(a) The validity of the comprehensive automobile insurance terms and conditions, which are cited as the exemption from liability of an insurance company with respect to personal compensation in a case where the insured employee is the victim, who is eligible to receive accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act;

(b) Whether it constitutes double insurance where an industrial accident compensation insurance and comprehensive automobile insurance are purchased (negative);

(c) Binding Force of General Insurance Terms

A. It is reasonable to regard the provision of the general terms and conditions of automobile insurance as one of the reasons for exemption of an insurance company’s liability for personal compensation in cases where the victim is an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation and is eligible for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act as one of the reasons for exemption of the insurance company’s liability for personal compensation as one of the reasons for exemption of liability for damages caused by an occupational accident in the labor-management relations as the purport of exclusion from the scope of personal compensation for automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for the damages caused by an industrial accident compensation insurance and compensating for the damages to a third party. It cannot be deemed that the

B. The industrial accident compensation insurance and the motor vehicle comprehensive accident compensation insurance cannot be deemed identical to the purpose of the insurance, and thus, even if the employer has subscribed to the above insurance together, they cannot be deemed to constitute a duplicate insurance under Article 672 of the Commercial Act, which refers to a case where several insurance contracts are concluded for the same purpose.

C. The fact that a general insurance clause has binding force on a contracting party is not because it itself is not due to the fact that the terms and conditions having the legal or legal nature, but rather because they agreed to include them in the contents of the contract between the parties to the contract. As long as the policyholder voluntarily prepares the insurance clause that includes the general insurance clause in the contents of the contract, whether the contents of the terms and conditions are not specified in a generally anticipated method or is an important matter, and thus, the policyholder cannot escape from the binding of the terms and conditions on the ground that he did not know whether he did not examine in detail the contents of the terms and conditions or not

(a) Article 659 of the Commercial Act; Articles 1 and 4 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act; Article 672 (c) of the Commercial Act;

C. Supreme Court Decision 84Meu2543 Decided November 26, 1985, Supreme Court Decision 84Meu122 Decided October 14, 1986

Seoul Puston Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Dongyang Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee and 3 others

Seoul High Court Decision 88Na4180 delivered on October 12, 1988

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. According to the provisions of Article 2 (2) 4 of the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile Insurance applicable in this case, one of the reasons for the exemption of the insurer's liability for personal injury compensation, which is one of the reasons for the exemption of the insurer's liability, where the victim is an employee who is liable for compensation under the Labor Standards Act. As to the damages caused by the occupational accident caused by the employer's labor-management relations, the Labor Standards Act regulates various employer's liability for compensation in regulating the labor-management relations and establishes the industrial accident compensation insurance system under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act in order to secure the liability for compensation, it is reasonable to view the exemption clause as the purport of the exclusion from the scope of the automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating the damages caused by the industrial accident compensation insurance and compensating the third party for the damages caused by the labor-management relations, and it cannot be deemed that the aforementioned exemption clause changed the exemption clause to the policyholder more unfavorable

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the non-party 1, the victim of the accident of this case, was an employee of the plaintiff company, and received disability compensation, suspension compensation, nursing expenses, medical expenses, and wheelchairs collection expenses from the Suwon local office of the Ministry of Labor in accordance with the industrial accident compensation insurance to which the plaintiff was admitted, and rejected the plaintiff's claim of this case on the ground that the non-party 1 is the victim who falls under the exemption clause of personal indemnity under the above general automobile insurance terms and conditions. However, the court below's decision is just and there is no error of law regarding the interpretation of the legal principles of insurance contract and the general insurance terms and conditions, such as the theory of lawsuit, and therefore, it is without merit (the judgment of the court below judged that the accident of this case constitutes a self-paid accident under the above insurance terms

In addition, the above exemption clause is contrary to Article 672 of the Commercial Act, which provides that in the case of duplicate insurance, it shall be borne only within the overlapping scope, and it is unfavorable to the policyholder. However, the duplicate insurance under Article 672 of the Commercial Act refers to a case where several insurance contracts are concluded for the same accident as the same purpose. Thus, the industrial accident compensation insurance and the automobile comprehensive insurance (personal compensation insurance) cannot be deemed the same as the purpose of the insurance and the insurance accident. Therefore, even if the employer subscribed to the industrial accident compensation insurance together with the automobile comprehensive insurance, it cannot be deemed as a duplicate insurance under Article 672 of the

2. The fact that the ordinary insurance terms and conditions have binding force on the parties to the contract is not because they themselves are not because of the fact that the terms and conditions have the legal or normative nature, but because of the fact that the parties to the contract agree to include in the terms and conditions (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Meu2543, Oct. 14, 1985; 84Meu122, Nov. 26, 1986). In general, as long as the policyholder prepares an insurance contract in which the terms and conditions of the ordinary insurance are included in the terms and conditions of the contract, it is whether the contents of the terms and conditions are not generally specified in the terms and conditions or are important, and thus, it cannot be avoided from the binding force of the terms and conditions on the grounds that the policyholder did not know whether the content of the terms and conditions are detailed or not,

In light of the records, we accept the binding measures of the exemption clause of this case, and find it invalid against the principle of good faith or in violation of the purpose of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions, it is merely an error in the judgment of the court below, and is therefore groundless.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice) Lee Jong-won (Presiding Justice)