A. The credibility of the facts admitted in a criminal judgment in a case where it is found that the facts conflict with the civil judgment after a civil judgment was rendered

B. The case holding that the witness who testified to be a title trust in a civil trial could have received a final judgment of conviction if the statute of limitations has not expired, in case where, after the judgment recognized as a title trust in a civil trial became final and conclusive, a criminal judgment became final and conclusive that the plaintiff's receipt of the above judgment constitutes a crime of fraud in the lawsuit on the premise that it is a payment in kind.

C. The starting point of counting the peremptory period of 30 days under Article 426 of the Civil Procedure Act for the grounds for a retrial under Article 422(1)7 of the same Act

A. In the original civil trial, even if not detained on the finding of facts in the criminal trial, the facts found guilty of the same facts are significant evidence. Thus, in light of other evidence submitted in the civil trial, it cannot be acknowledged that there is no special circumstance where it is difficult to adopt the factual determination of the criminal trial in light of other evidence. Furthermore, in a case where, after the civil trial, it is clearly stated that it is a judgment by fraud in the criminal procedure for a long time after the civil trial, it is ultimately determined that it is a judgment by fraud in the criminal procedure, the court should respect the existence and contents of the criminal judgment, and accept the facts recognized as consistent with the truth and credibility, rather than the facts recognized in the civil trial.

B. The case holding that the witness who testified as a title trust in a civil trial could have received a final judgment of conviction if the statute of limitations has not expired, in case where, after the judgment recognized as a title trust in a civil trial became final and conclusive, a criminal judgment became final and conclusive that the plaintiff's receipt of the above judgment constitutes a crime of litigation fraud on the premise that it is a payment in kind.

C. Unlike the five-year exclusion period stipulated in Article 426(3) and (4) of the Civil Procedure Act, the maximum period of 30 days as stipulated in Article 426(1) of the same Act shall continue from the date the parties become aware of the grounds for retrial. Accordingly, if the statute of limitations for a witness’s false statement as evidence after the judgment became final and conclusive after the judgment becomes final and conclusive and the grounds for retrial are determined that the witness cannot receive a final and conclusive judgment for reasons other than the defect in evidence, the maximum period of 30 days shall proceed from the date the parties knew that the witness cannot make a final and conclusive judgment on the witness’s false statement for reasons other than the defect in evidence

(a)Article 187(b) of the Civil Procedure Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 89Meu6812 delivered on August 14, 1990 (Gong1990, 1950) (Gong1990, 1950), 92Da51372 delivered on March 12, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 1170). Supreme Court Decision 74Da1398 delivered on December 23, 1975 (Gong1976, 863 delivered on February 13, 1990) 90Da3966 delivered on January 11, 1991 (Gong191, 718)

Plaintiff

Defendant 1, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na107 delivered on May 7, 1993

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. 원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은, 재심대상판결인 서울고등법원 86나779 판결은 갑제1호증의 1 내지 7(각 등기부등본)의 각 기재와 증인 소외 1, 소외 2, 소외 3, 소외 4의 각 증언을 증거로 하여, 이 사건 부동산은 원고(재심피고, 이하 원고라 한다)가 1983.6.21. 경락받아 소유권을 취득한 것인데, 원고의 고종사촌 형인 피고(재심원고, 이하 피고라 한다)가 그가 근무하는 회사로부터 사업자금을 대출받음에 있어 이 사건 부동산을 담보물로 제공하여 달라고 요청하면서 그 회사에서는 담보물이 그 회사 직원 명의로 소유권이전등기가 마쳐져 있어야만 이를 담보로 대출하여 준다고 하므로 원고는 1985.3.10.경 이를 승락하고 이 사건 부동산을 위 회사에 담보물로 제공할 목적으로 소유자 명의를 피고에게 신탁하기로 하여 같은 해 3.19. 피고 명의로 소유권이전등기를 마쳐 주었으나, 그 후 피고가 위 신탁취지에 반하여 이 사건 부동산을 타인에게 매도하기로 하는 매매계약을 체결하자 원고는 소장부본의 송달로써 위 명의신탁계약 해지의 의사표시를 하였다고 인정하고, 이를 바탕으로 이 사건 부동산에 관하여 명의신탁해지를 원인으로 한 소유권이전등기절차의 이행을 구하는 원고의 청구는 이유 있다고 판단하여 그와 결론을 달리 한 제1심판결을 취소하고 원고의 청구를 인용하였는데, 이에 대한 피고의 상고허가신청이 1987.3.10. 기각됨으로써 재심대상판결이 확정된 사실과, 위 재판과정에서 원고가 피고의 처인 소외 5 명의의 영수증(갑제5호증)을 위조하여 재심대상판결 법원에 제출하였고, 소외 6에게 허위의 증언을 하도록 교사하여 동인이 위 법원에서 허위의 증언을 하였으며, 위 민사소송을 제기하여 법원을 기망, 승소의 확정판결을 받아 냄으로써 이 사건 부동산을 편취하였다는 범죄사실로 원고 및 소외 6이 사문서위조, 동행사, 위증교사, 소송사기 또는 위증죄의 확정판결을 받은 사실을 인정한 다음, 피고가 이 사건 재심사유로서 (1) 원고의 소제기가 사기죄에 해당한다는 유죄의 확정판결을 받은 것은 민사소송법 제422조 제1항 제7호 소정의 '선서한 당사자의 허위진술이 판결의 증거로 된 때'에 준하는 재심사유가 있고, (2) 위 사유와 원고가 제출한 영수증이 위조되었고 소외 6이 허위의 증언을 하였다는 점이 확정판결로 인정된 이상 위 증인 소외 1, 2, 3의 각 증언들은 모두 허위진술임이 명백하나 다만 위 증인들의 위증행위는 이미 공소시효가 완성되어 처벌할 수 없게 되었으므로 이는 '증거흠결 이외의 이유로 유죄의 확정판결을 할 수 없을 때'에 해당하여 민사소송법 제422조 제1항 제7호 및 제2항 소정의 재심사유가 있다고 주장함에 대하여, (1) 위 사건에서 원고가 선서를 하고 진술한 일이 없고 재심대상판결에서 당사자의 진술을 사실인정의 자료로 삼은 바 없음이 뚜렷하므로 원고의 소제기가 사기죄에 해당한다는 유죄의 확정판결을 받았다 하더라도 이는 재심대상판결에 대한 민사소송법 제422조 제1항 제7호 소정의 '선서한 당사자의 허위진술이 판결의 증거로 된 때'에 해당하는 재심사유라고 할 수 없고, (2) 증인의 허위진술이 판결의 증거가 되었음을 재심사유로 삼을 경우에 공소시효가 완성되어 위증에 관한 유죄의 확정판결을 받을 수 없는 때에는 공소시효가 완성되지 아니하였다면 위증의 유죄 확정판결을 받을 수 있었으리라는 점을 재심청구인측에서 입증하여야 할 것인데, 원고 및 소외 6이 소송사기 등으로 유죄의 확정판결을 받은 사실은 앞서 본 바와 같고, 한편 기록에 의하면 피고는 위 증인 소외 1, 2, 3의 각 증언들은 모두 허위진술이고 재심대상판결은 위 허위진술을 증거로 삼았으니 재심대상판결에는 민사소송법 제422조 제1항 제7호 소정의 재심사유가 있다고 주장하여 서울고등법원 87재나31호로 재심을 청구하였으나, 위 증인들의 허위진술에 대하여 유죄의 확정판결이 있다거나 증거흠결 이외의 이유로 유죄의 확정판결을 할 수 없었다는 점을 인정할 증거가 없다는 이유로 1988.11.14. 위 재심의 소를 각하한다는 판결이 선고되어 확정되었고, 피고가 그 후 위 위증행위에 대하여 고소도 제기하지 아니한 채 위 위증의 공소시효가 완성된 사실을 알 수 있는바, 이에 비추어 보면 원고 및 소외 6이 위 범죄사실로 유죄의 확정판결을 받은 사실만으로는 공소시효가 완성되지 아니하였다면 위 증인 소외 1, 2, 3이가 위증의 유죄 확정판결을 받을 수 있었으리라는 점을 인정하기에 부족하고 달리 이를 인정할 증거가 없으므로 재심대상판결에 피고 주장의 재심사유가 있다고 할 수 없다고 판단하면서, 아울러 사실관계가 위와 같다면 피고는 위 위증의 공소시효가 완성된 날 재심사유를 알았다고 할 것인데 위 증인들 중 마지막으로 증언한 증인 소외 1에 대한 공소시효가 완성된 1991.9.4.부터 불변기간인 30일이 경과한 후인 1992.3.6. 이 사건 재심을 제기한 것은 부적법하다는 판단을 덧붙이고 있다.

2. However, according to the records, while the plaintiff alleged that the real estate in this case was trusted in title by the plaintiff, the defendant alleged that the real estate in this case was trusted by the plaintiff, the key issue is whether the real estate in this case was trusted in title or received payment in kind, and the judgment subject to a retrial was recognized as a title trust. However, after the decision subject to a retrial became final and conclusive, the court below acknowledged that the defendant was given payment in kind in the criminal case in this case which started with the defendant's complaint, and on this premise recognized that the defendant was received in accord with the judgment of the Supreme Court's dismissal on September 24, 191, which became final and conclusive by the judgment of the Supreme Court's dismissal on September 24, 199, and on this premise, found the defendant guilty of acquiring the real estate in this case by means of the judgment subject to a retrial constitutes a crime of fraud. Thus, even if the original civil judgment was not bound by the finding of facts in the criminal trial, the court below, which found the defendant guilty of the same facts in this case's final and conclusive judgment, cannot be accepted.

However, according to the records, among the above witnesses who asserted that the defendant made a false statement, the contents of testimony by the witness non-party 1 among the above witnesses should be the name of the defendant company (which appears to the purport that the defendant works for the defendant) that the defendant would speak to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff should be the employee of the defendant company, and the plaintiff should trust the defendant's trust in the name of the defendant. When the defendant receives the registration of ownership transfer, if the defendant promises to the plaintiff, the trust should be immediately terminated if the defendant did not borrow the loan from the company, and the defendant should not have promised to return the ownership." The witness non-party 2's testimony provided that "the defendant would have offered the real estate of this case to the company where he works for the defendant and received the loan from the company where the defendant works for the defendant after the title trust in the name of the defendant," and the contents of testimony by the above witness should be clearly known from the defendant's overall statement or evaluation of the facts that the above witness was not directly known from the defendant's evidence or evaluation of the above facts.

The above facts are not the Plaintiff’s title trust but the Plaintiff made a statement that the Plaintiff was aware that the real estate of this case was in title trust through his experience, barring any special circumstances, if the said witness made a statement that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the fact that the real estate of this case was held in title trust, such statement should be deemed to have been made against his memory, even if the said witness made false statement despite being aware of the fact that it was a title trust or a payment in kind, or at least it was impossible to know it. Therefore, the grounds for retrial on the ground that the witness’s testimony was false statement, should be deemed to have been proved that the judgment of conviction could have been obtained if the statute of limitations has not expired. As cited by the court below, it should be deemed that the Defendant had no evidence to acknowledge the Defendant’s false statement before the retrial of this case, or that there was no evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant could not make a final judgment of conviction on the grounds other than the lack of evidence, and even after the judgment dismissing the Defendant’s judgment dismissing the above judgment, it cannot be said that the Defendant’s act of fraud after the statute of limitations against the above witness cannot be established.

Although the court below acknowledged the fact that the plaintiff was convicted due to the crime of fraud, etc., but it is not sufficient to readily conclude that the above witness 1 and 2 could have been convicted of perjury if the statute of limitations has not yet expired, it is difficult to avoid criticism that the above witness 1 and 2 violated the rules of evidence that found the remaining facts against the rules of evidence. Therefore, the argument pointing this out is with merit.

3. Unlike the five-year exclusion period stipulated in Article 426(3) and (4) of the Civil Procedure Act, the peremptory period of 30 days as stipulated in Article 426(1) of the same Act shall continue from the date the parties become aware of the grounds for retrial. Thus, as in the case of this case, if the statute of limitations for a witness's false statement as evidence of the judgment became final and conclusive after the judgment for retrial became final and conclusive and it is deemed impossible to receive a final and conclusive judgment of conviction for reasons other than defects in evidence, the peremptory period of the above 30-day period shall proceed from the date the parties knew that the witness cannot make a final and conclusive judgment of conviction for reasons other than defects in evidence.

However, the defendant asserted that around February 23, 1992, two weeks before filing the lawsuit of this case, the defendant knew of the fact that the statute of limitations has expired against the confirmation of the above criminal case and the above witness non-party 1, etc., and even considering the record, there is no evidence to prove that the defendant had been aware of the completion of the statute of limitations prior to the examination (the testimony of non-party 1 or the respondent is that according to the testimony of the witness non-party 1 or the respondent, the defendant was aware of the confirmation of the above criminal case or the credibility thereof, and even according to the testimony itself, it does not mean that the defendant knew of the completion of the statute of limitations prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations). It cannot be confirmed that the ordinary party becomes aware of the completion of the statute of limitations on the date when the statute of limitations expired.

Nevertheless, the court below recognized that the defendant was aware of the grounds for retrial on the date when the statute of limitations expired, without any evidence, or erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the initial date of the period for filing a retrial. Therefore, the ground for appeal pointing this out has merit.

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)