A. The nature of the crime of taking property in breach of trust in a case where the money was received under a request to maintain a contractual relationship and ask for a request (negative);

B. The nature of Article 11(4) of the Littering Act

A. The crime of taking property in breach of trust under the Criminal Act does not constitute the crime of taking property in breach of trust unless an illegal solicitation is accepted between a donor of property or benefits and a purchaser of such property or benefits. Since the crime of taking property in breach of trust refers to a solicitation that goes against social norms or the principle of trust and good faith, the act of requesting the preservation of a contractual relationship and securing the existing rights is not an illegal solicitation. Thus, the act of receiving money in the name of honorarium upon receiving a request to maintain a contractual relationship does not constitute the crime of taking property in breach of trust

B. Article 11(4) of the Littering Act provides that a garbage disposal business operator shall not receive a fee exceeding the amount of commission under Article 29 of the same Act. However, in light of the legislative intent of the same Act, the foregoing provision cannot be interpreted as an effective provision denying the validity of a private law on the part exceeding the amount of statutory penalty under the Littering Agreement.

(a) Article 357 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Criminal Act;

Supreme Court Decision 84Do179 delivered on July 10, 1984; 79Do190 Delivered on October 14, 1980

Defendant

Prosecutor

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 84No1839 delivered on June 7, 1984

The appeal is dismissed.

The prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the defendant, who was the representative director of the non-indicted 1 corporation, entered into a garbage disposal business contract with the non-indicted 2 corporation on January 20, 1983 during the collection period from January 1, 1983 to December 31 of the same year, and the collection commission amount to KRW 1,00,000 per month until March, and the amount to KRW 750,00 per month from April to April, and concluded a garbage disposal contract with the non-indicted 2 corporation, which is the competition company of the non-indicted 2 corporation, to collect waste at KRW 60,000,00, and did not receive waste from the non-indicted 2 corporation without any fact of violation of the contract, and thus, it cannot be recognized that the above act of collecting waste from the non-indicted 2 corporation's representative director and the non-indicted 300,000,000, which should not be recognized as an illegal solicitation for 100,000,000.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding or judgment of the court below shall not be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles or in violation of the rules of evidence.

In addition, Article 11 (4) of the Litter Pollution Act provides that a garbage disposal business operator shall not receive fees exceeding the amount of fees pursuant to Article 29 of the same Act. However, in light of the legislative intent of the above Act (Article 1) and the provisions on permission for the sanitary disposal of sewage and waste, and the government's instructions and orders concerning permission for the sanitary disposal of sewage and waste, and the acts of collecting fees in excess of the amount of statutory fees (Articles 33 through 38) for the purpose of "the purpose of sanitary disposal of sewage and the clean living environment by treating sewage in a sanitary manner, making the natural environment and living environment clean, thereby contributing to the improvement of national health and the preservation of the environment", it shall not be interpreted that the act of collecting fees in excess of the amount of statutory fees is an effective provision that denies the legal effect of the agreement on the collection fees in excess of the limits of statutory justice among the provisions

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Jeong Tae-tae (Presiding Justice)