2014Du15092 Revocation of corrective order in a collective agreement

National Metal Trade Union

Head of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office Port Office

Daegu High Court Decision 2011Nu1710 decided October 24, 2014

April 29, 2016

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

For reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s corrective order was lawful on the ground that the part of subsidizing office maintenance expenses, vehicles, management expenses, oil expenses, etc. exceeding the provision of office fixtures and fixtures in the facility convenience clause of the instant collective agreement and separate agreement with the instant collective agreement is unlawful on the ground that it constitutes an act of assisting operation expenses corresponding to unfair labor practices as stipulated in the main sentence of Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act (hereinafter “Trade Union Act”).

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the above determination by the original ginseng is justifiable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles on the act of assistance in operating expenses prohibited as unfair labor

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different cases and are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. The restriction of the term of validity of a collective agreement to a maximum of two years under Article 32(1) and (2) of the Trade Union Act means that the restriction of the term of validity of a collective agreement goes against the purpose of maintaining appropriate working conditions and promoting stability in labor-management relations through a collective agreement, so it goes against the purpose of maintaining appropriate working conditions through the collective agreement, so that it can be unjustly restricted by the parties because it is difficult to apply the term of validity of the collective agreement so that it can be too long as changes in social and economic conditions, thereby making it difficult to adjust the terms of the collective

In addition, the proviso to Article 32(3) of the Trade Union Act provides that, if a collective agreement has not been concluded even after the expiration of the term of validity, a separate agreement shall continue to exist until a new collective agreement is concluded, and that one of the parties may terminate the previous collective agreement by notifying the other party of the fact six months prior to the date on which the new collective agreement is intended to be terminated. This is to ensure that the parties may escape from long-term detention in accordance with the legislative intent that restricts the term of validity of the collective agreement, and to urge the parties to enter into a new collective agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da71138, Oct. 29, 2015).

In full view of the contents, legislative purport, etc. of the above provisions, the proviso of Article 32(1) and (2) of the Trade Union Act or the proviso of Article 32(3) of the same Act, which prescribes the right to terminate a collective agreement, which limits the term of validity of the collective agreement, shall be deemed to be a compulsory provision by nature, and thus, it is not allowed to exclude the application of the proviso, such as prohibiting the exercise of the right to terminate a collective agreement even if agreed upon by the parties (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Du31

B. In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that the provisions on the restriction of the right to terminate each collective agreement of this case purported to limit or deprive the right to conclude a collective agreement after the expiration of the term of validity in advance by excluding the possibility of termination of the collective agreement from the source, and thus, it violates the proviso of Article 32 (3) of the Trade Union Act, which states compulsory provisions.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different cases and are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

3. As to the ground of appeal No. 3, barring any special circumstance, the existence and content of the declaration of intent indicated in the collective agreement ought to be recognized based on the content thereof (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da86287, Feb. 13, 2014).

The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's corrective order should be revoked on the ground that the provision of each of the instant negotiating parties of this case, which states that "no other labor organization is recognized" or "no other labor organization is recognized" in the collective agreement of this case and separate agreement of the collective agreement of this case, may infringe upon the workers' union formation, freedom of joining and right to collective bargaining, etc., on the ground that the purport of the above provision is merely merely a mere fact that the plaintiff is an organization representing union members belonging to the plaintiff.

Examining the records in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation of the collective agreement provisions.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who is the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

The presiding judge shall keep the record of the Justice

Justices Park Byung-chul

Chief Justice Park Jong-young

Justices Kim Jae-han