(a) The validity of personnel consultation or agreement provisions in violation of the collective agreement;

(b) The meaning of “agreement” in the collective agreement for the personnel management of the executives of a trade union, and “agreement” in the case of the members’ personnel management to “pre-consultation.”

(c) The case holding that disciplinary action is valid unless a trade union reach an agreement with the trade union because the trade union abused the right to refuse agreement;

(d) Whether the regulations governing the commuting to and from work of a full-time employee apply;

(e) The case holding that the absence from office without permission is deemed to constitute absence from office of a worker on duty while the worker on duty escaped to be exempted from the execution of a detention warrant;

A. Where a trade union provides that an employer shall give an opportunity to present his/her opinion in order to ensure carefulness in performing personnel affairs, the validity of personnel affairs shall not be affected even if the trade union did not go through the procedure. However, if an employer requires the prior consent or consent of the trade union in conducting personnel affairs or stipulates that an employer shall conduct personnel affairs in consideration of the agreement of the trade union and the person affairs, in principle, by holding discussions on personnel affairs with the trade union, a person who did not go through the procedure shall be deemed null and void.

B. If a collective agreement uses the term “pre-agreement” for the personnel affairs of the union members, and “pre-consultation” for the personnel affairs of the union members, it is reasonable to interpret that the above collective agreement provides that the degree of restriction is different by distinguishing between the union members and the union members with respect to the right to the personnel affairs of the union members. The degree of consultation on the union members is to complete the procedure for collecting opinions for the prudent exercise of the right to the personnel affairs of the union members, or that the consultation on the personnel affairs of the union and the union members should exercise the right to the personnel affairs of the union and the union members by faithfully exchanging their opinions with the union.

C. In taking disciplinary action against the executives of a trade union, it is not possible to deny the employer’s exercise of the employer’s right to disciplinary action against his/her employee because it was stipulated to make a prior agreement with the trade union in a collective agreement. Thus, the exercise of the trade union’s right to prior agreement should be reasonably exercised in accordance with the principle of good faith. If the trade union refuses or refuses a prior agreement solely on the ground that the person subject to disciplinary action is the executive officer of the trade union despite the existence of objective apparent and significant grounds for disciplinary action against the person subject to disciplinary action, this constitutes waiver of the right to agree or abuse of the right

(d) The case holding that disciplinary action is valid unless a trade union has reached an agreement with the trade union because the trade union abused the right to refuse agreement;

E. Even if the full-time officer of a trade union is the full-time officer of a trade union, the basic labor-management relationship between the employer and the full-time employee is not subject to the application of the rules of employment or the regulations, and thus, the collective agreement is subject to the application of the rules of employment or the regulations on commuting unless there are special regulations or special

(f) The case holding that the absence from office without permission is deemed to constitute absence from office of a full-time employee who escaped to be exempted from the execution of a detention warrant.

Article 36 of the Trade Union Act, Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act

A.B.C. (d) Supreme Court Decision 92Da45735 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1993, 2249) 92Da50263 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1993, 2257) . B.C. Decision 92Da32074 delivered on December 8, 1992 (Gong193, 435) .B. 91Da22100 delivered on May 222, 1992 (Gong192, 1963), 92Da13400 delivered on September 22, 1992 (Gong1963), 92Da329429, 29394, 29394, 294, 1992).

[Judgment of the court below]

Daelim Automobile Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Busan High Court Decision 91Na14796 delivered on July 1, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal. The supplemental appellate brief is to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief.

On the first ground for appeal

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since Article 37 subparagraph 2 of the collective agreement between the defendant company and its labor union provides that personnel affairs and disciplinary actions between the labor union and the chief vice-chairperson of the labor union shall be agreed upon by the labor union in advance, the defendant company acknowledged that the plaintiff, who worked as the chief vice-chairperson of the labor union on September 13, 190, was dismissed without prior agreement with the labor union under the collective agreement, and the above prior agreement stipulates that the defendant's personnel rights or disciplinary measures shall be generally restricted, unlike those cases where the defendant should be approved or consented by the labor union or where the labor union shall be decided jointly with the labor union, so that the defendant company's arbitrary personnel rights or disciplinary measures against the executive officers of the labor union may not be interfered with the normal activities of the labor union, and it is reasonable to view that the defendant company did not have an opportunity to present opinions on the plaintiff company's dismissal and the defendant company's opinion on the grounds that it did not have any influence on the dismissal of the plaintiff company's opinion on the ground of the plaintiff 1 and the labor union.

2. However, in a case where it is stipulated that a trade union shall give an employer an opportunity to present its opinion so that an employer may be decently in conducting personnel affairs, the validity of personnel affairs shall not be affected even if the employer did not follow the procedure. However, in a case where an employer requires the prior consent or consent of the trade union in conducting personnel affairs or where it is stipulated that an employer should conduct personnel affairs in consideration of the agreement with the trade union by holding discussions on personnel affairs with the trade union, a person who did not follow the procedure shall, in principle, be deemed null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da475, Apr. 14, 192; 92Da34940, Apr. 23, 1993).

However, according to the records, the collective agreement of this case provides that "the personnel management and disciplinary action between the union and the union shall be agreed in advance with the union" under Article 37 subparagraph 2 of the same Article, while "the disciplinary action, dismissal, and dispatch of union members shall be consulted in advance with the union" under subparagraph 3 of the same Article, "the prior agreement on the personnel management and disciplinary action between the union and the union members shall be divided into the terms of prior consultation, and the personnel management and disciplinary action of the union members shall be conducted in advance, and the terms of consultation or agreement shall be classified and used under Articles 45 and 46 (2). Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the above collective agreement of this case separately determines the degree of restriction between the union and the union members with regard to the defendant's right to the personnel management of the union between the union and the union members, but it is reasonable to interpret that "the prior agreement" should be exercised in consideration of "the agreement between the union and the union members" as to the personnel management of the union between the union and the union members.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the effect of the disciplinary action does not affect the validity of the disciplinary action, even though the defendant did not undergo the above prior agreement by exchange of opinions between labor and management when taking disciplinary action against the plaintiff who is a trade union executive officer, does not err in the misapprehension of the provisions of the collective agreement.

3. However, in taking disciplinary action against the executive officers of a trade union under the collective agreement as above, it is not possible to deny the employer's exercise of the employer's right to disciplinary action against the employee since it was stipulated to make a prior agreement with the trade union. Thus, the exercise of the trade union's right to prior agreement should be reasonably exercised in accordance with the principle of good faith. If the trade union rejects a disciplinary action or refuses a prior agreement on the ground that the person subject to disciplinary action is the executive officer of the trade union despite objectively obvious and serious grounds for disciplinary action, if the person subject to disciplinary action refuses to reach a prior agreement or refuses a prior agreement on the ground that the person subject to disciplinary action constitutes abuse of the right to waiver of the right to agree or the right to refuse to agree, it shall not be deemed null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da45735, Jul. 13, 1993; 92Da502

However, according to the records, while the collective agreement provides that a trade union shall be subject to prior agreement on disciplinary action against the executive officers of the trade union in the collective agreement, there is no provision on the specific procedure or method of such prior agreement under collective agreement or other personnel relations regulations. According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the plaintiff, as the chief vice-chairperson of the trade union, led the defendant to engage in illegal strike for a long time, thereby causing enormous property damage to the defendant, and the defendant was absent without permission for 53 days since he attempted to escape from the violation of the National Security Act, and due to the above crime, the court of first instance sentenced the suspension of 3 years and 1 year and 6 months of suspension of qualification to 13 subparagraph 5 of Article 13 of the Criminal Code, "where an employee is absent without permission for 7 days or more," and it is objectively clear that the member of the trade union was subject to prior agreement on disciplinary action against the plaintiff from the defendant company to 1, and the defendant company did not unilaterally agree with the disciplinary committee's prior agreement on the plaintiff's labor union members.

Therefore, the court below's conclusion that the disciplinary dismissal against the plaintiff was valid even if it was done without prior agreement with the labor union. Thus, the court below's above misapprehension of legal principles does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, and the arguments are without merit.

On the second ground for appeal

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the defendant company's rules of employment and personnel management regulations were to be dismissed or absent from office in accordance with the prescribed procedures and that if the defendant company's employees were to file a report or pay attention in advance and obtain approval thereafter, it shall be deemed absence from office without delay (Article 30 of the Rules of Employment, Article 20 of the Rules of Employment, and Article 43 of the Rules of Employment). The above rules of punishment provides that the defendant company shall be subject to disciplinary punishment separately for employees' commendation and disciplinary action (Article 3 of the Rules of Employment), and that the above rules of punishment shall be deliberated by the committee for punishment (Article 12 of the above Rules of Employment), suspension from office, reduction of salary, and reprimand for the same period from 3 months to 19 days, and that the plaintiff company shall be subject to disciplinary punishment for the same reason as the defendant company's first 1's first 6th 6th 2nd 7th 2nd 7th 2nd 7th 7th 19.

2. Even if the full-time officer of a trade union is the full-time officer of the trade union, the basic labor-management relations between the employer and the full-time employee does not exclude the application of the rules of employment or the rules of the trade union. Thus, the collective agreement is subject to the application of the rules of employment or the rules of the trade union for commuting unless there are special

However, according to the records, Article 12 (1) of the collective agreement of the defendant company provides that "a company intends to participate in various meetings, educational events, and other matters related to the union, the union shall be recognized. It shall consult with the company in advance (Evidence 18). If the plaintiff et al. who is the full-time employee of the union intends to make an official trip to the outside, the defendant company sent an official document for cooperation to the company in advance (Evidence 21-1, 2, and Non-party 4 of the first instance trial witness non-party No. 21-2), and the defendant company received a statistical report on the attendance of all employees by a daily report on the full-time employee status (Evidence 7-1 through 34 of the evidence No. 7). Thus, if the plaintiff is a long-term withdrawal without permission from the employer if the plaintiff is a private worker, not a trade union's work, but a private worker, it shall be deemed that the act constitutes an absence without permission from the employer."

Therefore, the plaintiff's escape in order to be exempted from the execution of a warrant of detention regardless of the trade union's work, and absence without prior notification to the defendant company or approval or permission from the defendant company for 53 days constitutes "where an employee continues to be absent from office for 7 days or more" under Article 13 subparagraph 5 of the Punishment Regulations, so the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence or in the misapprehension of legal principles.

3. Article 13 subparag. 11 of the above punishment provision provides that the grounds for dismissal of a person who has been sentenced to a fine or heavier punishment. In light of the fact that there is no provision guaranteeing re-employment or reinstatement at the time when the defendant was found not guilty in the higher court, it may be interpreted that the person who has been sentenced to a fine or higher punishment refers to a final and conclusive judgment (in the case of a criminal case where the substantial grounds for the criminal case are different grounds for disciplinary punishment, it shall be natural that the person can be subject to disciplinary punishment regardless of the criminal judgment). However, even if the plaintiff has been absent without permission for at least seven days as mentioned above, it shall be reasonable to determine that the court below did not have the grounds for disciplinary punishment under Article 13 subparag. 5 of the above punishment provision, and in light of the above circumstances such as the period of absence without permission and its reasons, it shall not be deemed that the above grounds for dismissal of the plaintiff constitutes abuse of discretionary power. Thus, whether the defendant constitutes a ground for dismissal under Article 13 subparag. 111 of the above provision on the ground for the final judgment.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)