(a) the basis of binding force of ordinary insurance terms and conditions of exclusion of objections;

B. Whether the automobile comprehensive insurance clause, which is cited as the exemption from liability of an insurance company for personal compensation in a case where a person who is an employee of the insured and is entitled to accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act is the victim, is null and void as it violates Article 663 of the Commercial Act (negative)

C. Whether exemption clause of the comprehensive automobile insurance clause under the preceding paragraph constitutes Article 7 subparag. 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act and thus null and void (negative)

A. The binding effect of a general insurance clause on a contracting party is not because it itself is not because it is not due to the fact that the contract itself has the legal or legal nature, but because it has agreed to include the general insurance clause in the contents of the contract between the contracting parties. In general, in a case where an insurance contract has been made between the contracting parties which includes the general insurance clause in the contents of the contract, the binding force of the contract cannot be ruled out even if the contracting parties are not aware of the contents of the contract. However, in principle, the binding force of the contract is excluded if it is expressly agreed on the terms of the contract between the contracting parties or if it is necessary to explain

B. The provisions of the automobile comprehensive insurance contract cited in cases where the victim is an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation as one of the reasons for exemption of an insurance company's liability for personal compensation and who is entitled to receive an accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act shall be compensated by industrial accident compensation insurance for the accident compensation arising in the labor-management relations and shall be compensated by the liability for damages to a third party. It is reasonable to view that the purpose of the automobile insurance is excluded within the scope of personal compensation for automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for the accident compensation arising in the labor-management relations. The above exemption provision cannot be deemed to violate Article 663 of the Commercial Act by changing the reason for exemption to disadvantage the policyholder

C. The exemption clause of the General Automobile Insurance Clause mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not constitute "a clause which limits the scope of damages to an enterpriser (i.e., an insurance company) without any justifiable reason or transfers the risks to be borne by the enterpriser to the customer" under Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, and thus, shall not

(a) Article 638 of the Commercial Act; Articles 659 and 663 of the Commercial Act; Articles 1 and 4(c) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act; Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 84Meu2543 decided Nov. 26, 1985 (Gong1986,108) (Gong198), October 14, 1986 (Gong1986,3028) (Gong1988), Supreme Court Decision 88Meu29177 decided Nov. 14, 1989 (Gong1990,29) (Gong1990,29)

Madern Electricity Co., Ltd.

Dongyang Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 89Na978 delivered on July 19, 1989

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

The binding force of a general insurance contract on a contracting party is not due to the fact that the contract itself is not a legal or legal norm, but because the contracting party agrees to include the terms and conditions in the terms and conditions. In general, in a case where an insurance contract which includes the terms and conditions in the terms and conditions is made between the contracting parties, the binding force of such terms and conditions shall not be excluded in principle unless the contracting party knows the terms and conditions in the terms and conditions. However, in a case where the contracting party expressly agrees on the terms and conditions, the binding force of the terms and conditions shall not be excluded (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 84Meu2543, Nov. 26, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 84Meu122, Oct. 14, 1986; and 88Meu2917, Nov. 14, 198; and in particular, if the terms and conditions are not specified in the terms and conditions in a generally anticipated manner, it should be excluded from the binding force of the terms and conditions.

According to the facts duly established by the court below, it is clear that the plaintiff and the defendant who are the party to the insurance contract of this case voluntarily prepared an insurance contract in which the automobile comprehensive insurance clause of the defendant company included in the terms of the contract and paid the insurance premium to the defendant. However, in this case, it is difficult to view that the contents of the exemption clause of Article 10 (2) 4 of the above terms and conditions are important in terms of generally anticipated methods (e.g., where the contents of the exemption clause are printed or written in a place that is not easily visible in a smallest active form), or that it is necessary to explain by the insurer (the above exemption clause is a general and common provision in the automobile comprehensive insurance clause), the plaintiff who is the policyholder is not aware of the contents of the above terms and conditions without examining them in detail or not hearing the insurer's explanation.

However, the judgment of the court below is clear in its reasoning that the above terms and conditions are binding on the plaintiff and the defendant, who is the party to an insurance contract, and further, it is not clear that the judgment of the court below affected the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles on the binding force of the general terms and conditions of automobile insurance.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

According to the provisions of Article 10 (2) 4 of the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile Insurance applicable to this case, as one of the reasons for exemption of an insurance company's liability for personal compensation, the victim is an employee who is liable for compensation under the Labor Standards Act. As to damages caused by occupational accidents in the labor-management relations between the employer and the employee, the Labor Standards Act governing the labor-management relations regulates various employer's liability for compensation, while the industrial accident compensation insurance system is established under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act to secure such liability, it is reasonable to regard the exemption clause as the purport of excluding it within the scope of personal compensation of automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for damages caused by industrial accident compensation insurance and compensating for damages to a third party. The above exemption clause cannot be deemed as a violation of Article 63 of the Commercial Act by changing the exemption clause to a policyholder or the insured at a disadvantage than the insurer's exemption of an insurer's liability under Article 659 of the Commercial Act (see Supreme Court Decision 88Meu29177, Nov. 14, 1989).

Thus, even though Article 10 (2) 4 of the above General Terms and Conditions of Automobile General Insurance is effective, the judgment of the court below held that the above General Terms and Conditions of Automobile General Insurance are null and void, and accepted the plaintiff's insurance claim of this case as stated in the plaintiff's explanation. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is justified in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the above Terms and Conditions of Insurance which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and it constitutes a ground for reversal of Article 12

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)