(b) Whether the provisions of Article 21-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites apply to the use and development of housing sites in a manner different from the details of the proposed use plan;

(c) Cases where the construction of housing is prohibited under the related Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Building Act and the Urban Planning Act, prescribed in the former part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites

(d) The meaning of “a site where de facto construction is impossible” in the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site;

E. Whether Article 12 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites comprehensively delegates the scope of the housing site excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges to the Enforcement Decree

F. Whether the provisions of each subparagraph of Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Site are unconstitutional

(g) Scope of land annexed to buildings excluded from housing sites subject to imposition of excess ownership charges.

(h) The meaning of "permanent building" as provided in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 2 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site;

B. The provisions of Article 21-2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites which provide special cases concerning the calculation of the compulsory period for use and development shall apply only to cases where the owner of the existing housing site deemed to have obtained permission for acquisition pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the Act and Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the same Act and Article 3 (1) of the Addenda of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act intend to use and develop the housing site according to the plan for use and development, but it is impossible to use and develop the housing site due to objective reasons such as restriction on construction permission, etc., and there

C. The phrase “prohibited against the construction of housing pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations, such as the Building Act and the Urban Planning Act” under the former part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site refers only to the case where the construction of housing is prohibited regardless of a detached house or apartment house, and it does not constitute a case where the construction of housing is restricted only on a certain scale

D. The term “batch site where de facto construction is impossible” stipulated as a housing site excluded from the subject of the imposition of excess ownership charges under the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site refers to a housing site that cannot be constructed due to the physical reasons inherent in that housing site itself, and it is not necessary to determine by the objective standard of who is impossible to construct the housing site or who is not in possession of that housing site, but to determine by the subjective circumstances of the

E. Article 12 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites stipulates that a corporation may acquire a housing site for the purpose prescribed in subparagraph 4 of this Article and for other purposes prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and Article 12 of the same Act provides that a corporation may acquire a housing site with permission by specific delegation under subparagraph 4 of Article 12 of the same Act. Thus, Article 12 of the same Act does not comprehensively delegate the scope of the housing site excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges to the Enforcement Decree.

F. According to the delegation of Article 12 subparagraph 4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, the provisions of each subparagraph of Article 12 of the same Act stipulate an individual’s acquisition of housing sites exceeding the maximum limits of possession by a household, and a juristic person’s acquisition of housing sites for the exceptional reasons under Articles 7 and 8 of the same Act that prohibit in principle an individual’s acquisition of housing sites and a juristic person’s acquisition of housing sites in excess of the maximum limits of possession by a household due to social and economic needs, and are derived from the legislative purpose of the same Act that induces citizens to own housing sites evenly and facilitate the supply of housing sites, and the contents thereof are not unreasonable. Thus, the above provision cannot be deemed as unconstitutional as a provision that infringes on

G. Under Article 2 subparag. 1(b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 3 subparag. 1 and [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 73 of the Building Act, and Article 119(1)2, 3, and 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the area calculated by multiplying the floor area of a building by the ratio by the ratio of the ratio by the ratio by the ratio by the ratio by the specific-use area shall be considered as the land annexed to the

H. Comprehensively taking into account the contents and purport of Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites and Articles 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, it is reasonable to interpret that a permanent building under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the same Act shall be permitted or reported under the Building Act and other related Acts and subordinate statutes, which shall not be permitted or reported and which shall be subject to a completion inspection and which shall be legitimate except for buildings which shall not undergo a completion inspection.

The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

A. As to the first ground for appeal:

Article 20(1)1 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) provides that housing sites within the period of obligation for use and development under Article 18 of the Act shall be excluded from the subject of imposition of excess ownership charges (hereinafter referred to as “charges”). Article 18(1) of the Act and Article 21 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 13882, May 10, 1993; hereinafter referred to as the “Enforcement Decree”) provide that the period of obligation for use and development shall be two years. In calculating the period of obligation for use and development, Article 21-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that the period of obligation for use and development shall not be included in the period of obligation for use and development under Article 12 of the Building Act or the period of commencement is limited by administrative guidance for the adjustment of demand and supply of construction materials.

The purport of the above legislation is that no charge shall be imposed during the period of the compulsory use and development of the housing site for two years is to grant a grace period of two years to those who have acquired the housing site exceeding the upper limit of the ownership of each household by permission, etc. for the use and development of the housing site, and the purpose of the special provision on the calculation of the compulsory use and development period is to guarantee the substantial grace period excluding the charge from the imposition of the charge by extending the compulsory use and development period for the limited period if it is impossible to use and develop the housing site due to objective reasons such as the restriction on the use and development, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1999 delivered on August 26, 199

Therefore, the provision of Article 21-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Special Cases concerning the Calculation of the Period of Time for Use and Development shall apply only to cases where the owner of the existing housing site deemed to have obtained permission for acquisition pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the Act and Article 3 (1) of the Addenda of the Enforcement Decree intends to use and develop the housing site according to the contents of the plan, but it becomes impossible to use and develop the housing site due to objective reasons such as the restriction on construction permission, etc.

However, according to the records, the plaintiff submitted a plan to use and develop the land of this case acquired before the enforcement of the law, pursuant to Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the Act as to the land of this case which was owned by the plaintiff prior to the enforcement of the law, that it is planned to construct one building of reinforced concrete structure with a floor area of 561m2 on the land of this case. Thus, the plaintiff should use and develop the land of this case according to the contents of the plan. However, although the plaintiff tried to use and develop the land of this case in accordance with the above plan, there is no evidence to support that the plaintiff could not use and develop the land of this case due to objective reasons such as the restriction on construction permission, etc.

B. As to ground of appeal No. 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that "the prohibition of the construction of a house under the Building Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes" under the former part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act means only all cases where the construction of a house is prohibited regardless of a detached house or apartment house, and the land in this case is not prohibited regardless of a detached house or apartment house, but only limited to a certain size such as an apartment house, etc., and it does not constitute "the prohibition of the construction of a house" under the former part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act. In light of the provisions of the related Acts and subordinate statutes, the judgment of the court below is correct and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles under the former part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act, such as the theory of lawsuit. We also have no reason

C. As to ground of appeal No. 3

The term "site that cannot be constructed", which is stipulated as a site that is excluded from the subject of the charge under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act, refers to a site that cannot be constructed due to physical reasons inherent in the relevant site itself, and it is the view of the party members that it is not a nature that can be determined according to the subjective circumstances of the owner of the site, but it is not a matter of view that it is impossible to determine under the objective criteria as to who owns the site or who is impossible to construct it (see each of the Decisions 93Nu2071, Apr. 26, 1994; 93Nu20252, May 13, 1994).

In the same purport, the court below held that the land of this case cannot be deemed a site where it is impossible to construct the land of this case in fact under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act, since the grounds alleged in the theory of lawsuit do not fall under the case where anyone owns the land of this case or it is impossible to construct the land of this case, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no reason to interpret the legal principles.

D. As to the fourth ground for appeal:

In full view of the purport of Articles 8, 12, 19, and 20 (1) 1 and 8 of the Act, and Article 26 (1) 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, a corporation shall not own a housing site in principle, and shall be allowed to exceptionally own a housing site only in certain cases, such as the acquisition of a housing site with permission due to a corporation’s need for carrying out its unique duties, and if so, it shall be excluded from the subject of the imposition of charges. This provision applies to a housing site owned by a corporation at the time of the enforcement of the Act, which is deemed to have obtained permission, etc. for the acquisition of a housing site under Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the Act, and which is allowed to be owned by it. Therefore, it shall be excluded from the subject of charges only in accordance with a plan for use submitted pursuant to Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the Act (see Supreme Court Decision 93Nu20320 delivered on May 13, 1994).

Meanwhile, Article 12 of the Act explicitly lists the reasons for a corporation to acquire a housing site upon obtaining permission (paragraphs 1 through 3) and provides for cases where a corporation acquires a housing site for other purposes as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree provides for the reasons for a corporation to acquire a housing site upon obtaining permission by specific delegation under subparagraph 4 of Article 12 of the Act. Thus, Article 12 of the Act does not comprehensively delegate the scope of the housing site excluded from the subject of the charge to the Enforcement Decree.

In addition, Article 12 subparagraph 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Automobile Transport Business Act (Article 10 subparagraph 7 of the Enforcement Decree), automobile management business under the Automobile Management Act (Article 10 subparagraph 9 of the Enforcement Decree), and mid-term rental business and mid-term maintenance business under the mid-term Management Act (Article 10 subparagraph 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Enforcement Decree of the Act) provide for the permission for the acquisition of housing sites for corporations in cases where a person who intends to operate a filling business of liquefied petroleum gas under the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act acquires housing sites within a certain standard area to use for the pertinent business, and does not provide for the permission for the acquisition of housing sites for corporations in cases where a person who intends to operate a filling business of liquefied petroleum gas under the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act acquires housing sites within a certain standard area to use for the pertinent business. However, the provisions of each subparagraph of Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree do not provide for the right to equality or freedom of corporation acquisition by delegation under Article 12 subparagraph 4 of the Act.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit.

E. Regarding ground of appeal No. 5

Examining the provisions and records of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as Article 2 subparag. 1(b) of the Act, Article 3 subparag. 1(b) of the Enforcement Decree, Article 73 of the Building Act, and Article 119(1)2, 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, etc., the court below is justified in considering the floor area of a building constructed on the land in this case by multiplying the floor area of the building by the ratio of the non-use-use area by the ratio of the non-use-use area on the land as the land attached to the building and excludes the subject of the charge from the site subject to the charge.

2. The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act provides that "land prescribed by Presidential Decree, among the land land the category of which is the large land, on which no permanent building is constructed, shall be regulated as one of the sites subject to the regulation of the Act, and there is no restriction other than permanent building. Accordingly, Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree provides that the site of a building for which permission has not been granted or a report has not been completed exceptionally shall be deemed as the site without any permission or report, and the subject of charges shall be the same. However, the purport of Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act is to prevent the owner of a building from constructing a building without permission or report for the purpose of evading charges, and to prevent the actual construction from avoiding charges by means such as construction permission or report, even if the construction is defined in the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree, which does not require a completion inspection, and thus, it goes against the purpose of the Act or the Enforcement Decree of the Act, which does not stipulate that the construction permission was not completed by the construction completion inspection without any purpose or the construction completion inspection.

However, in full view of the contents and purport of the relevant provisions such as Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act and Articles 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree, it is reasonable to interpret that a permanent building under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act means a building which must be permitted or reported pursuant to the Building Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes and which must be permitted or reported, and a building which has not undergone a completion inspection and which has not undergone a completion inspection, and which must be subject to a completion inspection (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu3506 delivered on Nov. 25, 1994).

Nevertheless, the court below recognized that some buildings constructed on the land of this case did not undergo a completion inspection, but held that such buildings correspond to permanent buildings as stipulated in Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act and did not constitute a housing site subject to the regulation of the Act, by misunderstanding the legal principles of the relevant provisions such as Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act and Articles 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the argument on this point is with merit.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant is reversed and remanded to the court below. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)