The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

(1) In the case of a replotting disposition, even if it is a land substitution disposition, the previous land has changed to the land’s point, shape, and location of the entire land due to the replotting, and thus, it is designated as a land substitution place prior to the completion of prescriptive acquisition among the possession of some specific parts of the previous land, and where a replotting becomes final and conclusive, even if the specific portions of the previous land were located within the land scheduled for replotting or the land determined for replotting, barring special circumstances, the possessor of the previous land cannot be deemed to have occupied the relevant specific portions on the land scheduled for replotting or the land determined for replotting even before the land substitution is designated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da30306, May 14, 1993; 8Meu18795, Sept. 2

The court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning by taking full account of the evidences. According to the facts of recognition, it is clear that the 20-year period of possession as to the above forest land has not elapsed since 1967 or October 27, 1973, which claimed that part of the previous forest land in Gangnam-gu Seoul ( Address 1 omitted), which was the previous land prior to the substitution by Nonparty 1 or 2, had started to occupy each of the above building sites, etc. from the present site, until October 27, 1973, which was designated as a planned land substitution. Meanwhile, even if the above planned land substitution was calculated from October 27, 1973, it is obvious that the plaintiffs who were the reasons for suspending the acquisition by prescription were the filing date of the lawsuit in this case, and it is obvious that the period of possession was not elapsed for 20 years until April 23, 191, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the above part of the land in this case's possession.

The possession is de facto controlled by the object, and the designation of the land scheduled for replotting or the disposition of replotting does not result in any change in the de facto control of the object as it does not result in any factual act, and it is not accepted as an independent opinion that determination of the prescription period for the acquisition of possession is extremely unfair in light of the legislative intent and equity that recognized the prescriptive acquisition system as well as the disposition of replotting.

(2) In the event of recognizing the prescriptive acquisition of the co-ownership shares in the land substituted without recognizing the prescriptive acquisition of possession for a specific portion, the theory that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the ratio of co-ownership acquired by the occupant, thereby recognizing the ratio, thereby recognizing the removal obligation to the occupant of this case who acquired more than a majority of the co-ownership, is nothing more than criticize the lower court’s additional and assumptive

(3) Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)