[1] The grounds for binding force of the General Insurance Terms and Conditions and the case where the binding force of the General Insurance Terms and Conditions is excluded

[2] Whether the provisions of the General Agreement on Motor Vehicle Insurance cited in cases where the victim is an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation as one of the reasons for exemption of an insurance company's liability for personal compensation and is eligible for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act are invalid as it violates Article 663 of the Commercial Act or Article 7 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts

[3] Whether a person who leased an insured worker from a registered insured and performed work under his/her management and responsibility, along with the articles under his/her control, constitutes an insured worker under the terms and conditions of comprehensive automobile insurance (affirmative)

[1] The binding force of a general insurance clause on a contracting party is not because it itself is not because it is not because it is the legal or legal nature of a standardized contract, but because it has agreed to include a general insurance clause in the contents of a contract between the contracting parties. In general, in a case where an insurance contract which includes a general insurance clause in the contents of a contract has been made between the contracting parties, it shall not be excluded from the binding force of the standardized contract even if the contracting parties are not aware of the contents of the standardized contract. However, if the standardized contract is expressly agreed on a standardized contract between the contracting parties, the binding force of the standardized contract shall not be excluded, and in particular, if the contents of the standardized contract are not

[2] With respect to damages caused by occupational accidents in the labor-management relations between the employer and the insured, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides for the employer's various liability for compensation under the Labor Standards Act governing the labor-management relations, while securing such liability for compensation. Thus, it is reasonable to view that the general terms and conditions of automobile insurance cited in cases where the victim is an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation under the Labor Standards Act as one of the grounds for exemption of the insurer's liability for compensation for personal damage, excluding the accident compensation arising in the labor-management relations within the scope of the automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for the damages caused by industrial accident and compensating for the damages to the third party. Such exemption clause does not violate Article 63 of the Commercial Act by changing the exemption from liability to the policyholder or the insured more unfavorable than the insurer's exemption from liability under Article 659 of the Commercial Act. It does not constitute a violation of Article 7 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act without any justifiable reason, or a violation of Article 7 (2) of the same Act.

[3] A person who leases an insured automobile from an insured insured person, along with the articles under his control and responsibility, used it as an insured automobile, and used it to perform the mid-term operation under his control and responsibility, constitutes a person who uses or manages an insured automobile with the consent of the insured under the terms and conditions of the automobile comprehensive insurance (the insured with the consent).

[1] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Articles 638 and 638-3 of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 638, 659, and 663 of the Commercial Act, Articles 1 and 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, Article 7 subparagraph 2 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [3] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 89Meu24070 delivered on April 27, 1990 (Gong1990, 1141) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 96Da19307 delivered on October 11, 1996 (Gong1996Ha, 3314), Supreme Court Decision 98Da31868 delivered on July 23, 199 (Gong1999Ha, 1724 delivered on November 14, 198) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 88Da29177 delivered on November 14, 197 (Gong1990, 299), Supreme Court Decision 90Da2653 delivered on December 11, 199 (Gong1991, 479) 97Da197949 delivered on December 19, 197 (Gong19939)

Motion Engineering Co., Ltd. (Donghwa Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Sun-ray et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Dongbu Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Vindication, Attorney Jeon Jae-in, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul District Court Decision 99Na49865 delivered on October 29, 1999

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The judgment of the court below

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below accepted the judgment of the court of first instance and recognized the facts as stated in its reasoning. The industrial accident accident of this case is caused by the non-party 1's negligence in driving during the mid-term season of this case, who is the employee of the non-party 1, and the plaintiff's employee, and the negligence in directing and supervising the field director, etc., who is the plaintiff's employee, and thus jointly discharged from one joint liability, the counter-party can seek reimbursement of the part equivalent to the ratio of negligence against the other party. The plaintiff maintained the obligation of the court of first instance to pay damages to the defendant who is the victim of this case by paying damages to the non-party 2, who is the victim of this case, who takes over the liability for damages to the other party due to the accident during the operation of the above mid-term season of this case. Accordingly, the defendant maintained the obligation of the court of first instance to pay to the plaintiff the amount equivalent to the ratio of the non-party 1's share out of the amount withdrawn to the plaintiff 2.

2. Judgment of the Supreme Court

A. The fact that a general insurance contract has binding force on a contracting party is not because it itself is not because of the fact that the contract itself has the legal or legal nature, but because of the agreement between the parties to the contract to include the general insurance contract in the contents of the contract. In general, if an insurance contract has been made between the parties to the contract, if the contractor does not know of the contents of the contract, the binding force of the contract shall not be excluded in principle, but if the contract is expressly agreed on the terms of the contract between the parties, the binding force of the contract shall not be excluded. However, if the contents of the contract are not specified in the terms of the contract in general, or is not specified in the terms of the contract, or in particular,

However, according to the provisions of Article 10 (2) 4 of the Clause of the defendant company's comprehensive automobile insurance contract applicable to this case, one of the reasons for exemption of an insurance company's liability for personal injury compensation is the case where the victim is an employee who is liable for compensation under the Labor Standards Act. As for damages caused by occupational accidents in the labor-management relations between the employer and the employee, the Labor Standards Act governing the labor-management relations provides for various compensation liabilities of the employer under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, and as for securing such liability for compensation, it is reasonable to regard the exemption clause as the purport of excluding it within the scope of personal compensation of automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for damages caused by industrial accident compensation insurance and compensating for damages to a third party. Such exemption clause cannot be deemed as a violation of Article 63 of the same Act by changing the insurer's exemption clause to a disadvantage to the policyholder or the insured than the insurer's exemption clause under Article 659 of the Commercial Act, and it does not constitute a violation of Article 7 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act.

B. According to the records of this case, the plaintiff was deemed to have leased the aircraft of this case, which is an insured automobile, with the article belonging to the named insured, and used it as an intermediate operation under the management and responsibility. Thus, the plaintiff is a person who uses or manages the insured automobile (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da56791 delivered on April 28, 1995) with the consent of the named insured under the above insurance terms and conditions. On October 23, 1996, the non-party 2, who is the victim of the industrial accident of this case, was paid the amount of KRW 95,74,640 as the disability pension due to the accident of this case from the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation on October 23, 1996. If this facts are acknowledged, it seems that the non-party 2 is likely to be entitled to receive accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act as an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation under Article 10 (2) 4 of the above terms and conditions.

Therefore, the court below's further review on this point and then rejected the defendant's defense on the ground that there is no evidence to prove that the non-party 2 falls under the grounds stipulated in the above exemption clause, and thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the exemption clause and by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. Therefore, there is a reason to point this out.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the lower court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Jae-sik (Presiding Justice)