National Metal Trade Union (Attorney Song Young-pon et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daejeon District Employment and Labor Office Head (Attorney Lee Jae-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

June 8, 2011

1. On November 11, 2010, the part of each of the corrective orders stated in the column of the attached Table of the corrective order is revoked among the corrective orders regarding each collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and 7 users, such as Yusung Enterprise Co., Ltd., Ltd., Nastech Co., Ltd., Ltd., Nastek, Kagymp Co., Ltd., Korea Co., Ltd., Daesung Franchis Co., Ltd., Kakkn Law

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. One-half of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendant, respectively.

The Defendant’s corrective orders against the Plaintiff on November 11, 2010 regarding each collective agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and seven users, including the Plaintiff and the Sungsung Enterprise Co., Ltd., Ltd., Nasck, YEK, the Korea protegym Co., Ltd., Masckyms Co., Ltd., Masckyms Co., Ltd., Masckyms Co., Ltd., Masckys Co., Ltd. and Mascky Co., Ltd.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is an industrial trade union established for the organization of workers engaged in the field of metal industry.

B. The Plaintiff entered into each collective agreement (hereinafter collectively referred to as “each collective agreement of this case”) including each company mentioned in the separate sheet stating “the details of the corrective order” and “the contents of the collective agreement” with each company mentioned in the separate sheet stating “the contents of the collective agreement” and “the contents of the collective agreement” (hereinafter collectively referred to as “instant provisions”). The date of each agreement and the effective period are as stated in the separate sheet stating “the details of the collective agreement.”

C. On September 6, 2010, the Defendant requested the Chungcheong Regional Labor Relations Commission to make a resolution on the corrective order of collective agreements on the grounds that the instant provision violates the relevant statutes, such as the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Labor Relations Adjustment Act”). On October 19, 2010, the Chungcheong Regional Labor Relations Commission decided that the instant provision violates the Trade Union Act, the Labor Standards Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-Family Balance Assistance Act, etc.

D. Accordingly, on November 11, 2010, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff to correct the instant provision in accordance with Article 31(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act on the ground that the instant provision violated the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Trade Union and Labor Standards Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-Family Balance Assistance Act, as stated in the “reasons for Corrective Order” column in the attached Table of “Details of Corrective Order” (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 21 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The key issues of this case

There is no dispute between the parties that the main issues of this case are as follows.

A. Article 1 of each collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the instant users provides that “A company is the sole labor organization that negotiates wages, conditions of labor, rights to union activities and other matters on behalf of all union members, and does not recognize any other two labor organizations” (hereinafter referred to as “daily provision”).

B. Article 4 (Qualification and Admission of Members) of each collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the UP enterprise, the Natech and the Ytech provides that “When a person who contests the validity of dismissal applies for remedy for unfair labor practices to the Labor Relations Commission, or files a lawsuit with a court, it shall not be interpreted as a non-member until the Supreme Court makes a final decision thereon, and shall not restrict entry into and activities within the company” (hereinafter “the qualification provision for membership”).

C. Each collective agreement of this case provides for supporting full-time officers of a trade union, such as “The full-time period of a person who takes full-time service in the union affairs shall be recognized, and all wages and salaries shall be paid to the full-time officer,” and “a member shall recognize an additional full-time officer at a higher organization of a union or the Plaintiff’s headquarters and treat him/her in the same manner as the full-time officer at the workplace” (

D. Article 6(3)10 of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean branch of the Labor Relations Commission provides that “a company shall grant the said hours to the union’s husband or the union members when they engage in the cooperative activities, such as joint activities (60 hours a month), and the union’s activity hours shall be divided into six months and full-time employees, and the union employees shall recognize the remaining business only during the given hours when the union members attend the union’s activities.” Article 116 of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean branch of the Labor Relations Commission provides that “The negotiating members shall be four days a week during the negotiating period, and the remaining hours of full-time employees shall be 60 hours a month during the bargaining period,” and that a trade union officer or the negotiating members, who are not full-time officers, may engage in the union activities in paid wages, not being neglected to the limit on the exemption from working hours stipulated in Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter

E. Each collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff provides the employer with facilities and convenience to a trade union (hereinafter “facilities and convenience clause”), such as “the Company provides partnership offices and house fixtures, and bears the expenses for the management and maintenance of partnership offices (such as electricity, water supply, cooling and heating, etc.),” and “the Company shall provide the partnership vehicles, and pay the principal and various taxes and repair expenses” (hereinafter “facilities and convenience clause”).

F. Each collective agreement between the Plaintiff, flexible company, and the Korean branch of the Hague Fund provides that “The validity of the collective agreement shall continue until the conclusion of the agreement even if the term of validity expires, and no one shall terminate the collective agreement on the ground of the expiration of the term of validity (hereinafter “collective agreement limitation clause”).”

G. Article 56(1) and (3) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Republic of Korea provides that “Any female union member during pregnancy shall grant a paid leave for 60 days before and after childbirth to female union members.” Of the above 60-day period, 30 days or more shall be granted after childbirth. A pregnant union member shall be granted a paid leave for 7 days if a pregnant union member was miscarriage.” Article 79(3) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean knife clinic provides that “a female union member by law shall be granted a paid leave of 3 days if a female union member by law retires” (hereinafter “the maternity leave provision”).

H. Articles 81(1) and 81(2) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Kknovasium provides that “If a partner who has an infant under the age of one year applies for childcare leave, he/she shall be granted a unpaid leave of absence for up to one year, and this period shall be included in the number of years in the continuous service years,” and “the date on which the period of leave of absence ends shall not exceed one year after infant birth” (hereinafter “child leave provision”).

3. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff asserts that the main issue of this case does not violate the relevant laws and regulations such as Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act for the following reasons, so the disposition of this case in this case should be revoked as unlawful.

1. Provisions concerning one-day negotiating party;

A) Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 930, Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter the same) prohibits multiple trade unions from being established until June 30, 201, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and the Defendant has so far denied the establishment of a trade union in the case of a workplace where a trade union exists based on the aforementioned supplementary provisions so far, regardless of its organizational form. Therefore, as of November 11, 2010, the instant provision on the instant one-day negotiating party does not infringe on the right to organize and collective bargaining of other trade unions guaranteed by Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, etc. In addition, the provision on one-day negotiating party does not infringe upon the right to organize and collective bargaining of other trade unions to avoid negotiations with the trade union and prevent the abuse of employer’s negotiating power by negotiating with the labor union, the meaning confirming the employer’s negotiating duty and its significance in order to secure its organizational power and power.

B) Since the provision on the negotiating party in the instant case provides that not representing “all union members” but representing “all union members,” there is no risk of infringing on the right to collective bargaining by non-members, other union members, and multiple trade unions, as well as the provision confirming the status of a representative bargaining trade union that provides for the simplification of multiple trade union windows under the amended Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, it is in accord with the Trade Union and Labor

2) Qualification clauses for dismissed members;

The proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is a provision that establishes a company-level trade union on the premise of a company-level trade union consisting of workers who directly have a labor relationship with an employer. Since the proviso does not apply to an industrial trade union that does not require a specific employer-subsidiary relationship from the original date to a certain employer as the Plaintiff, the above provision on the qualification of an

3) Article on the treatment of full-time officers

A) Each provision of Article 24(3), (4), (5), and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulating the limit of exemption from working hours in relation to the payment of full-time officer’s benefits refers to July 1, 2010 under the proviso to Article 1 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Article 8 of the Addenda prohibits the payment of full-time officer’s benefits applies until June 30, 2010 under Article 24(2) of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act that prohibits the payment of full-time officer’s benefits. Considering that each provision of Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act enters into force and applies, “this Act enters into force” under Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be construed as July 1, 2010. Accordingly, each provision included in each of the collective agreements of this case entered into before July 1, 2010 becomes effective as a corrective order under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act.

B) Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibiting full-time officers of a trade union from paying wages and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulating the above acts as unfair labor practices violates the essential contents of the three labor rights guaranteed by Article 33 of the Constitution, violates the principle of labor-management autonomy derived from Articles 10, 33, and 37(1) of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the labor rights under Article 32 of the Constitution, violates the principle of excessive prohibition under Article 37(2) of the Constitution, violates the Convention No. 135 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and Article 143 of the Constitution, and violates the principle of respect for international legal order under Article 6 of the Constitution, violates the principle of equality under Article 11 of the Constitution, and is unconstitutional by infringing on the freedom of occupation selection under Article 15 of the Constitution.

C) In principle, whether to pay wages to a full-time officer of a trade union or not is a matter of self-determination by the labor and management; there is no penal provision on Article 24(2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act; and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibited under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act only for the purpose of demanding and accomplishing the payment of wages in violation of Article 24(2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Article 92(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act). In light of the fact that Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act only has the meaning of “industrial action” prohibited under the premise of punishment in relation to Article 92(5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and it cannot be deemed as a mandatory provision that prohibits the act itself from being conducted due to its anti-competitive nature, anti-competitive ethics, and anti-social order. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the provision of Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act as a voluntary provision.

D) Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act regarding unfair labor practices shall be interpreted to apply only to cases where a trade union is highly likely to lose autonomy due to the payment of wages to full-time officers of a trade union. There is no ground to deem that this case constitutes such cases as illegal.

(iv) a clause for treatment of non-exclusive workers;

Each provision of Article 24(2) and (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall apply only to “pre-paid persons,” who are engaged exclusively in the affairs of the trade union, and shall not be applied to “non-standing executives, such as non-standing executives, negotiation members, etc.” Thus, the provision on the treatment of non-standing executives of this case shall not be deemed to violate the above provisions of the

5) A provision of facilities and convenience

Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be interpreted to apply only to cases where there is a serious risk of infringing the independence of a trade union. The provision of facilities and convenience in this case is merely obtained by the affirmative demand of the employer in this case as the result of the Plaintiff’s independent activities, and there is no possibility of infringing the Plaintiff’s autonomy. Thus, the provision of facilities and convenience in this case

6) Article restricting the right to terminate a collective agreement

The agreement that limits the right to terminate a collective agreement is an autonomous self-regulation, which is naturally allowed under the principle of labor-management autonomy, and there is a realistic necessity to restrict the abuse of employer's right to terminate the collective agreement, so it cannot be deemed unlawful even if the collective agreement provides otherwise than the proviso of Article 32 (3) of the Trade Union

7) Article on maternity leave

Even if this part is partly short of the standard prescribed in the Labor Standards Act, the pertinent collective agreement provisions are not entirely null and void, but are null and void only for the violation of Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean branch of the workplace is null and void as it violates the Labor Standards Act, and thus, the corrective order is lawful. However, in each collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean branch of the workplace and the Korean branch of the workplace, the corrective order should have been issued to the effect that the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the Korean branch of the workplace provides seven-day paid leave and three-day paid leave under Article 74(2) of the Labor Standards Act, “if a female member of the workplace is a miscarriage or stillbirth, a female member of the workplace has a miscarriage or stillbirth under 16 weeks of pregnancy,” and that the corrective order should have been issued to the effect that the Defendant was unlawful only when a miscarriage or stillbirth was made after the 16th week of pregnancy.

8) Childcare leave clause

This part is in violation of Article 19 of the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-Family Balance Assistance Act, and it does not dispute this.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Determination on the clauses of one-day negotiating party

A) First, we examine whether the instant disposition was made before June 30, 201 ( November 11, 2010), which was the grace period for the application of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as stipulated in Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 9930, January 1, 2010), and therefore, whether the instant provision does not violate Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

From the time of its enactment by Act No. 5310 of March 13, 1997, Article 5 provides that “workers may freely organize or join an industrial trade union.” However, the Addenda provides that “where a trade union is organized in one business or workplace, a new trade union which shall be organized with such trade union may not be established despite Article 5).” The term of postponement of its establishment has been extended up to June 30, 201 pursuant to Article 7 of the Addenda (Act No. 930, Jan. 1, 2010) to an industrial or industrial trade union with the capacity of establishing a new business or industrial trade union by region for more than 14 years since it was established. The reason why the establishment of a new business or industrial trade union by region for more than 20 years can not be seen as an independent business or industrial trade union with the capacity of establishing a single business or industrial trade union for more than 20 years, and thus, it means that the establishment of an independent business or industrial trade union by trade union is prohibited by the law of two separate business or industrial or trade union.”

In light of the above legal principles, even if multiple trade unions exist, which do not violate Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010), the provision on the day of each collective agreement of this case explicitly stating that most of the negotiating parties of this case do not recognize any other labor organizations, the Plaintiff can exercise the right to collective bargaining by only the Plaintiff. This is in violation of Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which ensure the formation and joining of a trade union, collective bargaining, and the conclusion of collective agreements. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion in this part is without merit.

B) Next, in light of the contents of the provision on the daily negotiation of this case, we examine whether there is no room for violation of Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union Act. ① First, the Plaintiff asserts that the provision on the daily negotiation of parties does not represent “former workers,” but rather represent “former members,” and that there is no possibility of infringing on the right to collective bargaining of non-members, members of other trade unions, and multiple trade unions. However, each of the provisions on the daily negotiation of this case state that “the company recognizes that it is the only labor organization that negotiates wages, labor conditions, etc. on behalf of all union members,” and the negotiations on behalf of all union members are “representative of the trade union” (Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act). This part of the provision on the collective bargaining of all union members is merely an organization that represents all union members (Article 29(2) of the Trade Union Act). It does not mean that the amendment of the provision on the collective bargaining of all union members and the amendment of the provision on the collective bargaining of labor union members.

2) Determination on the qualification clause of dismissed members

A) The Plaintiff’s industrial trade union, such as the Plaintiff, does not hold a subordinate relationship to a certain employer as a member’s qualification. As such, workers employed in various workplaces engaged in the same industry are allowed to join as a member even if they are dismissed or temporarily in a position. Meanwhile, Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union Act provides that an association which permits the joining of a person other than an employee shall not be deemed a trade union, but shall be construed as a worker until the dismissal is decided by the Central Labor Relations Commission, in case where the dismissed person has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission. This is limited to the provisions prepared in preparation for the rejection of the employee status by the dismissal from the employer of the “corporate-level trade union”, and in principle, it does not apply to the case of an industrial, occupational, and regional trade union, etc. which does not require any subordinate relationship with the original employer (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du8568, Feb. 27, 2004).

B) In light of the above legal principles, even if the provision on the qualification of the dismissed member of the instant case maintains the qualification of the association member until the dismissal decision is made by the National Labor Relations Commission and the dismissal decision is made by filing a lawsuit with the court, it cannot be deemed as a violation of Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and the corrective order cannot be issued. Therefore, the part ordering the correction of this part of the instant disposition is unlawful.

(1) In the case of this case, it is not a matter of whether it can be deemed that the labor union is not a trade union, but a matter of whether it is possible to determine the membership of the dismissed person under a collective agreement to maintain its membership on the ground that the dismissed person is a person who has not yet received a final and conclusive judgment after the review decision by the National Labor Relations Commission was rendered. In such a case, it should be said that the collective agreement of this case, which is merely a definition provision, has been set forth in Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act to be a member of the “person who is not a worker,” thereby allowing the “person who is not a worker,” and thus, it should be said

(2) However, the legislative purpose of the Trade Union Act is to ensure the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the improvement of workers’ economic and social status by guaranteeing the right to organize, collective bargaining, and collective action of workers under Article 33(1) of the Constitution (Article 1). The Labor Standards Act was enacted for the purpose of regulating individual labor-management relations in terms of “whether there is a need to directly protect those who provide labor in reality by the State’s management and supervision.” On the other hand, the Trade Union Act was enacted for the purpose of regulating collective labor-management relations in terms of “whether there is a need to guarantee the right to organize, etc. between labor suppliers.” In light of the legislative purpose of the Trade Union Act, the concept of workers varies in accordance with the legislative purpose is defined differently. As long as the worker was, even if the worker was dismissed from the employer and did not actually have a labor relations with the employer even before the dismissal, the temporary working conditions (e.g., working conditions which are applied when the worker was employed later) applied when the dismissal becomes invalidated, and the need to maintain and improve his/her labor conditions and working conditions can be more determined.

(3) In addition, comprehensively taking account of the purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 8 and 21 (including each number), each collective agreement of this case provides for the joining of the union and the qualifications of union members, "employee belonging to the scope of union members shall automatically become union members at the same time with entry." "persons subject to membership shall be union members at the same time with the expiration of the training period, and employees shall lose their status at the time of withdrawal." "workers shall join an association with the time of entry except any of the following persons," and "workers shall become union members except for the following persons." In this regard, each collective agreement of this case applies not to all union members, but to employers who are parties to each collective agreement of this case among the plaintiff union members, but to the extent that the collective agreement of this case applies only to the workers who are parties to each of the collective agreements of this case, which are union members after joining the collective agreement of this case, and the issue of when the plaintiff's union members have the status of industrial union members should be determined differently from the case of the plaintiff's union members.

3) Determination on the provision on the treatment of full-time officers

A) Whether it becomes effective pursuant to the supplementary provision

The date of conclusion of each collective agreement of this case is as stated in the separate statement of the contents of the collective agreement in the attached Table of the correction order, and as to whether each collective agreement of this case concluded before July 1, 2010 is not illegal in accordance with Articles 1, 3, and 8 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Law No. 930, Jan. 1, 2010) and is not subject to the correction order.

The Trade Union Act was enacted on March 13, 197 by Act No. 5310, and Article 24 of the Addenda of the Labor Union Act was established or consented by the employer, and the full-time officer of a trade union shall not receive any benefit from the employer during his/her former period (Paragraph 1). Article 81 Subparag. 4 of the Act provides that the employer shall not be subject to the provision of Article 24(2) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Addenda of the Labor Union Act (Article 24 subparag. 4 of the Act). The employer shall not be subject to the provision of Article 9 subparag. 2 of the Trade Union Act, including Article 24 subparag. 2 and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Act, which provides that the employer shall not be subject to the provision of Article 9 subparag. 2 of the Act until the date of entry into force of the said Act.

On the other hand, Article 3 of the Addenda provides that "any collective agreement in force as at the time this Act enters into force shall be deemed to have been concluded pursuant to this Act: Provided, That if the whole or part of such collective agreement violates Article 24 due to the enforcement of this Act, it shall be deemed to have been effective until the time the relevant collective agreement enters into force notwithstanding the enforcement

In full view of the following circumstances, each collective agreement of this case entered into before July 1, 2010 cannot be deemed to violate Article 24(2) and (4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and thus, the part of the instant disposition ordering correction on the ground that it violated the aforementioned provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act among the dispositions of this case is unlawful.

(1) In light of the fact that Article 1 of the Addenda provides for the enforcement date differently, Article 3 of the Addenda cannot be uniformly construed as January 1, 2010, which is the basic enforcement date of the amended Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

(2) "Enforcement of the Act" means actual giving effect after the promulgation of the Act. "Application of the Act" is an act that realizes abstract legal matters individually, and it is deemed that the Act is a provision premised on the enforcement of the Act. However, Article 1 of the Addenda explicitly states that Article 24 (3), 4, and (5) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 (Newly Inserted by Act No. 810, Jul. 1, 2010; Article 24 (1) and (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act are applicable at the same time after the enactment of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 6 (Act No. 5310, Mar. 13, 1997); Article 24 (1) and (3) of the Addenda (amended by Act No. 100, Jul. 1, 2010; 2010) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act are not applied at the same time after the enforcement of the Act.

(3) Article 3 of the Addenda provides that "a collective agreement in force as at the time this Act enters into force shall be deemed to have been concluded pursuant to this Act." However, in light of the legislative intent as seen earlier, the phrase "Enforcement Date" shall not be interpreted as it is, but the whole of Article 24 shall mean the time when the whole of Article 24 enters into force and applies stages. Therefore, in relation to Article 24 of the Trade Union Act, "a collective agreement in force as at the time this Act enters into force" means a collective agreement in force as at July 1, 2010. Before July 1, 2010, Article 24 (1) and (2) of the Trade Union Act does not apply to the status where the provision of Article 6 of the Addenda (Act No. 5310, Mar. 13, 1997); thus, the payment of wages to a full-time officer was postponed by Article 301 of the Labor Union Act and Article 40 of the Addenda of the Trade Union Act, which did not apply until December 31, 4, 9301.

(4) The Defendant asserts to the effect that Article 8 of the Addenda of the Trade Union Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Labor Union Act") has already been effective since January 1, 2010, with a view to suspending sanctions for violations of the Act for a certain period of time (six months). It cannot be interpreted as an enforcement reservation of the principle of prohibition on payment of wages under Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. A collective agreement entered into at the time of the effect of the violation also includes a collective agreement that enters into force as at the time of the violation of the Act has excessively expanded the scope of exception and is unreasonable. However, even if there was an act contrary to the Act even if it comes into force, it cannot be viewed as a "violation of the Act." Therefore, even if the above provision becomes effective until June 30, 2010, it cannot be viewed as a "violation of the Act."

(5) As seen earlier, there is no room to regard the violation of the Act if the Act does not apply even if there was an act contrary to the Act in the situation where the Act takes effect. As such, the premise that “the whole or part of its contents violates Article 24” under the proviso of Article 3 of the Addenda refers to “a case where Article 24 is enforced and applied.” Therefore, Article 3 of the Addenda related to Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act “where the whole or part of its contents are in violation of Article 24 due to the enforcement of this Act” refers to a case where Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act enters into force on July 1, 2010 when the whole phase of its enforcement and application is in violation of Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and in such a case, it shall be deemed that the collective agreement takes effect until the term of validity of the collective agreement is in accordance with the proviso of Article 3 of the Addenda.

B) Sub-decisions

The part that the provision on full-time officer treatment of the instant disposition violates Article 24(2) and (4) and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is unlawful in interpreting Articles 1, 3, and 8 of the Addenda without the need to further examine the remainder of the Plaintiff’s assertion.

4) Determination on the provision regarding treatment of non-exclusive workers

A) Whether it becomes effective pursuant to the supplementary provision

Of the instant disposition, the part concerning the provision on the treatment of non-exclusive workers in the instant disposition may be carried out as a paid trade union activity without being subject to the limit of time-off under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. As seen earlier, it is unlawful in light of Articles 1 and 3 of the Addenda.

B) Whether Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act applies to non-exclusive managers

In addition, as to whether Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act applies to non-permanent employees who are not full-time officers of the Trade Union, the following circumstances, namely, ① Article 24(1) and (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prior to the amendment of January 1, 2010 provides that the full-time officer’s payment of wages may be suspended, but the same provision is amended on January 1, 2010, and further, Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “any employee may consult with and negotiate with the employer without loss of wages, handle grievances, and maintain and manage the labor union.” In light of the above amendment process, it is reasonable to view that the legislators’ intent is not to establish the law for the full-time officer of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, but to relax the concept of “non-permanent officer’s wages” of Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as an exception to the Act for the full-time officer of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act.

5) Determination on the provision of facilities and convenience

A) the purport that the control and entry acts are prescribed as unfair labor practices

Article 81 Subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “the act of an employee controlling or participating in the organization or operation of a trade union and the act of subsidizing wages or assisting the full-time officer of a trade union in operating expenses of a trade union.” The former is controlled or opened through the direct act of the employer, and the latter constitutes an indirect control or intervention through the subsidization of expenses. The reason for prohibiting such direct or indirect control or intervention constitutes an unfair labor practice is to prevent the employer from exercising influence over a trade union in the opposing relation, and to form and maintain an equal labor-management relationship and to maintain the independence of a trade union. In particular, the purport of stipulating the subsidization as an unfair labor practice is to prohibit the act of “feasing the independence and independence of a trade union” of a trade union as a negotiating party regardless of the intent of the employer or the employee.

B) Direction of interpretation of Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

In light of the purport of the above provision, Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be interpreted as follows. In other words, the main text prohibits an employee from controlling or participating in the organization or operation of a trade union and providing wages to the full-time officer of a trade union or assisting him/her in operating expenses of a trade union, and the proviso prohibits an employee from allowing the employer to engage in activities under Article 24(4) during working hours, and it does not include any contribution of funds for the welfare of workers or for the prevention, relief, etc. of economic depression and other re-influences, and the provision of a trade union office at a minimum size of expenses, which may be deemed as an unfair labor practice. In light of the above, the above proviso applies to cases where the employee’s direct control or intervention in the operation of a trade union and indirect control or intervention in the operation of a trade union and it does not include any indirect control or intervention in the operation of a trade union, but it does not include any indirect or non-control or intervention in the operation of a trade union.

C) The case of each collective agreement of this case

The collective agreement between the Plaintiff and NaStech, Pacific, Korea powder, IMP, and Switzerland provides that the employer shall provide office fixtures and fixtures with the labor union, bear the management and maintenance expenses of the partnership office (electric power, water supply, heating, cooling and heating expenses, and air maintenance expenses), and provide vehicles to the labor union or provide vehicle management expenses and oil expenses, etc. This is not only a provision necessary for the provision of a trade union office, but also it is difficult to clearly distinguish only the water and electricity charges due to the use of the trade union office, and the non-conditioning and heating charges. In light of the fact that this part constitutes unfair labor practices under the premise that it constitutes unfair labor practices under the main sentence of Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, the part concerning the provision of facilities and convenience in this case is unlawful.

6) Judgment on the provision restricting the termination of collective agreement

A) Contents of the regulation

The main text of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides, “If a new collective agreement is not concluded even though both parties continue collective bargaining to conclude a new collective agreement before and after the expiration of the term of validity of the collective agreement, the previous collective agreement shall continue to have effect until three months after the expiration date of the term of validity thereof, except as otherwise agreed upon,” and the proviso provides, “However, if a separate agreement exists to the effect that if a new collective agreement is not concluded even after the expiration date of the term of validity, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until the completion date of the new collective agreement, such agreement shall prevail, on condition that one of the parties may terminate the previous collective agreement by notifying the other party six months prior to the date on which the collective agreement is to be terminated, by notifying the other party thereof at least six months prior to

B) Whether Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is violated

The collective agreement is an area to which the principle of autonomy between labor and management is applied, and thus it cannot intervene in the State in principle, but the State shall not intervene voluntarily as to the binding force of a collective agreement. Nevertheless, if a collective agreement automatically extends clause due to a collective agreement, it is intended to recognize one party's right to terminate the collective agreement so that it can prevent unfair long-term termination of the collective agreement from being unfairly dependent on the previous collective agreement. In light of this purport, it is reasonable to deem that Article 32 (3) of the Trade Union and Labor Act is a policy compulsory provision. However, the provision on the restriction of the right to terminate the collective agreement of this case provides that "any one party is unable to demand termination of the existing collective agreement on the ground of the expiration of the term of validity," which states that "no one party may demand termination of the existing collective agreement on the ground of the expiration of the term of validity," while both labor and management make efforts to conclude a new collective agreement, it is reasonable to recognize the possibility of termination of a new collective agreement without any negotiation between the labor and management, and therefore, it does not recognize the possibility of termination of the above provision of Article 3 (3).

7) Determination on the provision on maternity leave

Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act provides that a labor contract that provides for working conditions that do not meet the standards prescribed by the Act shall be null and void only in its part, and where a collective agreement provides that certain matters, such as the maternity leave clause in this case, are below the standards prescribed by the Labor Standards Act, it would rather be reasonable to issue a corrective order with regard to the whole part, including the violation, so that the whole part may be re-determined and revised to legitimate contents, even if a part of the labor contract falls short of the standards. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Related Acts and subordinate statutes omitted]

Judges Embryon (Presiding Judge)