A. Whether the person who bears the burden of proving the circumstances where the ownership of the land is extinguished due to the fall (=the person who asserts the extinction of the private right)

(b) Difference in the methods of determining river areas in the new or old River Act;

C. Validity of public notice of recognition of river areas by public notice of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation under the former River Act (amended by Act No. 2292 of Jan. 19, 1971)

(d) The case holding that the land does not constitute the river area, the private right of which is extinguished, if the land is located in a place higher than the frequency of times a year at which the water level is measured and the flood has not been temporarily stored in the water even when the flood has occurred;

(e) The case rejecting the claim by prescription for the acquisition of the registry on the land portion on the ground that it is difficult to regard the possession of the portion as good faith and negligence if the State closed the registry and completed the registration of preservation of ownership on the land portion which is not a river area, and the form of possession that became the place of the land has not changed;

(f) In the case of the above "Ma", the case holding that the lawsuit after the original owner filed a claim for compensation in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended River Act (Act No. 3782) and Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended River Act (Act No. 3782) is not contrary to the principle of good faith or the principle of no speech

(a) If the land adjacent to a river is flooded due to flood inundations due to flood, the ownership of the land continues to exist permanently due to the so-called so-called collapse, if it is impossible by social norms to restore the land to its original state because the land has been flooded, flooded below the water, or flows into the water at all times, and such circumstances must be proved by the person who asserts the extinction of the private right.

B. According to Articles 2, 4, and 12 of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 2292 of Jan. 19, 1971), the area of a river shall be determined only by recognizing and publicly announcing the area of a river. Even if land has been deteriorated, it cannot naturally be a river area without such special procedure, but according to the current River Act, a river area is not particularly recognized and publicly notified by the management agency, but a river area is recognized as a river area by itself from among the land within a river area under Article 2 (1) 2 of the River Act. Thus, the area falling under the above Act shall naturally become a river area.

C. The recognition and public notice of river areas under Article 12 of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 2292 of Jan. 19, 197) and Article 8-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1753 of Dec. 16, 1963) are based on the provisions of Article 8-2 of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1753 of Dec. 16, 1964) are temporary measures until the relevant drawings concerning the determination of river areas under the proviso of Article 12 of the former River Act are maintained, and such recognition area belongs to the criteria for the recognition of river areas under the above Enforcement Decree. Thus, the public notice of the said construction division does not affect the validity as a river area recognized and publicly notified in accordance with the procedures under the former River Act, even if there is no indication of the relevant lot number or area in the public notice of recognition.

(d) The case holding that the land does not constitute a river area, the private right of which is extinguished if it is not temporarily set away in water even when floods have occurred due to its location at a place higher than the frequency of a year in which the water level is measured at the river where any part of the land is located and the flood has occurred;

(e) The case rejecting the claim by prescription for the acquisition of the registry on the portion of the above land on the ground that if the State closed the previous registry and completed the registration of preservation of ownership on the portion of the land which is not deemed a river area, it is difficult to view that the possession was bona fide and without fault even if there was possession on this part, and that the form of possession did not vary because the land was removed due to the removal of the land due to the embankment construction.

F. The case holding that even if the original owner claimed compensation in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Addenda of the amended River Act (Presidential Decree No. 11919), the original owner's claim for compensation was made in accordance with the above "E" and the former owner's claim for compensation is likely to not be paid compensation because he/she was unaware of the method of dispute over the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the State, etc., and thus, the former owner's claim for compensation can not be made in violation of the principle of good faith or the principle of prohibition or abuse of rights if he/she did not intend to waive other rights such as ownership.

A.B. D. Article 211(a) of the Civil Act (amended by Act No. 2292 of Jan. 19, 1971) Article 12(c) of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 2292 of Dec. 16, 1963) Article 8-2(e) of the former Enforcement Decree of the River Act (amended by Act No. 1753 of Dec. 16, 1963) Article 245 of the Civil Act. Article 2 of the Civil Act, Article 2 of the Addenda of the River Act (amended by Act No. 3785, Dec. 31,

A. Supreme Court Decision 84Meu1077030 Decided December 27, 1983 (Gong1984, 262) (Gong1984, 262) Decided November 27, 1984 (Gong1985, 75) (Gong1985, 1046). (B) Supreme Court Decision 87Meu3029 Decided December 20, 198 (Gong1989, 194), Supreme Court Decision 88Da7030 Decided February 27, 1990 (Gong190, 741), Supreme Court Decision 91Da1046 decided June 28, 1991 (Gong191, 2032), Supreme Court Decision 87Da198387, Jul. 27, 197 (Gong1987, 209, 197Da198379, Jul. 27, 1987)

Plaintiff-Appellee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Republic of Korea and two others, Counsel for the defendant-appellee and two others

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na8635 delivered on October 8, 1991

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

The grounds of appeal by the defendants (litigation and litigation representative) shall be examined together.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 by Defendant Republic of Korea and Seoul Special Metropolitan City

If the land adjacent to a river is flooded due to flooding of river flow due to flood, the land is destroyed by the flood, or the water flows over at all times, and its restoration to its original state is impossible by social norms, the ownership is extinguished permanently due to the so-called fall, and such circumstance must be proved by the party who asserts the extinction of his private right (see Supreme Court Decision 84Meu178, Jun. 25, 1985).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that each of the lands of this case fell into Han River as Han River in 1925, and its private rights were extinguished, since it is difficult to believe the entry of Eul evidence No. 11, Eul evidence No. 5-1, 3, Eul evidence No. 6, 7-2, Eul evidence No. 8, 9-2, Eul evidence No. 13, 15-1, 2, Eul evidence No. 14, 19, 20, 21-1, Eul evidence No. 22-1, 2, 3, and Eul evidence No. 25-1, 25-6, and the fact inquiry report to the Minister of Construction and Transportation of the first instance court, and it is not sufficient to admit facts for the reasons stated in the judgment of the court below, and it is justified in the misapprehension of facts and there is no evidence to find it otherwise.

Nor can we accept the theory on the premise that each of the lands of this case was a river that fell into the Han River River with the Han River with the Han River with the large flood, it is merely an attack against the judgment of the court below that there was a misunderstanding of the reasoning or legal principles.

There is no reason or reason to discuss.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of Defendant Republic of Korea and the grounds of appeal Nos. 3, 4, and Defendant Hyundai Construction Company’s grounds of appeal No. 1.

According to Articles 2, 4, and 12 of the former River Act (Law No. 892 and 1475), a river area shall be determined only by recognizing and publicly announcing the river area. Even if land was de facto deteriorated, a river area shall not be a river area as a matter of course without such special procedures, but according to the current River Act (Act No. 2292), a river area shall not be specifically recognized and publicly notified by the management agency. Since a river area itself recognizes a certain land as a river area from among land within a river area under Article 2 (1) 2 of the River Act, it shall be deemed a river area as a matter of course (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Meu3029, Dec. 20, 198). Meanwhile, a river area shall be acknowledged and publicly notified as a river area under Article 12 of the former River Act (Act No. 1475) and Article 8-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Enforcement Decree of the River Act shall be acknowledged and publicly notified as a river area under Article 12 of the former River Act.

원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은, 이 사건 각 토지가 구 하천법시행 당시 한강의 하천구역으로서 국유로 되었는지 여부는 결국 이 사건 각 토지가 위 건설부 고시 제1항이 정하는 토지의 구역에 해당되는 토지인가의 여부에 의하여 결정된다고 할 것이고, 또 이 사건 각 토지가 현행 하천법 시행 이후 한강의 하천구역으로서 국유로 된 것인지의 여부도 위 건설부 고시 제1항과 같은 내용으로 규정된 같은 법 제2조 제1항 제2호 (가)목 에 해당되는 토지인가의 여부에 의하여 결정된다고 전제하여, 이 사건 제2토지 중 원심판시 도면 ㉰부분 87㎡와 이 사건 제3토지 중 같은 도면 ㉮부분 211㎡를 제외한 나머지 토지 부분에 대하여는 1975년에 서울특별시가 구의 제방을 축조하기 훨씬 이전부터 1년에 1, 2회 이상 상당한 유속으로 물이 흐르게 된 사실을 원고 스스로 시인하고 있어 이 부분은 늦어도 1975년에는 현행 하천법의 위 (가)목 에 의하여 국유로 되어 사권이 소멸되었다고 할 것이고, 그 부분이 구의제방 축조로 제내지로 되었다 하여도 사권이 부활되는 것은 아니라 할 것이라고 판단한 다음, 위 ㉮㉰부분에 대하여는 그 채택증거에 의하여 이 부분 토지는 한강의 빈도수위 측점 365와 366(원심의 364와 365는 착오기재로 보임)에 위치하고 있으며 그 지점의 1년 빈도수위는 13.38m인데, 그 빈도수위보다 높은 곳에 위치하여 홍수가 났을 때에도 물에 잠기지 아니하였던 사실을 인정한 다음, 위㉮㉰부분의 토지가 하천구역에 해당되어 사권이 소멸되었다는 피고들의 주장을 배척하였다.

기록에 비추어 검토하면, 원심이 위 ㉮㉰부분이 하천구역이 아니라고 판단함에 있어 거친 증거취사판단과 사실인정은 정당하게 수긍되고, 그 법률판단 또한 위에서 본 법리에 따른 것으로서 정당하고 거기에 소론과 같은 채증법칙을 위배한 위법은 물론 하천구역 인정에 관한 법리오해나 이유모순 내지 이유불비의 위법 등이 있다 할 수 없다.

In addition, it cannot be said that the cancellation of registration is ordered for a specified part of one parcel of land, which is contrary to the principle of one water right. All arguments are without merit.

3. As to Defendant Seoul Special Metropolitan City’s ground of appeal No. 5, Defendant Republic of Korea’s ground of appeal No. 6, and Defendant Hyundai Construction Company’s ground of appeal

원심이 확정한 바와 같이 하천구역이라고 볼 수 없는 위 ㉮㉰부분에 대하여까지 피고 대한민국이 종전 등기부를 폐쇄하고 소유권보존등기를 마친 것이라면 설사 이 부분에 대한 점유가 있었다 하더라도 그 점유가 선의, 무과실이라고 보기 어렵다 할 것이고, 또 원고는 위 ㉮부분 토지에 대한 소론주장의 등기부취득시효의 완성일인 1988.3.9. 이전에 이 사건 소송을 제기하였을 뿐더러 원심 판시대로 구의제방 축조로 이 사건 각 토지가 제내지가 되었다 하여 그 점유의 태양이 달라지는 것도 아니다.

Therefore, the court below's rejection of the claim by the defendant Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd. for the acquisition of the registry is just, and there is no error of law such as the theory

In addition, even though the plaintiff filed a claim for compensation pursuant to the provisions on the compensation for land incorporated into a river (Presidential Decree No. 11919) of the theory of lawsuit, as determined by the court below, the plaintiff's claim for compensation as determined by the court below is concerned that the plaintiff's claim for compensation may not be completed because he did not know whether there was a way to dispute the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendants, and as long as he did not intend to waive his ownership and other rights, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's lawsuit in this case goes against the principle of good faith or the principle of prohibition, or constitutes an abuse of rights, and therefore,

4. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.