2010Guhap3420 Revocation of corrective order in a collective agreement

*Korea Trade Union*

Seoul and below omitted

Representative****

Attorney**

Head of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office Port Office

Litigation Performers***

Attorney**,***

May 20, 2011

June 29, 2011

1. All of the Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed. 2. Costs of lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiff.

All corrective orders issued by the Defendant on September 8, 2010 with respect to each of the provisions in the separate agreement between the Plaintiff and each of the companies listed in the “List of Use Subsidiaries” (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “instant companies”) in the separate agreement between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff on September 8, 2010, regarding the contents of the collective agreement, are revoked.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is a unit trade union by industry established on February 8, 2001 with the organization of workers in industries** industrial and* related industries as a unit trade union.

B. During the period from June 1, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the Plaintiff Union concluded each collective agreement (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “instant collective agreement”) with ○○ Co., Ltd. on July 5, 2010 between the companies listed in the separate sheet Nos. 1 to 11, 14, and 15, and between the companies listed in the separate sheet No. 15, July 5, 2010, and between ○○ Co., Ltd. on July 13, 2010. The Defendant requested the Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission to make a correction order on the grounds that the instant issues violate the relevant provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Labor Relations Act”). The Defendant made a resolution to violate the instant collective agreement with ○○ Co., Ltd. on July 23, 2010 and August 4, 2010.

D. On September 8, 2010, the Defendant issued a corrective order by applying Article 31(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act to the Plaintiff on the ground that the instant provision violated each provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, among the details of correction order of illegal matters in the attached Table of the Organization Agreement (hereinafter “instant disposition”). [The grounds for recognition] of absence of dispute, entry of No. 1 through 3 and No. 8 (including the virtual number), and the purport of the entire pleadings.

2. The key issue clause of this case is as follows (the fact that there is no dispute).

A. Article 1(1) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and**** The Company recognizes that it is the sole labor organization that negotiates wages, labor conditions, rights to union activities and other matters on behalf of all union members including all union members and does not recognize any other two labor organizations on behalf of all union members.” The remaining collective agreements of this case have the same provision (hereinafter referred to as “daily provisions”).

B. Article 1(2) and (3) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and***200 Stock Companies and Article 1(1) and (2) of the collective agreement between the Plaintiff and the competent administrative agency 000 Stock Companies provide that “the company shall guarantee, after July 1, 201, negotiations with ** Trade Union (including branches and sub-branches) and shall not be included in the subject of the simplification of bargaining windows. This agreement will be deemed to have consented to autonomous bargaining under the Trade Union Act (hereinafter referred to as “the exclusion provision of procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows”).

C. The Plaintiff and******* Article 4(2) of the collective agreement between the stock company provides that “the company shall not interpret a person who has asserted the validity of dismissal as a non-member until the final and conclusive judgment of the Supreme Court, and shall not restrict entry and activities in the company,” and most of the remaining collective agreements of this case have the same provision (hereinafter referred to as “the provision of qualification as a member”).

라. 원고와 **** ◎○ 주식회사 간의 단체협약 제14조(전임자의 처우) 제5항은 "회사는 전임자 임금은 임원 선거 전 3개월 평균임금+직책수당을 지급한다"라고 규정하고, 같은 제6항은 "회사는 전임자가 조합활동 과정에서 재해를 당했으나 산재인정을 받지 못한 경우 업무상 재해보장과 동등한 보상을 해야 한다"라고 규정하며, 이 사건 나머지 단체협약들 대다수는 노동조합의 전임자(이하 '노조전임자'라 한다)에게 급여를 지급하는 등 전임자를 지원하는 조항을 두고 있다(이하 '전임자처우조항'이라 한다). 마. 원고와 ****◇◎○ 주식회사 간의 단체협약 제131조(임시상근)는 "단체교섭의 준비와 원만한 진행 및 조속한 타결을 위하여 회사는 교섭기간 중에 교섭위원 전원의 전임을 인정한다"라고 규정하고, 원고와 주식회사 2000 간의 단체협약 제16조(공직 취임 인정)는 "회사는 조합원이 조합의 상급조직의 공직에 취임함을 인정한다. 단, 전임으로 취임하는 자의 처우는 조합 전임자의 처우에 준하며, 비전임으로 취임하는 자의 경우는 요청시 공무활동시간을 부여하고 이 활동으로 근무하지 못한 시간은 근무한 것으로 간주하여 어떠한 불이익 처우도 하지 않는다"라고 규정하며, 같은 제126조(임시 상근) 제1항, 제2항에는 "단체교섭의 준비와 원만한 진행 및 조속한 타결을 위하여 회사는 교섭기간 중에 교섭위원 상근을 인정한다. 교섭위원의 임금은 상근 전 3개월 간 지급받은 급여 평균금액으로 지급한다"라고 규정하고, 이 사건 나머지 단체협약들 일부는 위와 같이 전임자가 아닌 노조간부나 교섭위원이 노동조합법 제24조 제4항이 규정하고 있는 근로시간면제한도에 구애받지 않고 유급으로 노조 활동을 할 수 있다는 조항을 두고 있다(이하 '비전임자처우조항'이라 한다).

F. The Plaintiff and**** Article 16(1) of the collective agreement between the stock company provides that "the company shall provide exclusive office rooms required by the union, office equipment, communication equipment, office supplies, gasoline-related office maintenance expenses, and shall be borne by the union-related office maintenance expenses," and Article 56(1) of the collective agreement provides that "the company shall be borne by the union: 170,000 won per head of the branch office, 130,000 won per office, 60,000 won per office and representative, 80,000,000 won per office, 10,000,000 won per office, and 10,000,000 won per office". The rest of the collective agreement of this case provides that the employer shall bear expenses for the management and maintenance of offices in addition to the provision of the union office and the equipment, and that the employer shall not pay expenses for the management and maintenance of the union office's office (hereinafter referred to as "service facilities").

G. Article 140(3) of the collective agreement between the plaintiff and****200 (Effective Term) provides that "the provisions of the collective agreement on guaranteeing the activities of a trade union shall have effect until the conclusion of a new collective agreement even if the collective agreement has ceased to have effect by one of the six months prior to the expiration of the term of validity, and by one of the six months prior to the termination notification," and Article 121(2) of the collective agreement between the plaintiff and the competent administrative agency 000 provides that "the company shall not unilaterally terminate the collective agreement without the labor-management agreement, and shall continue to have the effect of this agreement until the renewal of the agreement after the expiration of the term of validity" (hereinafter referred to as "collective agreement limitation clause"), and some of the other collective agreements of this case provide that the right

3. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff asserts that the issue clause of this case is legitimate for the following reasons, and thus, the disposition of this case should be revoked in an unlawful manner.

(a) Articles of the negotiating party;

(1) According to the provisions of Article 7 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), since multiple labor unions are prohibited until June 30, 201, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, the establishment of multiple labor unions is not prohibited until June 30, 201. Thus, even if

(2) The collective agreement of this case provides a so-called union shop shop provision to the effect that a person who is eligible to join the association at the same time as a member is admitted to the association and who voluntarily withdraws from the union or refuses to join the association. This is valid pursuant to Article 81 subparagraph 2 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. As such, as a result, the Plaintiff’s member is prohibited from organizing a new trade union or joining a new trade union after withdrawing from the Plaintiff association, it cannot be deemed unlawful even if it is the only negotiating body of the Plaintiff association.

(3) The point of time of determining the illegality of the instant disposition is September 8, 2010, which is the time of disposition, and the establishment of multiple labor unions is prohibited until June 30, 201. As such, the negotiation body clause of the instant case cannot be deemed unlawful based on the time of disposition.

B. According to the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act excluding the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows, labor and management may agree to exclude the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows through autonomous bargaining, and the meaning of "period" under the above proviso refers to the termination period during which an employer can agree, and thus it is possible to agree in advance to exclude the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows from a collective agreement, because it does not necessarily require an agreement within a specific period. Even if interpreting that consent should be given within a specific period of time, the exclusion clause of the procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows can be recognized as a reservation to this

C. The proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 (d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the relationship subordinate to a certain employer shall apply to a company-level trade union meeting the qualification requirements for union members, and the Plaintiff Union, a primary industrial trade union, shall not apply to the Plaintiff Union, which is a primary industrial trade union. Thus, the provision on qualification for union members cannot be deemed as violating

(d) Provisions concerning treatment of full-time officers;

(1) Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which prohibit the payment of wages to full-time union workers, violate the essential contents of the three labor rights guaranteed by Article 33 of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the three labor rights guaranteed by Articles 33 and 10 and 37(1) of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the labor-management autonomy principle derived from Article 32 of the Constitution, violates the fundamental contents of the labor rights guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution, violates the over-breadth doctrine under Article 37(2) of the Constitution, violates the ILO Convention (ILO) and Article 143 of the Constitution, and violates the ILO (ILO)’s respect for the order of international law under Article 6 of the Constitution, and the non-payment of wages on the ground that the full-time union worker is a full-time union worker is in violation of the principle of equality under Article 11 of the Constitution, and thus is invalid.

(2) According to Articles 1 and 8 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), the amended provisions of Article 24(3), 4, and 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall enter into force from July 1, 2010, and Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall not apply from June 30, 2010. Thus, Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be construed as July 1, 2010 with respect to Article 24 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Accordingly, the term "the enforcement date of the Act" shall be construed as July 1, 2010. Therefore, the provision on full-time treatment included in the collective agreement concluded before July 1, 2010 among the collective agreement to the

E. The exemption limit of working hours under Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is a provision that only applies to union union union members, and it cannot be applied to the provision of benefits to union members, etc. Therefore, the treatment provision of non- union members cannot be deemed as a violation of Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

F. The provision of facilities, convenience provision, and convenience provision are about basic management and maintenance expenses incidental to the provision of trade union offices, and there is no substantial risk of infringing on the autonomy of trade unions, and thus, it cannot be deemed to constitute unfair labor practices under Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

G. The agreement that limits the right to terminate a collective agreement under the proviso of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is an autonomous self-detention, and naturally permitted under the principle of labor-management autonomy, and there is a realistic need to limit the abuse of employer's right to terminate the collective agreement. Thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful, unlike the proviso of Article 3

4. Related Acts;

Attachment 'Related Acts and subordinate statutes' shall be as shown.

5. Determination

(a) Articles of the negotiating party;

(1) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. A. (1)

(A) According to Article 7(1) of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), in a case where a trade union is organized in a business or workplace, a new trade union that shares the object of organization with the trade union until June 30, 2011 shall not be established until June 30, 2011. The purport of the above provision is to prohibit temporary prohibition in order to prevent confusion in collective bargaining that may arise from the dualization of the bargaining counter if the establishment of multiple labor unions with a separate right of bargaining is immediately permitted, among the absence of the methods and procedures for the simplification of bargaining windows.

A multiple labor union, the establishment of which is prohibited pursuant to the above provision, is already established at a business or a single business place, and a branch or sub-branch of a company-level labor union or a unit labor union by industry, industry, occupation, or region, which can be seen as equivalent thereto, is limited to a company-level labor union newly established or a branch or sub-branch of an industrial, occupation, or region-level labor union equivalent thereto. Unless an existing trade union is the primary business-level, a unit trade union by industry, occupation, or region and its branch or sub-branch can be seen as equivalent to a company-level labor union, it may establish a company-level labor union without restriction under the above provision. On the contrary, if an existing trade union is a company-level labor union, the newly established labor union is the unit labor union by industry, occupation, or region and its branch or sub-branch can be seen as equivalent to a company-level labor union (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Du5361, Jul. 26, 2002; 2004Du54664

(B) In the instant case, the collective agreement of this case was not concluded by each company of the Plaintiff Union as a party to the agreement, but concluded by the Plaintiff Union as an industrial unit trade union as a party to the direct agreement. Thus, even before July 1, 2011, the establishment of multiple labor unions was allowed, the Plaintiff’s assertion premised on the premise that this possibility of establishment is denied is without merit.

(2) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. A. (2)

According to Article 33(1) of the Constitution, Articles 5 and 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action to improve the working conditions, and workers may freely organize or join a trade union, and the representative of a trade union shall have the right to negotiate with an employer or employers' association and to conclude a collective agreement on behalf of the trade union or its members.

If the union shop agreement is concluded, if a union member permits another trade union with an independent collective bargaining right while withdrawing from a trade union and joining another trade union with an independent collective bargaining right as an object of organization, in fact, the company has multiple trade unions with collective bargaining rights in the union and has established a union shop agreement, and the union shop agreement is discarded, and the above union member who withdraws from the union is also subject to the union union (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da23815 Decided October 25, 2002). However, the above legal principle applies only to determine whether it is legitimate to determine which union member withdraws from a trade union and join another trade union, and it does not apply to the effect of the union union member's joining another trade union or to determine the existence of another trade union's collective bargaining right.

In the instant case, there is no dispute between the parties to the instant collective agreement, and there is no evidence to prove whether the Plaintiff’s union represents more than 2/3 of the employees belonging to the instant company at the time of concluding the instant collective agreement or thereafter, and even if the union shop provisions included in the instant collective agreement are valid, as seen in 5. A. (1) above, the instant company may establish another trade union affiliated with the Plaintiff union, and thus, it cannot be permitted pursuant to Article 81.3 of the Trade Union Act to refuse or neglect the Plaintiff’s demand for collective bargaining by the surviving trade union separate from the Plaintiff union on the ground that the instant company has a union shop provisions.

Therefore, recognizing only the plaintiff union as the only negotiating body is illegal because it infringes the workers' right to organize and the labor union's right to collective bargaining guaranteed by Article 33(1) of the Constitution and Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union Act. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without

(3) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s above 3. A. (3) argument

In full view of the purport of the entire pleadings, the validity term of the instant collective agreement may be recognized until March 31, 2012. As such, pursuant to the main text of Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), the collective agreement of this case is not only until June 30, 2011 where the establishment of multiple labor union is prohibited, but also during the period from July 1, 201 to March 31, 2012 where the establishment of multiple labor union is permitted. Accordingly, the collective agreement of the parties to the collective bargaining organization infringes upon another trade union’s right to collective bargaining that may be newly organized after July 1, 201 where the establishment of multiple labor union is permitted. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

(b) Exclusionary clause of the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows;

(1) According to Articles 29(2) and 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which came into force from July 1, 2011, where multiple labor unions exist, a trade union shall determine a representative bargaining trade union and request bargaining. However, the same shall not apply where an employer agrees not to undergo the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows (the procedures for determining a representative bargaining trade union) within the deadline for autonomous determination of a representative bargaining trade union. A representative bargaining trade union has the authority to negotiate with an employer and conclude a collective agreement with an employer for all the trade unions or members that have requested bargaining. In addition, according to Article 29-2(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, all the trade unions which participated in the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows have decided a representative bargaining trade union autonomously within the period prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 14-2 through 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides for the procedures for determining a representative bargaining trade union, and according to the above Article 14-6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act.

Where it is intended to set a representative bargaining trade union autonomously, the representative, negotiating members, etc. of the representative bargaining trade union shall be jointly signed or sealed and notified to the employer during the period from the date of determination or decision of the trade union which has requested the bargaining to the date of 14 days.

(2) Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is legitimate to consent in advance from the employer to not undergo the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows as stipulated under the proviso of Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act requires the procedures for simplification of bargaining windows at the time of collective bargaining in principle in order to prevent confusion in collective bargaining due to the diversification of bargaining windows after July 1, 2011 where multiple unions are allowed to establish multiple unions. Provided, however, the exception is recognized if the employer consents thereto. In light of the legislative intent, form, and method of interpretation of the general law, the above exceptional provisions should be strictly interpreted. (2) The procedure for simplification of bargaining windows is premised on the premise that the trade union requesting the bargaining becomes final and conclusive or decided by the trade union, and thus, the procedure for simplification of bargaining windows begins from the "date on which the trade union requested the bargaining bargaining becomes final and conclusive" under Article 14(1) proviso of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act cannot be deemed to be justified.

(1) According to the proviso of Article 2 subparag. 4 and Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission Act, a union which permits non-workers to join shall be construed as a trade union, but if the dismissed person has requested the Labor Relations Commission to remedy unfair labor practices, it shall be construed as a worker until the Central Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on review. In other words, if a worker is dismissed by an employer, in principle, he/she loses his/her status as a member of the trade union. However, if the dismissed worker requested the Labor Relations Commission to remedy unfair labor practices, he/she shall continue to hold his/

(2) Since the industrial trade union like the Plaintiff’s union does not meet the qualification requirements for a certain employer-subsidiary relationship, it is allowed to join the number of workers employed in various workplaces engaged in the same industry, and even if the worker is dismissed or temporarily in a position, it is allowed to join the industrial trade union as a member.

However, in light of the fact that the collective agreement of this case does not apply to all of the plaintiff union members, but only applies to workers (including workers dismissed from the company) who are parties to each collective agreement among the plaintiff union members, it is reasonable to interpret that the dismissed worker qualification provision of this case does not determine whether a person who asserts that he is an employee is a member of the plaintiff union against each company that is not a party to the collective agreement of this case, but determined whether a person who asserts that he is an employee is a member of the plaintiff union. Thus, the proviso of Article 2 (d) of the Trade Union Act shall apply to the collective agreement of this case. Accordingly, if a person who is dismissed from each company party to the collective agreement of this case claims the validity of dismissal against the dismissed company until the final and conclusive judgment of the Supreme Court, the dismissed worker qualification provision of the dismissed worker qualification provision that allows entry and activities in the company is in violation of the proviso of Article 2 (d) of the Trade Union

(d) Provisions concerning full-time officer treatment.

(1) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. D. (1)

According to the provisions of Article 24(1) and (2) and Article 81(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, an employee may be employed as a full-time employee if a collective agreement is prescribed or consent is obtained from the employer, and the full-time employee shall not be paid any benefits from the employer during his/her full-time period, and the employer’s payment of benefits to the full-time employee constitutes an unfair labor practice.

The provisions of Article 24 (2) of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which provide the benefits to the full-time worker, shall not be deemed to be unconstitutional for the following reasons. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

First, it is difficult to see the issue of recognition of the union tenant or the payment of wages to the union tenant as a kind of right to organize under the Constitution or the right derived therefrom, because the union tenant is recognized as the premise of the consent of the employer.

Second, a full-time employee has no right to receive wages as remuneration for his/her work since he/she exclusively engages in the work of a trade union and provides labor, and a trade union bears the burden of his/her own wage, and even if an employer pays wages to a full-time employee under a collective agreement, it is a matter of support or provision of convenience to the trade union of the employer. Therefore, even if the payment of wages to a full-time employee is prohibited by law, there is no room for infringement of the freedom of occupation, the right to work

Third, there is a lot of cases where a trade union actually plays a role as a representative of all employees, and it is desirable to solve the issue of support for an employer's trade union through consultation between the labor and management, and there is no need to prohibit the payment of wages to the full-time union by autonomous bargaining between the labor and management, but on the other hand, the payment of wages to the full-time union by the employer to the full-time union may weaken the autonomy of the trade union, may have an impact on the process of negotiations between the trade union and the employer, and ultimately, there is a need to restrict the employer's payment of wages to the full-time union workers in terms of the possibility of affecting the bargaining process, and ultimately, it is necessary to restrict the employer's payment of wages to the full-time union workers in terms of securing the legitimacy of the agreements

Fourth, it is difficult to view that the wage support for a full-time worker is an unfair labor act, and even if it is decided to punish a violation, it is against the excessive prohibition principle, in that there are considerable side effects due to the provision of wage to a full-time worker, such as fear of infringing the autonomy of a trade union and the formation of a disorderly labor-management relationship due to the establishment of so-called labor-management union, and there is a great need to eradicate practices among labor-management.

Fifth, Article 24 (4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides an alternative provision by recognizing the exemption of paid working hours within a certain scope.

Sixth, the Convention No. 135 of the International Labor Organization provides that the representative of workers shall not take any disadvantageous measure on the ground of his/her position or activity, and that the appropriate convenience should be provided from the company so that the representative of workers can perform his/her duties in a prompt and efficient manner. However, it is difficult to view the above Convention as directly regulating the issue of payment of wages to full-time workers, and the recommendation of the International Labor Organization is not a treaty or a generally accepted international law, and thus, it cannot be deemed that Article 6(1) of the Constitution

(2) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s allegation No. 3. D. (2)

According to the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 9930), Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act enters into force from January 1, 2010, but it is apparent that the application is postponed until June 30, 2010. Thus, in applying Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, "the enforcement date of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act" under Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act refers to "the enforcement date of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act" as " January 1,

Therefore, a collective agreement concluded before January 1, 2010 constitutes a "collective agreement in force as at the time the Act enters into force," and thus, even though the provision that benefits shall be paid to a full-time employee under the proviso of Article 3 of the Addenda, the collective agreement entered into after January 1, 2010, as in the instant collective agreement, constitutes a "collective agreement in force as at the time the Act enters into force," if the provision that benefits shall be paid to a full-time employee, in violation of Article 24 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, is two provisions that

Therefore, since this case's full-time officer treatment clause takes effect only until June 30, 2010, for which the application of Article 24 (2) is postponed, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

E. Since Article 24(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act stipulates the subject of the paid working hours exemption system ("Time") as an employee who is not an employee who is not an employee, it is not allowed to interpret that the above provision is regularly applied only to the full-time employee, and that it is not applied to the labor union or negotiating members, etc., not only to a limited interpretation that is inconsistent with the language and text of the law, but also to restrict the payment of wages to the full-time employee in order to secure the independence of the labor union and eradicate wrong practices. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

F. Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibits an employer from engaging in unfair labor practices. The operation expenses refer to all expenses necessary for the existence and activities of a trade union. The operation expenses include expenses incurred in purchasing goods, labor expenses for union employees, meetings, such as meetings, such as labor union meetings, withdrawal equipment, and other expenses to be paid from the budget of a trade union. The operation expenses of a trade union shall be paid from the union paid by the union members. If a trade union receives a subsidy from the employer for the operation of the union, it would lose autonomy as a conflicting organization, and even if not, it would be prohibited from providing an opportunity for an employer to control and join the trade union. Therefore, it is not necessary to separately determine whether an employer assists the operation expenses of a trade union. However, the proviso to Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that the provision of minimum contributions to welfare funds of senior citizens, economic or other relief measures, and the provision of funds to a trade union office should not be approved as an exception to the provision of funds to a trade union office.

The instant provision of facilities and convenience goes beyond the provision of the minimum office and essential equipment recognized by social norms, and provides that the maintenance expenses of offices, such as communications expenses, electricity and water rates, office supplies, and the payment of a certain monthly amount of gasoline and allowance for duties between associations, etc., thereby constituting unfair labor practices under Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

G. The main text of Article 32(3) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “If a new collective agreement has not been concluded even though both parties continue to conduct collective bargaining before and after the expiration of the term of validity of the collective agreement, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until three months after the expiration date of the term of validity thereof, except as otherwise agreed upon,” and the proviso of Article 32(3) provides that “if a new collective agreement is not concluded even after the expiration date of the term of validity thereof, the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until the date of the conclusion of the new collective agreement, but either of the parties may terminate the previous collective agreement by notifying the other party six months prior to the expiration date of the term of validity thereof.”

On the other hand, the purport of the proviso is to prevent a long-term subordinate to the previous collective agreement by recognizing one party's right to terminate if there is an automatic extension clause under the collective agreement. Therefore, it is reasonable to see it as a mandatory provision. The restriction of the right to terminate the collective agreement is not allowed against the mandatory provision. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

The presiding judge, judge and judicial police officer

Judges Civil Service Bureau

Judges Kim Yong-nam