The case holding that there is no illegality of abuse of discretionary authority in the dismissal disposition against a police officer who receives money and valuables under the pretext of giving a suspect who was under investigation due to the suspicion of retailing.

In light of Article 4 of the Regulations on the Punishment, etc. of Public Officials (Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 251 of July 14, 1981) that provides that where a police officer who has worked in the investigation and criminal community receives money and valuables under the pretext of leading a suspect under investigation on the suspicion of retail violation, such act of receiving money and valuables is an act that disturbs the public official's discipline and violates the public official's duty of integrity as an act that disturbs the public official's discipline. On the other hand, where there is an intentional intent to commit a violation of the duty of integrity, it shall not be exempted from disciplinary action for receiving money and valuables related to the duties of Article 2 (1) of the Rules on the Punishment, etc. of Disciplinary Action against Public Officials (Ordinance No. 251 of the Prime Minister No. 251 of July 14, 1981) that provides that the defendant who has been subject to disciplinary action against the plaintiff on the ground of the above misconduct shall not be exempted from disciplinary action.

Articles 78 and 61 of the State Public Officials Act, Regulations on Disciplinary Action against Public Officials (Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 251 of July 14, 1981), Articles 2 and 4

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jae-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff

Do Governor of Chungcheongbuk-do

Seoul High Court Decision 87Gu1487 delivered on January 25, 1990

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on macroficial evidence, found that the plaintiff's act of receiving money and valuables from the non-party 3 under the pretext of leading the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 under investigation while working in the police station investigation and the criminal department, and recognized that the act of receiving money and valuables from the non-party 1 violates the duty of integrity under Article 61 of the State Public Officials Act and constitutes a disciplinary cause under Article 78 (1) 2 of the same Act. Upon examining the process of the evidence preparation which was conducted by the court below, the court below's above measures cannot be found in the judgment of a criminal lawsuit which found the plaintiff guilty at the time of original adjudication, and there is no special reason not to be adopted, and unlike the above decision of the court below, there is no error of law in violation of the rules of evidence or in misunderstanding the legal principles on the principle of free evaluation of evidence as pointed out in the process of the above argument.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In order to be regarded as an illegal disposition beyond the scope of discretionary authority due to the excessive degree of disciplinary action against a public official, the contents and nature of the violation of disciplinary action and the administrative purpose for which the disciplinary action is to be achieved through the disciplinary action should be objectively and clearly unfair (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 83Nu76, Jun. 12, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 87Nu366, Mar. 22, 1988). The above act of receiving money and valuables recognized by the court below is an act of violating the duty of integrity of a public official as an act disturbing the public official's discipline. Meanwhile, Article 2 (1) of the Regulations on the Punishment, etc. of Disciplinary Action against Public Officials (Ordinance No. 251, Jul. 14, 1981) provides that the dismissal of the public official's violation of disciplinary authority based on the criteria for disciplinary action, and that the court below's dismissal of the plaintiff's violation of the duty and discretion should not be justified in light of the nature and purpose of disciplinary action.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jong-soo (Presiding Justice) Lee Chang-soo Kim Jong-won