suspended in order to make the defendant prepare for necessary defense. Thus, even if there is a partial alteration of facts charged and the court did not suspend the trial proceedings on the ground of such alteration, if it is deemed that such alteration does not put a substantial disadvantage to the defendant's right of defense, in light of the progress of the trial proceedings

C. The time and date of a crime referred to in Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides the specific method of facts charged, requires a statement to the extent that it does not conflict with double prosecution or prescription, and the place requires a statement to the extent that it is possible to estimate the territorial jurisdiction. The method requires a statement to the extent that it is possible to specify the elements of a crime. The purport of the law requiring the specification of facts charged lies in limiting the scope of defense of the accused and allowing the exercise of defense to facilitate. As such, the facts charged are sufficient to state the facts constituting the crime to the extent that it is possible to distinguish the facts from other facts by taking account of the elements such

D. In the crime of bribery mediation under Article 132 of the Criminal Code, the term "public official taking advantage of his/her status" cannot be deemed as a case where he/she takes advantage of his/her status, but in the case where a public official has a legal or factual influence on the administration of affairs handled by another public official uses his/her status, it constitutes a case where he/she takes advantage of his/her status, and there is no need to do so.

E. If the Defendant received entertainment equivalent to a certain amount under the pretext of entertainment, such as the drinking value, etc. for a certain period of time, the Defendant’s acceptance of the bribe should first be recognized when recognizing the Defendant’s acceptance of the bribe, and the expenses consumed by the entertainment provider should be considered as the amount of the Defendant’s acceptance of the bribe in consideration of the Defendant’s expenses required for the entertainment and the expenses consumed by the entertainment provider should be recognized as the amount of the accepted acceptance of the Defendant. If the amount of expenses required by each person is unclear, it should be equally divided and recognized as the

A. Article 65 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 169 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 298(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 254(4)(d) of the same Act. Article 132(5) of the Criminal Act. Articles 129 and 48(2) of the Criminal Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Do3272 delivered on March 10, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 91Do2085 delivered on October 25, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 94Do1853 delivered on September 23, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 94Do1990 delivered on September 30, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 93Do1056 delivered on October 21, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 94Do852 delivered on October 21, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 76Do1982 delivered on March 8, 197; Supreme Court Decision 82Do1487 delivered on August 24, 1982

Defendant

Defendant Law Firm Dong-dong, Attorney Park Dong-dong, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Jeonju District Court Decision 94No314 delivered on September 17, 1994

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Jeonju District Court Panel Division.

Defendant’s counsel’s grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Service on a person detained in a prison or detention house takes effect regardless of whether it is delivered to the detained person, and according to Article 298(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act and Article 142(3) of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure, service on a copy of an application for changes of an indictment is made by the accused or his defense counsel. According to the records, prior to September 12, 1994, prior to the closing date of the hearing of the court below, it is recognized that the duplicate of the application for changes of an indictment was received by the president of the previous prison and the defense counsel of the accused, and thus, the argument that the accused did not notify the contents of

In addition, Article 298(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the procedure of trial may be suspended in order to make the defendant prepare for necessary defense if there is a partial change in the facts charged, and even if the court did not suspend the procedure on the ground of such change, it cannot be deemed unlawful if such change is deemed that it does not give any substantial disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his right to defense. The summary of the application for changes of the indictment of this case is that the defendant working as police officer would be able to obtain 16 driver's license, such as Kim Jong-hwan, etc. from the Gangwon branch of the court below, and it would be the end of the original facts charged that the public official received bribe in connection with his duties by accepting money and valuables for four times after the acceptance of it. According to the above opinion of the court below that the public official received a bribe in relation to his duties, the public official's amendment to the procedure of trial by using his status to "the acceptance of bribe in relation to the referral of the duties of the public official in charge of issuing motor vehicles," and the defendant's amendment to the above provision of the indictment of Article 129(13).

Meanwhile, the time and date of a crime referred to in Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides the specific method of facts charged, requires a statement to the extent that it does not conflict with double prosecution or prescription. The place requires a statement to the extent that it is possible to measure territorial jurisdiction, and the method of specifying the elements of the crime requires a statement to the extent that it makes it possible to facilitate the exercise of the defense right by limiting the scope of the defense of the defendant. As such, the purpose of the law requiring the specification of facts charged is to limit the scope of the defense of the defendant. Thus, the facts charged are sufficient if it is stated to the extent that it is possible to distinguish the facts from other facts by taking into account all the elements such as the time and date of the crime (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do2085 delivered on October 25, 191). In light of the above legal principles, since the revised facts charged in this case are specified to the extent that it does not interfere with the defendant's defense right, and thus, the argument in this case is not acceptable.

2. Examining the evidence of the first instance court maintained by the court below in light of the records, the court below's decision that recognized the criminal facts of the accepted bribery as stated in the judgment of the defendant is just and there is no error of violation of the rules of evidence or incomplete deliberation, such as the theory of lawsuit.

In addition, in the crime of mediation and bribery under Article 132 of the Criminal Act, the term "public official taking advantage of his status" shall not be deemed to be a case where he uses a private relationship, such as friendship and kinship. However, if a public official who has a legal or factual influence on the affairs handled by another public official uses his status, it constitutes a case where he uses his status, and it does not necessarily require that there is a special relationship, such as a superior relationship, cooperative relationship, supervision authority, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do1056 delivered on July 13, 1993). As shown in the record, as obvious, the defendant worked as a public official in charge of permission-related functional division of the police bureau in Jeollabuk-do from July 10, 199 to February 16, 190, the defendant worked as a public official in charge of the affairs of the public official in charge of the issuance of the driver's license in Jeollabuk-do. Thus, the defendant can be deemed to have a de facto influence over the affairs of the public official in charge of the issuance of the motor vehicle.

3. However, as acknowledged by the court below, if the defendant received entertainment equivalent to five million won in consideration of the above lecture from the beginning of August 10, 1991 to the beginning of November of the same year under the pretext of entertainment such as the drinking price, etc. among the above he had been provided several times from the above Gangseo-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City (hereinafter referred to as the "Seoul Special Metropolitan City"), the court below should first recognize the amount of the accepted bribery of the defendant as the amount of the accepted bribery of the defendant in consideration of the expenses for the defendant's contact and the amount of expenses consumed by the above lecture, and if each of the expenses is unclear, the amount of the accepted bribery should be equally divided and the amount of the accepted bribery of the defendant should be recognized as the amount of the accepted bribery of the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 76Do1982, Mar. 8, 197; 82Do1487, Aug. 24, 1982).

4. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)