Plaintiff 1

Plaintiff 2 and 23 others (Law Firm Young-soo, Attorneys Shin Dong-dong et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Court of Law, Attorney Kim Jae-chul, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

April 7, 2016

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap59393 Decided November 8, 2013

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against Plaintiffs 1 and 16 shall be modified as follows:

A. The part of the plaintiff 1's claim, excluding the part of the claim for consolation money inherited from the deceased non-party 2 and the deceased non-party 3, and the part of the claim, excluding the part of the claim for consolation money inherited from the deceased non-party 4 among the lawsuit of this case by the plaintiff 16, shall be dismissed.

B. The Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 1 5% a year from October 11, 2013 to May 3, 2016; and 20% a year from the next day to the date of full payment. The Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 1 5,454,545 won, and each of the above amounts, 5% a year from October 11, 2013 to May 3, 2016.

C. All remaining claims of Plaintiffs 1 and 16 are dismissed.

2. All appeals filed against the plaintiffs except the plaintiffs 1 and 16 and the remaining appeals filed against the plaintiffs except the plaintiffs 1 and 16 are dismissed.

3. The plaintiff 2's claim extended by this court is dismissed.

4. The total cost of the lawsuit between the plaintiffs 1, 16 and the defendant bears 99% of the above plaintiffs and 1% of the defendant, and the costs of the appeal between the plaintiffs and the defendant except the plaintiffs 1 and 16 are borne individually, and the costs of the lawsuit incurred by the expanded claim by this court shall be borne by the plaintiff 2.

5. The above paragraph 1(b) may be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 5% interest per annum from the date of closing argument in the court of first instance to the date of rendering a judgment, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of complete payment (this court reduced the claim by Plaintiffs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and the plaintiff 2 extended the claim by the plaintiff 2) with respect to each of the above amounts and each of the above amounts.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiffs except the plaintiff 1

Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the above plaintiffs corresponding to the claim amount shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the above plaintiffs the amount equivalent to 5% per annum from October 11, 2013 to November 8, 2013 (the date of the judgment of the court of first instance), and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

B. Defendant

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the defendant shall be revoked, and all plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the revoked part shall be dismissed.

1. Whether the non-party to the judgment of the Supreme Court is the appellant

In filing the instant appeal on December 2, 2013, the Defendant omitted Plaintiff 1 from the indication of the appellant in the petition of appeal, but considering the following as a whole, it appears that the omission is an obvious clerical error. Thus, Plaintiff 1 is in the position of the appellee.

① In the above petition of appeal, the Defendant stated “the indication of the original judgment” part of the judgment of the first instance, including the part concerning Plaintiff 1, and stated “the purport of appeal” part of “the part against the Defendant in the judgment of the first instance,” and stated “the purport of appeal” that “the part against the Defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and all of the claims of the Plaintiffs are dismissed. 2. The total costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiffs.” In addition, the Defendant did not appeal against the part against the Plaintiff only to the Plaintiff, but did not appeal against the part against the Defendant in the judgment of the first instance except for the part against which the Defendant

② On January 9, 2014, the Defendant applied for a suspension of compulsory execution against the judgment of the first instance court as Seoul High Court No. 2014Kadan20009, and received a decision of acceptance from the above court on the same day. The application and the list of the respondent of the decision include Plaintiff 1.

③ A written statement stating the grounds for appeal by the Defendant, which was first submitted on April 2, 2014 after the submission of the above petition of appeal, entered the indication of the party as “Plaintiff (Appellants and Appellants) 1 and 24,” and the grounds for appeal were as follows: (a) the details of Plaintiff 1’s consent to the decision to pay compensation, etc. pursuant to Article 18(2) of the Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation, etc. to Persons Related to Democratization Movement (hereinafter “Act on the Compensation for Democraticization”) and entered the illegality of Plaintiff 1’s lawsuit due to the effect of judicial compromise.

④ On June 20, 2014, Plaintiff 1 submitted to this Court an application for a proposal to enact a law on unconstitutionality on June 20, 2014, stating that the outcome of the instant judgment differs depending on whether the said application is unconstitutional under Article 18(2) of the Democratization Compensation Act.

⑤ On June 24, 2014, which was the first date for pleading of this Court, the Defendant submitted an application for correction of the petition of appeal to 16:16 on the same day, which was later than the end of 11:00, which was the first date for pleading of this Court. The Defendant stated in the application to the effect that “it is obvious that the Plaintiff 1 and the Seoul Southern-gu Office ( Address omitted) were omitted” on the list of the Plaintiff (Appellant) in the petition of appeal to the effect that it is obvious that the Defendant added it to the list of the Plaintiffs (only on the first date for pleading of appeal, the Defendant recognized that Plaintiff 1 was omitted in the indication

2. Basic facts

The reasoning for this part of the Court’s explanation is as follows, and this part of the reasoning for the first instance judgment is as stated in Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except in the following cases:

[Supplementary Use]

Of the judgment of the first instance court 6 pages 3 through 4, “Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 9, and Plaintiff 16 (Plaintiff 3 of the Supreme Court Decision)” was released on amnesty on December 23, 1979, and Plaintiff 22 on December 27, 1978, respectively, and “Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 9, and Plaintiff 16 were released on February 16, 1975, and Plaintiff 22 was released on suspension of execution of punishment on February 15, 1975, and thereafter, Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 9, and Plaintiff 16 were dismissed on December 23, 1979, and Plaintiff 22 was dismissed on December 27, 1978.”

[Supplementary Parts]

○ The following shall be added to 7 pages 8 of the first instance judgment:

“Familys and Inheritances.”

The Plaintiffs are Plaintiffs 1 and their families as indicated in the separate sheet of shares in inheritance, as shown in the separate sheet of shares in inheritance. Meanwhile, the inheritance relationship between Plaintiff 1, etc. and their father or mother’s death is as listed in the same separate sheet.

○ 7 pages 9 through 10 of the judgment of the first instance court [based grounds for recognition] shall be added to “the statements from Category A 15 to 18, 24 to 31.”

3. Determination on the defense prior to the merits

A. The defendant's argument

1) Since Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 16 consented to the decision to pay compensation under the Democratization Compensation Act and received compensation, and thus a judicial compromise has been established on all damages incurred in relation to democratization movements pursuant to Article 18(2) of the Democratization Compensation Act, the said Plaintiffs’ lawsuit in this case is unlawful as there is no benefit of protection of rights.

2) In addition, the above judicial compromise is deemed to have its effect on not only the principal who received compensation, but also on his family and relatives. Thus, the lawsuit of this case filed by Plaintiffs 2 (Plaintiff 1), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 00, 8, 00 (joint Plaintiff 9 in the first instance trial), 10 (the above Plaintiff 1), 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 (the above Plaintiff 16 related), which are premised on the right to claim damages, is also unlawful.

B. Determination

1) The part concerning plaintiffs 1 and 16

A) Relevant legal principles

The Act on the Democratization Movement Compensation is enacted with the aim of promoting the stabilization of livelihood and the improvement of welfare by the State for persons who have sacrificed in relation to democratization movements and their bereaved family members, and contributing to the development of democracy and national harmony. Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Act provides that "dcratization movements" means activities that violate the fundamental order of free democracy since March 24, 1964 and contribute to the realization of ideology and value guaranteed by the Constitution and the establishment of democratic constitutional order and to the recovery and extension of citizens' freedom and rights by resisting the authoritative rule that infringes on the fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution, and that the main sentence of subparagraph 2 provides that "persons related to democratization movements" (hereinafter referred to as "related persons") shall be subject to deliberation and decision-making by the Committee for Deliberation on Compensation in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act and shall be accompanied by the provision that "persons related to democratization movements who have received compensation or who are subject to disciplinary action for reasons" and "persons who intend to receive compensation" in accordance with the provision of Article 10(1) of the Act.

Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "where an applicant who has received a notice of decision on the payment of compensation or a written decision on the payment of living allowances or a written decision on the restoration of honor intends to receive compensation, etc., he/she shall submit a written consent and a written application stating the following matters (attached Form 10), along with one copy of a written decision on the payment of compensation, a written decision on the payment of living allowances or a written decision on the restoration of honor, and a certificate of personal seal impression of the applicant," and subparagraph 3 of the above Enforcement Decree provides that "The purport that he/she consents to the decision on compensation and claims the payment of compensation, etc." and the above Enforcement Decree (attached Form 10) provides that "I swear that the applicant shall conclude a compromise contract on the case, and

In addition to the legislative intent of the Democratization Compensation Act, the contents of relevant regulations, the consent prepared and submitted by the applicant, and the contents of the written claim, the legislative purpose of Article 18(2) of the Democratization Compensation Act is to promptly terminate and implement the same as a judicial compromise if the applicant consents to the decision of payment, such as compensation, in particular, by granting res judicata, prior to the litigation, through the procedures of the Deliberation Committee for the decision of payment such as compensation, and granting stability to the decision of payment such as compensation. In light of the above, if the applicant consents to the decision of the Deliberation Committee for the determination of payment such as compensation, the applicant shall be deemed to have the same effect as a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act as to all the damage arising in relation to the democratization movement for which he/she received compensation, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da45603, Mar. 13, 2014,

Meanwhile, Article 2 subparag. 2(d) of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that “a person who has been convicted of a democratization movement on the ground of his/her related person” as one of the relevant persons. Article 9(1) provides that “The Deliberative Committee may grant subsidies to assist his/her livelihood to any of the following persons and his/her bereaved family members.” The former part of Article 12-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that “a person detained for at least 30 days on the ground of democratization movements.” The former part of Article 12-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that “the person detained for at least 30 days among those eligible for living allowances under Article 9(1) of the Act shall be paid an amount calculated by multiplying the relevant number of days of detention by the standard median income, and the said amount shall not exceed 50,000 won.” According to the relevant provisions, since the Act does not distinguish the circumstances leading up to conviction of a person who was convicted of a democratization movement for a certain period, and thus, the applicant’s consent to the payment of illegal arrest or re-off, etc.

B) However, according to the records, the plaintiff 1 sought consolation money of 1.1 billion won and 1.2 billion won (1.1 billion won + 100 million won) inherited from the deceased non-party 3, the father of the non-party 1, the non-party 2, and the non-party 3, the deceased non-party 1. However, according to the records, the plaintiff 16 excluded the consolation money of 1,54,545,454 (1 billion won + 54,000 won) and the non-party 6's claim for consolation money of 1.6 billion won (excluding the non-party 1,14,545,454 won) from his own deceased non-party 4, the non-party 1, the deceased non-party 2, the deceased non-party 1, and the deceased non-party 2, the plaintiff 16, and the plaintiff 16, and the plaintiff 2, the plaintiff 16, who received consolation money of 105.2, and the plaintiff 162, the plaintiff 16.5.2.6.

C) Therefore, this part of the defendant's argument is with merit.

2) Part concerning family members

Article 1 of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "the purpose of the aforementioned Act is to promote the stability of livelihood and the improvement of welfare by the State for a person who has made a sacrifice in connection with a democratization movement and his/her bereaved family members." However, the aforementioned Act provides that "if an applicant has consented to the determination of compensation, etc. under the Democraticization Compensation Act, the payment of compensation, etc. shall be deemed to have been made by a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act with respect to damage incurred in relation to a democratization movement" (Article 18 (2)), and there is no express provision that the effect of a judicial compromise shall be lost by expanding the right to compensation for damage arising from unique mental distress suffered by a family member of a person related to a democratization movement and expanding the right to compensation for damage suffered by a person related to a democratization movement." Rather, the phrase of Article 18 (2) provides that "damage inflicted in relation to a democratization movement" refers to "damage suffered by a person who has made a sacrifice in relation to a democratization movement," and Article 3 (1) of the above Act limits the scope of his/her bereaved family member entitled to compensation or his/her bereaved family member.

Therefore, Plaintiff 1’s claim of consolation money and the claim of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 16’s family members for consolation money, which Plaintiff 1 succeeded from the deceased Nonparty 2 and the deceased Nonparty 3, and Plaintiff 16’s claim of consolation money, is legitimate. Therefore, this part of the Defendant’s claim cannot be accepted.

4. Judgment on the merits

(a) Occurrence of liability for damages;

In Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the right to pursue happiness, the obligation of the State to guarantee fundamental rights, the personal liberty in Article 12, the arrest and detention by law, the principle of no punishment without law and due process (Paragraph 1), the prohibition of advisers and the right to refuse to make statements unfavorable to them (Paragraph 2), the arrest and detention by warrant issued by a judge (Paragraph 3), the right to receive assistance of counsel (Paragraph 4), the notification of the reasons for detention (Paragraph 5), the right to receive a fair trial (Paragraph 7), and the right to receive a fair trial (Paragraph 7), and Article 27 stipulate that the State has the duty to protect the fundamental human rights of the people, guarantee the dignity and value of individuals as human beings, and enjoy the right to pursue happiness.

However, according to the facts acknowledged above, ① investigators belonging to the defendant did not abide by due process under the Constitution or the Criminal Procedure Act in the arrest and detention of plaintiffs 1 et al.; ② infringed upon the "right to counsel" of plaintiffs 1 guaranteed by the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act; ③ Cruing acts related to their duties, such as adviser, etc. with confessions from plaintiffs 1 et al.; but the evidence of the facts charged cannot be determined as guilty on the ground that most of the evidence of the facts charged lacks probative value or lack of probative value. However, the Emergency General Law Meeting and the Emergency High Military Law Meeting were sentenced to imprisonment with labor until they were released by suspension of execution; ④ it was partially executed; ④ it is reasonable for plaintiffs 1 et al. to take into account the press contents of "non-governmental volunteer training" as organizations whose substance was distorted as anti-government organizations to protect plaintiffs 1 and 1's reputation and reputation in the process of investigation; and ③ it is reasonable for them to recognize the defendant 1 et al.'s unlawful acts as well as the defendant 1's family members prior to the era.

Therefore, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act, the Defendant is liable to compensate for damages (excluding the portion of the claim for consolation money with the inherent nature of Plaintiffs 1 and 16 determined to be unlawful) suffered by Plaintiff 1, etc. and their family members from such series of illegal acts as above.

B. Judgment on the defense of extinctive prescription and the re-appeal of abuse of rights (excluding the part which was inappropriate as seen earlier among the claims by Plaintiffs 1 and 16)

1) Summary of the parties’ assertion

Even if the plaintiffs acquired the right to claim damages against the defendant, the defendant asserts that the above right to claim damages was ① around 1974, the time when the right to claim damages was terminated ( October 26, 1979), ② the time when the right to claim damages was terminated ( October 26, 1979), ③ the time when the government was launched ( February 2, 1998), ④ the time when the so-called government was launched ( February 2, 1998), ⑤ the time when the so-called participatory government was launched ( February 2003), ⑤ the time when the 128th meeting was held by the 128 meeting and recognized as a person related to democratization, such as the non-party 5, etc. ( December 27, 2004), and 7) the time when the past private committee established the truth-finding decision ( December 7, 2005).

The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant's claim for the completion of extinctive prescription constitutes an abuse of rights, since the plaintiffs had an objective obstacle to exercise their right to claim damages until the non-guilty verdict becomes final and conclusive through a retrial, and this case constitutes cases where it is remarkably unfair or unfair to recognize non-performance of obligation.

2) Determination

A) Relevant legal principles

(1) The right to claim damages against the State due to illegal acts is extinguished when five years (Article 96 of the National Finance Act, and Article 71 of the former Budget and Accounts Act, which was amended by Act No. 8050 of January 1, 2007, prior to the repeal by Act No. 8050 of January 1, 2007) have passed since the date when the injured party or his legal representative became aware of the damages and the identity of the perpetrator.

(2) Meanwhile, in a case where a public prosecution was instituted on the basis of evidence, etc. collected by a State agency due to an illegal act, etc. during the investigation process, and a final judgment of conviction was rendered, but the existence of grounds for retrial became final and conclusive later, and a State agency’s claim damages against the State due to an illegal act of the State agency, etc., it shall be deemed that there was a de facto obstacle that the obligee could not expect the claim for damages until the judgment of innocence becomes final and conclusive in the retrial procedure, and in such a case, the defense of the completion of extinctive prescription by the State, which is the debtor, cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g

B) Determination

(1) It is evident that the Defendant filed the instant lawsuit on July 12, 2012 after the lapse of five years from February 1975, 1975, which was the expiration date of the period for which the Defendant committed a tort against Plaintiff 1, etc. (the date on which the date on which the statute of limitations expired against Plaintiff 1, etc. was terminated is regarded as the date on which the past private committee expressed its opinion at any time before December 7, 2005, and the instant lawsuit was filed five years from that date).

(2) However, the plaintiff 1 et al. was convicted of the judgment of conviction in the case of public-private partnership, and the past private-private partnership committee expressed its opinion on December 7, 2005 that restoration of the victims' honor and appropriate compensation and prompt compensation should be made. On November 19, 2010, the plaintiff 1 et al. filed a request for a retrial on the judgment of conviction as Seoul High Court 2010 No. 2010No79, May 10, 2010. The above court acquitted the plaintiff 1 et al. on May 10, 2013. The judgment of retrial became final and conclusive around that time is as seen earlier. Accordingly, there was an objective obstacle that plaintiff 1 et al. and their family members could not expect to exercise their right to claim damages against the defendant until the new judgment of new trial against the plaintiff 1 et al. is finalized.

Therefore, since the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit of this case on July 12, 2012, which was before the ground for such disability occurred, and exercised their rights, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiffs exercised their rights within a reasonable period that can prevent the defendant from exercising their rights.

Therefore, the plaintiff's second defense pointing this out is with merit, and the defendant's second defense is without merit.

C. Scope of liability for damages

1) The plaintiffs' consolation money (excluding the part of consolation money with proper nature of plaintiffs 1 and 16)

A) Calculation of consolation money

In calculating consolation money due to a tort, the court is in accord with the principle of fair compensation for damages, such as the victim's age and occupation, social status, property and living conditions, degree of suffering from damage, degree of negligence on the part of the victim, as well as the victim's intentional and negligent act, motive and cause of harmful act, the perpetrator's property status, social status and age, and attitude of the perpetrator after the accident (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da7149, Dec. 4, 2009). Furthermore, in exceptional cases where compensation liability for delay due to a tort should be calculated from the date of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings, it is necessary to calculate consolation money at the time of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings, taking due account of the circumstances where compensation for delay is added to the cases where compensation is delayed, and it is necessary to determine the principal amount of consolation money at the time of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings. In cases of a tort committed by a public official's infringement of human rights as in this case, it should also be considered important factors such as the degree of illegality, period of the victim and family.

In light of the above legal principles, in full view of all the circumstances revealed in the arguments of this case, including the following: (a) health team; (b) the Defendant’s human rights and organized characteristics of the tort as seen above; (c) the gravity and calendar period of the sentence of the Plaintiff 1; (d) the Plaintiff’s family relationship; (b) the amount of consolation money recognized in a similar case; (c) equity in a similar case; and (d) the circumstances after the Plaintiff 1 et al. were released; and (e) the Plaintiff et al.’s parents; (e) the Plaintiffs (excluding the Plaintiffs who established a family relationship after they were released by the Plaintiff 1, 9, and 22; (e) the consolation money of the Plaintiff et al. as of the date of the closing of argument in the court of first instance; (e) the parents of the Plaintiff 1; (e) the Plaintiff 20 million won; and (e) the victims of the Plaintiff 9; and (e) the parents of the Plaintiff 30 million won; and (e) the Plaintiff 1.

B) As to the Plaintiffs who established a family relationship after they were released by Plaintiffs 1, 9, and 22

Meanwhile, Plaintiffs 1, 9, and 22 (Plaintiffs 2, 11, and 25) who established a family relationship after the release of Plaintiffs 1, 9, and 22 (Plaintiffs 2, 11, and 25) did not directly suffer from the Defendant’s tort, such as Plaintiff 1, and their parents, siblings, but even after the release as seen above, the State appears to have conducted a speculative and surveillance, etc. against the above Plaintiffs through information agencies, police, etc., and even after the release, it appears that the above Plaintiffs were unable to freely choose occupation due to their previous offenders, and their family members were faced with economic difficulties and were unable to lead normal work and social life. Considering the fact that there was a truth-finding decision of the past Private School Committee, it is reasonable to view that the above Plaintiffs suffered from mental distress, such as Plaintiff 2, 11, and 25, until the date of the truth-finding decision of the past Private School Committee, as well as the amount of consolation money for the above Plaintiffs as the court of first instance.

c)the starting point of counting damages;

If significant changes have occurred in comparison with the time of tort in monetary value, etc. at the time of the conclusion of arguments to be considered in calculating consolation money as long as three months have elapsed between the time of tort and the time of the conclusion of arguments, damages for delay to pay consolation money due to tort shall be deemed to have occurred from the date of the conclusion of arguments at the fact-finding court, which is the basis of calculating consolation money (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da103950, Jan. 13, 201, etc.). In addition, from around 1974, when 40 years have passed since the defendant's tort occurred until the date of the conclusion of arguments at the court at the court at the court at the court at the court at the court of first instance, there is a significant change in prices and national income, and there is a significant change in the monetary value at the time of the conclusion of arguments in comparison with the time of tort. Accordingly, as seen earlier

2) Mutual aid for criminal compensation

A) Article 5(1) of the former Criminal Compensation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10698, May 23, 201) provides that “this Act shall not prohibit a person entitled to compensation from claiming compensation pursuant to the provisions of other Acts.” Article 5(3) provides that “When a person entitled to compensation under the provisions of other Acts has received compensation for the same cause, the amount of compensation shall be determined after deducting the amount of compensation from the amount of compensation.” Article 6(1) and (3) of the current Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act also provides for the same purport. However, if a person who has been detained in prison or sentenced to punishment in criminal proceedings proves his/her causes attributable to a public official, and a person who has already received compensation by deducting consolation money from 20 days before receiving compensation from the original amount of compensation for tort, the amount of compensation for late payment damages shall be calculated based on the principle of compensation for late payment from the fact-finding court in light of the purport of the Criminal Compensation System, which is 10 days before receiving compensation from the original amount of compensation for tort.

B) According to the purport of the instant case’s statement and the entire argument, Plaintiff 12 and Plaintiff 22 filed a claim for compensation with Seoul High Court 2013co34, May 28, 2013, which became final and conclusive after the said new judgment became final and conclusive, and rendered a decision to pay KRW 63,374,400 to Plaintiff 12, August 26, 2013, and the said decision became final and conclusive around that time, and the said Plaintiffs received the above criminal compensation amount. Accordingly, it can be recognized that the said Plaintiffs received the above criminal compensation amount. Accordingly, as seen earlier, the damages for delay should be deducted from the principal (the damages for delay shall be calculated from the date of the closing of argument in the court of first instance) of Plaintiff 12 and Plaintiff 22’s principal (the damages for delay shall not occur at the time of receiving each of the pertinent criminal compensation).

3) Calculation of damages

Based on the above, when calculating the amount of damages by the plaintiffs in consideration of their shares in inheritance stated in the attached Table 2, the amount corresponding to each of the corresponding amounts stated in the "damage Calculation Table" in the attached Table 1 shall be the amount of money.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum under each Civil Act until November 8, 2013, which is the date of the closing of argument in the court of first instance, to the plaintiffs from October 11, 2013, which is the date of the closing of argument in the court of first instance, and the plaintiff 16 from May 3, 2016, which is the date of this decision, that it is deemed reasonable for the defendant to raise a dispute as to the existence or scope of the obligation to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The remaining plaintiffs are obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 20% per annum under each Civil Act until November 8, 2013, which is the date of the decision in the court of first instance, where it is deemed reasonable for the defendant to raise a dispute as to the existence or scope of the obligation to pay damages to the plaintiffs.

5. Conclusion

The part of the plaintiff 1's claim except the part of the claim for consolation money inherited from the deceased non-party 2 and the deceased non-party 3, and the part of the claim except the part of the claim for consolation money inherited from the deceased non-party 4 among the plaintiff 16's lawsuit of this case is unlawful and dismissed. The remaining claims of the plaintiff 1 and 16 and the remaining claims of the plaintiff 1 and 16 are accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and each of the claims of this case shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition.

The part against plaintiffs 1 and 16 in the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair in accordance with some conclusion. As such, the defendant's appeal partially accepted and the judgment of the court of first instance is modified as above, and the part against the plaintiffs other than plaintiffs 1 and 16 is just in conclusion. As such, the remaining plaintiffs' appeal, the plaintiff 2's claim for extension in this court, and the appeal against the plaintiffs other than plaintiffs 1 and 16 are dismissed as it is without merit.

(attached Form omitted)

Judge Lee Gyeong-Gyeong(Presiding Judge) (Presiding Justice)