(영문) 대구고등법원 2014.10.24. 선고 2011누1710 판결

1. The part of the judgment of the first instance court against the Plaintiff, which falls under the part of the order to revoke below, shall be revoked. The part of the corrective order (excluding the part in the column of the attached order of correction) regarding the qualification of union members, full-time officer, and non-full-time treatment clause (excluding the Identificationls & KON Co., Ltd. and KONEX Co., Ltd.) shall be revoked in order to read "the collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff on September 8, 2010 and each company listed in the attached order of correction."

2. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. Of the total litigation costs, 60% is borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder 40% is borne by the Defendant, respectively.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The corrective order for collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff on September 8, 2010 and each company recorded in the name of the business place in the separate sheet of correction order with the Plaintiff on September 8, 2010 shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is an industrial unit trade union established on February 8, 2001 with the organization of workers in the metal industry and metal-related industries as its subject.

B. On July 23, 2010 and August 4, 2010, the Plaintiff entered into a collective agreement (hereinafter collectively referred to as "collective agreement of this case") including each company listed in the separate sheet of correction order (hereinafter referred to as "stock company") and each company listed in the separate sheet of correction order (hereinafter referred to as "each company of this case"). The date of the conclusion of the collective agreement of this case and the effective period of the collective agreement of this case are as follows. The Defendant requested the North Regional Labor Relations Commission to make a resolution to correct the collective agreement on the grounds that the issues of this case violate the relevant provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Labor Relations Commission Act"), and the Special Labor Relations Commission made a resolution on August 25, 2010 in violation of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

D. Accordingly, on September 8, 2010, the Defendant issued a corrective order based on Article 31(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “instant disposition”) to the Plaintiff on the ground that the instant provision violated each provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as stated in the column of “reasons for the Corrective Order” in the attached Table of Details of the Corrective Order (hereinafter “instant disposition”). [The grounds for recognition] without dispute, entry of Gap’s 1 through 3, and evidence (including the serial number), and the purport of the entire pleadings.

2. 이 사건 쟁점 조항 및 원고의 주장, 관계 법령이 법원이 이 부분에 관하여 설시할 이유는 아래와 같이 일부 내용을 추가하거나 고치는 외에는 제1심 판결 이유 해당 부분 기재(제1심 판결문 제3쪽 2째 줄부터 제8쪽 8째 줄까지)와 같으므로, 행정소송법 제8조, 제2항, 민사소송빕 제420조 본문에 의하여 이를 그대로 인용한다.

Section 1 of Article 56 (Allowances) of the first instance court's first instance court's second instance judgment provides that "The second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's second instance court's first instance court's second instance court's second instance court's first instance court's first instance court's 170,000 won for chapter

Article 16 (Provision of Facilities) of the collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and SIGPexex (1) provides that “The Company shall provide exclusive office rooms, office equipment, communications equipment, office supplies, and gasoline-related offices required by the union, and bear the expenses for the maintenance of offices related to the union,” and most of the other collective agreements of this case provide that “The employer shall pay expenses for the management and maintenance of offices and for the activities of the metal trade union and branch in addition to the provision of trade union offices and equipment, or for the provision of money for supporting the activities of the trade union and branch offices” (hereinafter referred to as “facilities convenience provisions”). However, “Provision of exclusive office rooms and equipment” in the above provision is not subject to a corrective order.3.

A. Determination on the clauses of one-day negotiating party

1) First, as the grace period for the application of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulated under Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 9930, January 1, 2010) is until June 30, 2011, we examine whether the instant flexible provision does not violate Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which is the date of the instant disposition, based on September 8, 2010.

From the time of enactment by Act No. 5310 of March 13, 1997, “workers may freely organize or join an industrial union.” Article 5 provides that “If a trade union is organized in one business or workplace, it shall not establish a new trade union with the industrial union, notwithstanding Article 5.” This provision provides that the applicable grace period shall not be extended up to June 30, 201 pursuant to Article 7 of the Addenda (Act No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010) that allows the establishment of multiple trade unions by region or region. The reason why the establishment of a new business-based trade union by region or region is substantially postponed for more than 14 years means that the establishment of a new business-based trade union by region or region constitutes an independent trade union with the capacity of 10th anniversary of the establishment of an industrial-based trade union or its establishment by region or region (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Du10680, supra, it means an independent business-based trade union or subdivision by occupation.

In light of the above legal principles, if there are multiple trade unions that do not violate Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 930, Jan. 1, 2010), the Plaintiff can exercise only the right to collective bargaining of trade unions by making it possible for the Plaintiff to exercise the right to collective bargaining of trade unions. This is against Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act that guarantee establishment of a trade union, collective bargaining, and conclusion of collective agreements, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion in this part is without merit.

2) Next, as long as there are provisions in the instant collective agreement, we examine whether the provision on the instant daily negotiating party does not violate Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. (A) First of all, there is no provision on the shop shop in each collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the lux metal, the lux metal, the Cheongdong industry, and the luxator. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s above assertion premised on the existence of the provision on the shop shop in each collective agreement of each of the above companies is without merit, without any need to examine further.

B) Each collective agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and SIGPO Mexico, Samwon River, KCO Energy, Mangreing, ambane, Oral Plast, Oral, D. Escop, Escop, Escop, NONT, Escopher Escopher, Escopic System, and Icebregr bond, has provisions in the shop shop.

However, there is no evidence to prove that the Plaintiff, at the time of entering into a collective agreement with each of the above companies or thereafter, representing at least 2/3 of the employees belonging to each of the above companies, and even if the Nice provision contained in each of the above collective agreements is valid, as seen earlier, each of the above companies may be established by other trade unions jointly with the Plaintiff. Thus, each of the above companies may refuse or neglect the Plaintiff’s demand for collective bargaining of the labor union that can be jointly with the Plaintiff on the ground that each of the above companies was under the union shop provision without justifiable cause is not permissible pursuant to Article 81 subparag. 3 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Ultimately, recognizing only the Plaintiff’s union as the sole negotiating body is unlawful by infringing the workers’ right to organize and the workers’ right to collective bargaining guaranteed by Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor

3) Lastly, in light of the contents of the negotiation clause in the instant case, we examine whether there is room for violation of Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

① First of all, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the provision on the day between the negotiating party and the other negotiating party does not represent the former workers, but rather represent the former members, and that there is no possibility of infringing on the right to collective bargaining of non-members, union members belonging to other trade unions, and multiple trade unions. However, the provision on the day between the negotiating party and the other negotiating party states that "the union recognizes that it is the only labor organization that negotiates wages, labor conditions, etc. on behalf of all union members on behalf of all union members," and that the person who negotiates on behalf of all union members is the representative of the trade union (Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act), and this part of the provision stipulates that "trade union" is the labor organization that represents all union members. This is rather than the content that the representative of the trade union negotiates on behalf of all union members, but rather the "trade union" is the only labor organization

In the end, it is reasonable to deem that this part of the Labor-Management Council, Staff Council, standing union, and individual union members, as well as other labor organizations in the same workplace, may infringe upon the right to collective election of non-members, other union members, union members, and multiple union members.

② In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that the provision on the day negotiation of the instant case is merely confirming the status of the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff’s “representative bargaining trade union,” and thus, it is not illegal since it is consistent with the system of multiple labor union and counter unification as provided in Article 29-2 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. However, the provision on the day negotiation of the instant case stipulates that only the Plaintiff is a trade union with the right to collective bargaining without considering all the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows as provided in Article 29-2 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and therefore, it cannot be said that the provision on the day negotiation

4) Therefore, the Defendant’s corrective order on the ground that the provision on the instant one-day negotiating party violates Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act guaranteeing workers who belong to each of the instant companies the freedom to form and join a trade union and the right to collective intercourse is lawful, and the Plaintiff’s assertion disputing this is without merit

B. Determination on the exclusion clause of the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows

1) According to Articles 29(2) and 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which came into force from July 1, 2011, where multiple labor unions exist, a trade union shall determine a representative bargaining trade union and request bargaining. However, the same shall not apply where an employer agrees not to go through the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows (the procedures for the determination of a representative bargaining trade union) within the deadline for autonomous determination of a representative bargaining trade union. A representative bargaining trade union has the authority to negotiate with and conclude a collective agreement with an employer for all the trade unions or members that have requested bargaining.

In addition, according to Article 29-2 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, all trade unions which have participated in the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows shall set a representative bargaining trade union autonomously within the period prescribed by the Presidential Decree. The provisions of Articles 14-2 through 14-5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provide for the procedures for the determination of a trade union in need of teaching. According to the provisions of Article 14-6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, where a trade union determined or decided as a trade union which has requested bargaining autonomously pursuant to the above procedures intends to set a representative bargaining trade union pursuant to Article 29-2 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, the trade union which has requested bargaining shall sign or seal the representative, negotiating members, etc. of the representative bargaining trade

2) As in the instant case, whether it is legitimate for an employer to agree in advance not to undergo the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows as stipulated in the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act to be legitimate as a collective agreement; ① Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act requires the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows at the time of collective bargaining in order to prevent confusion in collective bargaining due to the diversification of bargaining windows after July 1, 201, in principle, the establishment of multiple trade unions is allowed. However, if the employer agrees, exceptions should be granted. In light of the legislative intent, form, and general methods of interpretation, etc., the above exceptions should be strictly interpreted; ② the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows are premised on the premise that the trade union requesting the bargaining becomes final and conclusive or decided; thus, the procedures for simplification can only start from the date on which the trade union requesting the bargaining windows becomes final and conclusive, and the period from the date on which the trade union becomes subject to the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act begins.

3) Therefore, the Defendant’s corrective order on the ground that the exclusion clause of the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows violates Articles 29(2) and 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is lawful. The Plaintiff’s assertion disputing this is without merit.

C. Determination as to the provision of qualification as a member of an dismissed person

According to the proviso of Article 2 subparagraph 4 (d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, a person who is not a worker is prohibited from joining a trade union. In principle, “worker” refers to a person who is actually employed by a specific employer and is actually employed (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du4483, Mar. 24, 2011).

However, the proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union Act that provides that a dismissed person shall be deemed an employee until the Central Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on review (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du8731, Feb. 11, 2010) is applicable only to a company-level trade union and does not apply to the industrial trade union like the Plaintiff (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du8731, Feb. 11, 2010). The Plaintiff’s industrial trade union, such as the Plaintiff, does not premise that a member has a subordinate relationship with a certain employer from its original characteristics; a person dismissed from the employer may make a request for remedy to the Labor Relations Commission; and accordingly, a lawsuit seeking invalidation of dismissal may be brought to the court immediately, regardless of the need to recognize the illegality of the dismissal as an employee. In light of the fact that a person disputing the illegality of the

Accordingly, the plaintiff, which is an industrial trade union of this City, placed "a clause of dismissal as a member of the company" in the collective agreement concluded between each company of this company and thus, it cannot be deemed that it violated the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Thus, the defendant's corrective order on this part is unlawful, and the plaintiff's assertion disputing this

D. Determination on the clause of full-time officer treatment

1) According to Articles 24(2) and 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Act as to whether the provision on full-time officer treatment violates Articles 24(2) and 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Act, the full-time officer should not receive any wage from the employer during the full-time period, and the employer’s payment of wages to the full-time officer is not allowed due to unfair labor practices. However, in cases where the employer determines by a collective agreement or agrees with the employer, the committee for deliberation on exemption from working hours shall deliberate and decide on the exemption from working hours to the extent that it does not exceed the limit of exemption notified by the Minister of Employment and Labor, such as negotiations with the employer, grievance settlement, industrial safety activities, and the maintenance and management of the trade union for the development of sound labor-management relations.

However, since the provision on the payment of full-time officer's wages imposes a duty on each company of this case to pay monthly wages to the full-time officer solely on the ground that he/she is the full-time officer regardless of the full-time officer's duties or the hours of association, it violates Article 24 (2) and (4) and Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act that allows the full-time officer to pay wages within the scope of the exemption of working hours only for the maintenance and management of labor unions for the purpose

2) Whether the Constitution violates the three basic rights of labor, the principle of labor-management autonomy, etc.

① The above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act contribute to securing the independence and independence of a trade union by having the trade union bear, in principle, expenses for workers in charge of affairs of a trade union without providing labor to an employer. On the other hand, the purpose of establishing a reasonable and stable labor-management relationship and enhancing the efficiency of management by continuously protecting and supporting the trade union activities at a certain level, and through these legislative measures, it can contribute to the maintenance of industrial peace by preventing and resolving related labor-management disputes in advance. To achieve such legislative purpose, the legislative purpose is justifiable. In addition, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act completely prohibit, in principle, those who are full charge of resolving related issues and receive wages from the employer, while completely prohibiting the workers who are employed by the trade union from engaging in the trade union activities without loss of wages, and prohibiting industrial actions to demand and carry out such demand through the working hours exemption system are appropriate means.

② Although the provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibit a union worker from receiving wages from a union worker and demanding more than the limit of the time-off, the previous union worker may continue to guarantee the union activity in the past by converting his status as a union worker as a full time-off worker, a time-off worker, or a time-off worker through the newly introduced system for the exemption of working hours. As such, the damage caused by the prohibition of full-time wages from the union worker can be minimized through the utilization of such a time-off system.

(3) Meanwhile, Article 24(5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act recognizes exemption from working hours only to the extent that does not exceed the limit of exemption from working hours set in advance, and prohibits industrial action in a wooden position to accomplish the demand. As to which extent of exemption from working hours is recognized, the Act to be freely agreed upon by the labor and management can be a desirable measure to ensure that the minimum amount of exemption from working hours is in excess of the Act to be set by the labor and management autonomy. However, as industrial trade union forms the principal place of business and the level of financial independence of the labor union, the wage for the executives of the first-company labor union is borne by the labor union, and the practice to recognize exemption from working hours is closely related to the labor management by the labor and management consultation in cases of the intra-corporate workers within a reasonably set place in Korea, it is difficult to set the minimum exemption from working hours at least by the labor union and the level of financial independence of the labor union after the introduction of new regulations on working hours in order to correct the long-term practice of the labor and management.

④ The provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulate that the exercise of collective bargaining rights and collective action rights is restricted only by taking paid treatment to the union’s activities that exceed the limit of exemption from wages and working hours for full-time union workers. At the same time, the current unreasonable practices surrounding the payment of wages for full-time union workers are corrected, and at the same time, the public interest, such as securing the autonomy of union unions, maintaining stable labor-management relations, and maintaining industrial peace, which can be achieved by continuing the activities of the union within the limit of exemption from working hours, is considerably serious.

⑤ Therefore, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act cannot be deemed as infringing on the principle of labor-management autonomy or the right to collective bargaining and collective action in violation of the over-breadth doctrine. Moreover, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act do not directly limit the right to organize, which is the right of an employee to form a trade union or not to join a trade union, to which an employee does not directly limit

B) Whether Article 6(1) of the Constitution violates the principle of respect for international law

(1) The Constitution of the Republic of Korea is one of the basic principles that contribute to the permanent world peace and human co-prosperity by complying with treaties signed and promulgated by the Constitution and generally accepted international laws as well as domestic laws and regulations in good faith and respect international order (Article 6(1))). As such, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea must endeavor to achieve the objectives of international laws and regulations that may respect the spirit of international cooperation.

② First, the Convention on the Protection and Convenience provided to the Representative of Workers by Enterprises No. 135 of the Labour Convention was adopted in 1971 and entered into force on December 27, 2002. Therefore, Korea has a duty to comply with it as well as domestic law.

On the other hand, Article 2 (1) of the above Convention provides that "no disadvantageous measure shall be taken against the representative of workers on the ground of his position or activity, and the appropriate convenience shall be provided from the enterprise so that the representative of workers can perform his duties promptly and efficiently." However, Article 2 (2) of the above Convention provides that "in case of a domestic labor-management relationship system, the characteristics of the domestic labor-management relations system, or the necessary size and ability of the enterprise concerned should be taken into account," and Article 2 (3) of the above Convention provides that "the provision of such convenience shall not interfere with the efficient operation of the enterprise." Thus, the provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act in this case is not deemed to be inconsistent with the above Convention as long as the exemption of working hours was introduced as a measure to prohibit the payment of wages to the full-time union workers. Furthermore, even if Article 10 of the "Recommendation on the Protection and Convenience provided to the representative of workers" as reference for the interpretation of the above Convention, it is difficult to see that the above provision in Article 130 of the above Convention contains the above provision.

3. In addition, the recommendation of the 'Committee on Freedom of Labor' under the International Labor Organization cannot be deemed as having the same effect as domestic law or as generally accepted international law, and as seen earlier, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibit the employer from receiving wages from the employer and, as long as they introduced the 'Committee on Freedom of Labor' in the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as the reasons that do not conflict with the pertinent agreements and recommendations of the Labour Organization, it is difficult to view that the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act are inconsistent with the recommendations of the 'Committee on Freedom of Labor'.

C) Whether the right to work and the freedom of occupation are infringed

A full-time union worker is similar to a worker who is in a state of temporary retirement, who is exempted from the duty to provide labor to the employer for a certain period of time with the consent of the collective agreement or employer under a free agreement between labor and management, and is entitled to provide labor and receive wages to the employer according to the basic labor-management relations with the employer. Thus, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act cannot be deemed as limiting the right to work of the full-time union worker. Furthermore, it is difficult to see that the right to work of the full-time union worker itself is restricted as one type of occupation.

D) Whether the right to equality is violated

Although the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act separates the non-grade union worker system and the paid working hours payment system, the status of the union worker may be converted to the time-off worker pursuant to the individual labor-management agreement, and the time-off worker may be allowed to be exempted from working hours depending on the case. This may vary depending on how the two systems are operated in each business or workplace. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss the infringement of the right to equality on the premise that the union worker and the time-off worker are strictly divided. Therefore, the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act cannot be deemed to infringe the right to equality.

E) Therefore, since the above Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Provisions do not violate the Constitution, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

3) Whether the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act constitutes a discretionary provision

The plaintiff asserts that the above provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is still valid even if the above provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act violates the above provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

However, the legislative intent of Article 24 (2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 24 (5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provide that "no industrial action shall be conducted for the purpose of demanding payment of wages in violation of paragraphs (2) and (4) and accomplishing such demand." Article 81 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulates that an act such as providing wages to full-time officer of a trade union shall be allowed to be performed by an employer under Article 24 (4) exceptionally, and Article 24 (2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act intends to secure implementation of Article 24 (2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act through each of the above provisions. In light of the legislative intent of Article 24 (2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 24 (5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, even if it is difficult to view it as a mandatory provision (which is related to good morals and other social order among the above statutes).

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

4) We examine whether the provision of full-time officer treatment is valid under Article 1 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and the date of conclusion of the collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and each company other than KON and KONEX is as stated in the separate sheet of correction order, and whether the provision of full-time officer treatment is not unlawful under Articles 1, 3, and 8 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010), which existed as of July 1, 2010.

Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act was enacted by Act No. 5310 on March 13, 1997, and Article 24 of the Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that, if a collective agreement is prescribed or consent is obtained from an employer, a worker may engage exclusively in the affairs of a trade union without providing labor as prescribed by a labor contract (paragraph 1), and Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the employer shall not receive any benefits from the employer during the previous period (paragraph 2), and stipulates that the employer shall provide the payment of benefits to the full-time worker as an unfair labor practice. In addition, Article 6 of the Addenda (Act No. 5310, Mar. 13, 1997) provides that the application of Articles 24 (2) and 81 subparagraph 4 of the above Act shall be postponed until December 31, 201, but finally, the aforementioned provision was amended by Act No. 6310, Mar. 28, 2001;

In addition, Article 24 of the Trade Union Act amended by Act No. 930 of January 1, 2010, Article 24 of the Act provides that "no employer shall limit the legitimate activities of his/her predecessor (paragraph (3)), and where the employer determines or agrees to do so by collective agreement or by workplace, an employee may conduct management and operation of trade unions for the purpose of developing sound labor-management relations (paragraph (4) of this Act or other Acts, such as negotiations, settlement of grievances, and industrial safety activities with the employer without any wage loss, and the maintenance and operation of trade unions for the purpose of carrying out such activities (paragraph (5) of this Article), and Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Act provides that "no employer shall demand payment of wages in violation of paragraphs (2) and (4) of this Article and for the purpose of carrying out such activities (paragraph (4) of this Article)," and Article 24 subparagraph 4 of the Act provides that "no employer is allowed to limit unfair labor practices," and Article 92 subparagraph 10 of the Act provides that "no employer shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 920.10.1.2.1.2 of the Act"

Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that "Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall enter into force on July 1, 2010, and Article 8 of the Addenda provides that "Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Addenda (Article 8 of the Addenda) shall not apply until June 30, 2010." Ultimately, the provision prohibiting full-time officer's benefit was applied from July 1, 2010.

Meanwhile, Article 3 of the Addenda (Act No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010) provides that “any collective agreement in force as of the enforcement date of this Act shall be deemed to have been concluded pursuant to this Act: Provided, That if all or part of the collective agreement violates Article 24 upon the enforcement of this Act, it shall be deemed as effective until the effective date of the relevant collective agreement, notwithstanding the enforcement of this Act.” This purport is to minimize disadvantages and confusion arising from the application of Article 24(2) by recognizing the validity of the existing collective agreement even if Article 24(2) of the former collective agreement violates Article 24(2) as it completely applies, even if Article 24(2) of the Addenda provides that the collective agreement is valid until the effective date of the collective agreement, excluding Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, which is the date of application of Article 24(2) of the former Act, and thus, it shall be deemed that the remaining provisions of the collective agreement are valid until the expiration of Article 27(101).

Ultimately, in light of the interpretation of Articles 1, 3, and 8 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010), the part ordering correction on the ground that the provision on full-time treatment of collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff and each company, other than the KONEX and KONEX, violates Articles 24(2) and 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

5) Sub-committee

Therefore, a corrective order under the premise that the provision on full-time officer treatment violates Article 24(2) and Article 84 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act among the collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff and the KONEX and the other companies except for KONEX is unlawful. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this is reasonable. The corrective order under the premise that the provision on full-time officer treatment of the collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and KONEX and KONEX violated the above provisions on Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this is without merit.

E. Determination as to the provision for non-exclusive treatment

1) Whether Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act applies to non-exclusive managers

Considering the following circumstances, it is reasonable to consider that the system of exemption from working hours under Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act for all workers including the full-time officer, and it is not limited to the full-time officer.

① Under the title of "full-time officer of a trade union", Article 24 of the Trade Union Act stipulates the definition of full-time officer of a trade union, the principle of prohibition of payment of wages, and the guarantee of employment of full-time officer of a trade union to an employer, and Article 24 of the Trade Union Act stipulates that, notwithstanding the principle of prohibition of payment of wages to full-time officer of a trade union and the principle of prohibition of payment of wages to an employer, in certain cases, that is, where a collective agreement is provided or the employer consents to do labor union activities without loss of wages, the Act stipulates that a worker may engage in labor union activities within the limits of the exemption of working hours, and Paragraph 1, 2,

In light of the above principle of prohibition of paying wages to full-time workers, the purport of introducing the system of exemption from working hours, the structure and form of the above provision, etc., our Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act grants wages to workers when they engage in trade union activities within the scope of not exceeding the limit of exemption from working hours, which is consistent with Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as well as the above interpretation as mentioned above, unlike Article 1, 2, and 3 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, unlike Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

② Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides full-time officers of a trade union with wages or assistance in operating expenses of a trade union: Provided, That it is inevitable for an employer to allow workers to do the activities referred to in Article 24(4) during working hours to clearly distinguish full-time officers and workers from those of a trade union. As such, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act consistently separates the subject of application into “full-time officer” and “worker”.

③ Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, instead of prohibiting the payment of wages to full-time union workers, provides that a "worker" may process a paid worker's maintenance and management of a trade union within a certain range of hours in order to prevent actual trade union activities and guarantee the real guarantee of the three labor rights. Thus, it can be interpreted that a "worker" can be interpreted as a " regardless of the principle of prohibition of payment of wages," and therefore, it does not necessarily mean that the above "worker" is limited to a "full-time union worker."

④ Rather, if Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act applies only to the full-time officer, the full-time officer is exempt from the obligation to provide labor under a labor contract and may be engaged exclusively in the affairs of a trade union with the consent of the employer, but on behalf of the employer, since the employer is not entitled to any wages from the beginning, it cannot be deemed that the full-time officer is deprived of wages in itself. Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the full-time officer shall not be deemed to lose wages. Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

On the other hand, considering that the principle is that if an employee fails to perform his/her duty to provide labor under an employment contract while performing his/her duties, he/she shall not be paid wages from the employer for that period, regardless of whether he/she is the full-time officer or not, the part that "it may maintain and manage a trade union without loss of wages" under Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that even if an employee fails to perform his/her duty to provide labor under an employment contract, regardless of whether he/she is a full-time officer, he/she

(5) If "worker" under Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is interpreted as "all workers including the full-time worker," it is easy to explain the full-time worker determined in the public notice of the limit of exemption from working hours. This is because Article 24 (1), 2, and (3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that "the full-time worker who is engaged in the affairs of a trade union only" as the full-time officer, a person who is engaged in the affairs of a trade union shall not, in principle, be deemed a full-time officer prescribed in the Act. However, under Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, a person who is in charge of the affairs of a trade union shall not be deemed a full-time officer who is in charge of the affairs of the trade union without loss of wages within the limit of exemption from

If a "worker" under Paragraph (4) refers only to a full-time worker, not a full-time worker, but a full-time worker is not subject to the restriction under Paragraph (4), so if a collective agreement or the consent of an employer is obtained, he/she may engage in an unlimited trade union activity regardless of the limit of the exemption from working hours, regardless of the limit of the exemption from working hours. As a result, the purpose of Article 24 (5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibiting industrial actions is to prevent industrial actions in order to accomplish the prohibition of payment of wages to full-time workers and exemption from

(5) Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that in cases of activities such as non-standing union members, grievance handling committee members, and occupational safety and health committee members during the working hours of non-standing union members or other union members, paid under other Acts is not guaranteed. However, the working hours guaranteed pursuant to other Acts are not separately calculated, but are included in the limit of working hours exemption. Thus, it is difficult to view the foregoing provision as a provision that only takes full account of the full-time officer.

2) As seen in the attached list of correction orders as to whether the provision on non-exclusive treatment becomes effective pursuant to the supplementary provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act or not, as seen in the attached list of correction orders, there was a provision on non-exclusive treatment in collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff and each company other than the KONls and KONEX as of July 1, 2010, and so long as the above provision on non-exclusive treatment exists, the interpretation of Articles 1 and 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as to the provision on non-exclusive treatment in the above collective agreements should be deemed as effective until the period of validity of the collective agreement.

Ultimately, it cannot be deemed that the provision on treatment of non-exclusive workers of collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff and the KONEX and each company except the KONEX violates Article 24(2) and (4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

(iii)in the case of stamp control tower ju and KONEX:

As seen earlier, the system of exemption from working hours under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is for all workers including the full-time officer, and where a full-time officer or a full-time member is able to work as a paid trade union, it shall be done within the scope of exemption from working hours.

The provisions of the separate agreement between the Plaintiff, stamp control tower, and KONEX concerning the treatment of non-full-time workers in each of the collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff, KON and KON provide that, without limiting the hours during which non-full-time union members or negotiating members are allowed to work as a paid trade union member within the limit of the exemption of working hours, the hours during which a paid trade union member is allowed to work as a paid trade union pursuant to the said agreement may exceed the limit of the exemption of working hours. This does not coincide with the purport of the prohibition of the payment of wages to his predecessors and the exemption of working hours as seen earlier.

Ultimately, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit, on the premise that the provision on the treatment of non-exclusive workers, among the separate collective agreements entered into between the Plaintiff and the KON and KON, violates Article 24(2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 84(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and that the above agreement does not violate the above provisions on the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, on the premise that the provision on the treatment of non-exclusive workers, should be construed as a full-time worker.

4) Sub-committee

Therefore, this part of the corrective order, based on the premise that the provisions for non-exclusive treatment of collective agreements concluded between the Plaintiff and the KONEX and each company other than KON violated Articles 24(2) and (4) and 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, is unlawful. The Plaintiff’s assertion of the dispute is with merit. The corrective order, based on the premise that the provisions for non-exclusive treatment of the separate agreement concluded between the Plaintiff, KONNEX and KONEX violate the provisions for the above Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate. The Plaintiff’s assertion of the dispute is without merit.

F. Determination on the provision of convenience to facilities

1) Interpretation of Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the act of subsidizing the operating expenses of a trade union shall be an unfair labor practice. The purport of the above provision is to maintain equal labor-management relations by preventing an employer from exercising influence over a trade union in the counterclaim and to maintain the independence of a trade union. The purpose of the provision is to prohibit an employer from engaging in any act that is likely to disturb the independence and independence of a trade union as a negotiating party, regardless of which the employer or the employee’s intent, except for the act of contributing funds to the welfare of workers, or to prevent and remedy for economic inequality or other re-influences, and the provision of a trade

The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that, even if the operation cost of a trade union is an act of assisting the operation cost of a trade union, it shall be deemed unfair labor practice only if there is a significant risk that the labor union's independence would be infringed, and that the provision should be permitted if not, but it is difficult to regard the scope of prohibition of subsidization of operation cost as an example of an act of assistance which permits the establishment of an "contribution and provision of an office" under the proviso, 2. Rather, it is unclear whether the provision of an unfair labor practice depends on the concept of uncertainty and the standard is uncertain if it is considered as an "risk that the autonomy of a trade union is infringed" under the proviso. Furthermore, in a situation where multiple labor unions are allowed, it is more likely that the provision of the former Labor Relations Commission's assistance would infringe upon the independence and independence of a trade union's assistance, and it is still difficult to interpret that the provision of the former Labor Relations Commission's assistance in terms of the Act's uniform provision of operation expense for the full-time officer, since it still has a big significance in the above revision of the Act.

2) Whether the provision of facility convenience violates Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act or not, the collective agreement of this case provides the office of the trade union and the office and fixtures of the trade union, bear the expenses for the management and maintenance of the office of the trade union (tele, electricity, water supply, heating, cooling, air-conditioning, and air-conditioning) and the expenses for the provision of vehicles to the trade union or the expenses for the support of the activities of the metal trade union and the branch. According to the above interpretation, the part of the above provision which provides the office and office maintenance expenses, vehicles and oil management expenses and oil expenses beyond the provision of the trade union office and office fixtures and fixtures is in violation of Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

Therefore, the part of the corrective order on the ground that the provision of convenience violates Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate, and the plaintiff's assertion disputing this is without merit.

G. Determination on the provision restricting the termination right of collective agreement

1) Contents of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

The main text of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that "if a new collective agreement has not been concluded even though both parties continued to engage in collective bargaining to conclude a new collective agreement before and after the expiration of the term of validity of the collective agreement, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until three months after the expiration date of the term of validity, except as otherwise agreed," provided that "if a collective agreement does not enter into a new collective agreement even after the expiration date of the term of validity, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until the expiration date of the term of validity thereof," provided that "if the collective agreement provides that "if a new collective agreement is not entered into even after the expiration date of the term of validity, the parties may terminate the previous collective agreement by notifying the other party six months prior to the date on which the collective agreement is to be terminated, either

2) Whether Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is in violation of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and the State does not intervene in the collective agreement. Thus, in principle, the State shall not intervene in the binding force of a collective agreement even in a case where the State voluntarily determines such collective agreement between labor and management. Nevertheless, if a collective agreement provides automatic extension clause due to a collective agreement, the reason behind the aforementioned provision is to prevent unfair long-term collective agreement from being unfairly dependent upon one party’s right to terminate the collective agreement. In light of such purport, Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act ought to

그런데 이 사건 단체협약 해지권 제한 조항은 '유효기간의 경과 6개월 전 일방 해지 통고에 의해 단체협약의 효력이 상실된 경우에도 노동조합 활동보장에 관해 규정한 본 협약의 규정은 새로운 단체협약이 체결될 떄까지 효력을 갖는다', '회사는 노사합의 없이 일방서으로 단체협약을 해지할 수 없으며, 협야효력이 경과된 후에도 갱신 체결시까지는 본 협약의 효력이 지속된다'고 규정하여, 노사 쌍방이 새로운 단체협약 체결을 위해 노력하였음에도 노사간의 의견 불일치로 인하여 그 체결이 지연되는 경우, 노사 쌍방이 새로운 단체협약 체결의 의지 없이 교섭이 이루어지지 않아 새로운 협약이 체결되지 않는 경우뿐만 아니라 사용자 노동조합 일방이 부당하게 교섭을 지연하는 등 노사간의 신뢰를 위반하는 행위로 인하여 새로운 협약을 체결하지 못하는 경우에도 그 단체협약의 해지 가능성을 원천적으로 배제함으로써 어떠한 예외도 인정하지 아니하고 유효기간 만료 후의 단체협약 체결권을 미리 제한하거나 박탈하는 내용을 담고 있으므로, 강행규정인 노조법 제32조 제3항에 위반된다.

Therefore, this part of the corrective order on the ground that the provision restricting the right to terminate a collective agreement violates Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate, and the plaintiff's assertion disputing this is without merit

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the plaintiff's claim of this case concerning the qualification clause for the dismissed member, the part concerning the full-time officer, and the part concerning the treatment clause for non-permanent officers (excluding the collective agreement between the recognized roller and KONEX) of the claim of this case shall be quoted for the reasons, and the remaining claims shall be dismissed for the reasons. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is partially unfair for the conclusion, the part of the judgment of the court of first instance which partially accepted the plaintiff's appeal against the dismissed member's qualification clause, the part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the dismissed member's qualification clause, the full-time officer, and the full-time officer clause (excluding the collective agreement between the recognized roller and KONEX), among the judgment of the court of first instance, shall be revoked, and the defendant'